By Ramon Pacheco Pardo
6.6.2024
On 27 May 2024, South Korea hosted the first iteration of the China-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Trilateral since December 2019. The governments of the three Northeast Asian countries were unable to agree on a trilateral summit for four years and a half mainly due to ongoing tensions between China, on the one hand, and Japan and South Korea, on the other, differences between Japan and South Korea during the Abe Shinzo and Moon Jae-in administrations and the COVID-19 pandemic. In recent months, however, China had subtly indicated its willingness to resume the trilateral summit, to a large extent due to the aforementioned ongoing tensions with Japan and South Korea. Beijing also seems to be alarmed by burgeoning trilateral ties between its two Northeast Asian neighbours and the United States (US). Seoul and Tokyo, for their part, have improved their relationship with Yoon Suk-yeol and Kishida Fumio in power. While both countries see themselves in a stronger position vis-à-vis Beijing in recent years, none of them is pursuing a policy of full economic decoupling from China or diplomatic isolation of their neighbour.
What is South Korea’s view of the Trilateral Summit with China and Japan?
From a South Korean perspective, it is necessary to maintain cordial relations with China. Geography drives this need, along with the economic, political and people-to-people bonds between both countries, as well as the security nexus between the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas. While the best years in South Korea-China relations date back to the Lee Myung-bak and, especially, Park Geun-hye administrations, those days are over for the time being. The Yoon government, however, understands that South Korea needs to work with China on as many issues as possible. In this respect, his approach is similar to that of Moon, his predecessor. ROK-US alliance aside, the burgeoning ties between South Korea, on the one hand, and Japan as well as other partners such as Australia, the Philippines, NATO or several European countries, on the other, means that the Yoon government believes that South Korea was in a position of strength prior to the trilateral summit. In private, South Korean officials have indicated that Beijing was as keen in holding the summit as Seoul, whereas in the past Seoul was arguably keener.
The joint statement agreed during the trilateral summit was longer and more detailed than initially expected. Having said that, the joint statement was limited in substance and new initiatives, and it remains to be seen to what extent deliverables will follow. From the perspective of South Korean policymakers, arguably the most interesting outcome is a pledge to ‘[speed] up negotiations for a Trilateral FTA’. A trilateral free trade agreement was first proposed more than 20 years ago, and negotiations were launched over a decade ago. Negotiations have been stalled for over five years now. The resumption of negotiations would indeed be a significant outcome of the trilateral summit, in particular if they lead to an actual agreement. Other than that, South Korea was encouraged that China signed up to ‘maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula’. While not new, this pledge by the Chinese government – at a time in which Beijing-Seoul relations are poor – is a positive development.
How may South Korea’s approach to security relations with China evolve following the trilateral summit?
South Korea’s approach towards China involves a mixture of cooperation when possible, as described above, along with economic derisking and criticism when Seoul feels its core interests are threatened. We should expect the South Korean government to continue to quietly encourage its companies to derisk from China by supporting US-led initiatives taking this direction. South Korean firms, in any case, have been shifting investment away from China for a decade, as the country’s cost competitiveness has declined and Chinese firms have moved up the value-added chain. When it comes to the security relationship between South Korea and China, we should expect the Yoon government to continue to be critical of Beijing’s stance on issues such as its Taiwan policy or position towards freedom of navigation on the East and South China seas. In fact, South Korea, the US and Japan agreed to launch their first-ever trilateral multi-domain exercise in a meeting taking place just days after the China-Japan-ROK trilateral summit. Trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington targets China as much as North Korea. This development thus underscores that South Korea is increasingly wary of China on security matters.
At the same time, Seoul and Beijing agreed to launch a “Korea-China 2+2 Diplomatic and Security Dialogue” in a bilateral meeting a day before their trilateral summit with Tokyo. They also agreed to restore other security and political dialogues currently on pause. This shows that the Yoon government sees the need to discuss security matters with Beijing. Plus, South Korea continues to believe that China has a role to play when diplomacy with North Korea eventually resumes. In this respect, South Korean leaders are very much aware that security developments in Northeast Asia and beyond are strongly influenced by China’s position. Therefore, they see the need to maintain dialogue with Beijing on any security matter that affects South Korea.
