By Tongfi Kim and Takumi Nagakubo
30.9.2024
On 27 September 2024, Ishiba Shigeru, a 67-year-old veteran politician, who had previously held key positions such as defence minister and party secretary general, was elected president of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Ishiba is set to become Japan’s 102nd prime minister on 1 October 2024. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government and experts welcome his election because Ishiba is a moderate conservative politician, who is less likely to cause political tensions between Tokyo and Seoul than many alternatives.
Unlike Takaichi Sanae, whom Ishiba defeated in the second round of the LDP presidential election, Ishiba is critical of politicians’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which has strained Japan’s relations with its East Asian neighbours. Ishiba also wrote in 2019 that post-war Japan has not squarely faced its responsibility for the war, and that is the fundamental cause of problems between Japan and South Korea. Ishiba has emphasised the importance of Japan-South Korea cooperation and called for a better understanding of South Korean perspectives among the Japanese. Ishiba’s stance on this issue will be welcomed also by Washington, which sees historical revisionism in Japan as a hindrance to United States (US)-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation.
Ishiba inherits an unusually positive bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea. A poll conducted by the East Asia Institute in August 2024 indicated that 41.7% of South Korean respondents had a favourable impression of Japan, the highest number since the survey began in 2013, and significantly higher than the 12.3% recorded in 2020. On the Japanese side, Genron NPO’s most recent survey on this topic, conducted in September 2023, recorded 37.4% of Japanese respondents having a favourable impression of South Korea – also the highest number since the survey began in 2013. Under Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the two governments reinstated the so-called “shuttle diplomacy” in 2023, after a 12-year hiatus. Kishida and Yoon held 12 summit meetings between September 2022 and September 2024.
The positive bilateral relations between Tokyo and Seoul has been the main enabler of the significant progress in US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation, symbolised and institutionalised by the Camp David Agreements in August 2023. Ishiba’s election is positive news for the trilateral cooperation, although leadership change in Japan, due to its parliamentary democracy and the LDP’s dominance, tends to matter less to foreign policy than in the US or in South Korea.
For both South Korea and the US, Ishiba’s policy on the US-Japan alliance, China and North Korea are important. On the one hand, Ishiba clearly supports the US-Japan alliance, takes a moderate view on China and emphasises the importance of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea. Thus, despite Ishiba’s criticism of late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s approach, Japanese foreign policy under Ishiba will likely show more continuity than change from its recent path.
On the other hand, however, Ishiba has also discussed some ideas that can be controversial within and outside Japan. In his answer to Hudson Institute’s inquiry before the LDP election, Ishiba proposed the establishment of “an Asian version of NATO […] to deter China,” revision of the US-Japan security treaty and the status of forces agreement and stationing Japan Self-Defense Forces in Guam to reduce the asymmetry in the US-Japan alliance. In a debate for the LDP election, Ishiba also mentioned the need for Japan to be involved in US decision making for the use of nuclear weapons. The proposed policies are not only difficult to implement but also likely to rattle many in Japan, the US and Japan’s neighbours. However, politicians nominated for key positions, such as Onodera Itsunori, Nakatani Gen and Nagashima Akihisa, are expected to steer Ishiba’s security policy in a less controversial direction.
Due to the increasing ties between Japan and the EU and between Japan and NATO, Ishiba’s new leadership will be of interest to European governments as well. Ishiba’s position on the Russia-Ukraine War and assistance to Ukraine is not clear at this point, although Japan’s policy in any case will be largely shaped by its relations with the US. Ishiba argues that it is Japan that should condemn Russia most strongly because of the Soviet Union’s behaviour toward Japan at the end of the Second World War, but he also argued in May 2022 that Japan should give priority to an early ceasefire. US allies on both ends of Eurasia share concerns about what a second Trump administration might do to US alliances, the negative impact of Sino-US geopolitical competition and US economic nationalism. It remains to be seen how Ishiba will approach European partners.
Finally, Ishiba’s impact on Japanese foreign policy will be shaped by Japanese domestic politics. Japan’s lower house election will be held as early as 27 October 2024, and the upper house election is to be held by July 2025. The LDP’s electoral performance will affect Ishiba’s power within the party and thus his foreign policy.
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The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).
