Uncertainty Ahead? The 2024 US Elections and What is at Stake for EU-NATO Cooperation

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 31/2024

By Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters

5.11.2024

Key issues

• The 2024 United States’ (US) elections will have a significant impact on transatlantic security and the European Union (EU)-NATO relationship, which is crucial amid the erosion of the rules-based international order, Russia’s war against Ukraine and renewed conflict in the Middle East.
• While a re-election of Donald Trump could imply new risks for transatlantic security that can lead to a rupture in the EU-NATO relationship, Europeans should also not be disillusioned by Kamala Harris’ proposed foreign policy agenda and the focus on great power rivalry with China.
• No matter the outcome of the 2024 US presidential elections, the EU-NATO relationship needs to be future-proofed against domestic changes in allies and member states and especially in key contributing states to Euro-Atlantic security.

Introduction

Every four years, the Euro-Atlantic community expectantly, but fearfully, awaits the outcome of the US presidential elections. With the forthcoming US elections on 5 November 2024, the United States will see either the return of Donald Trump or the election of Vice-President Kamala Harris, a presidential novice, to the White House. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Euro-Atlantic security community has witnessed unprecedented levels of cooperation between its key security organisations, NATO and the EU, yet this special partnership might be once again at stake. In fact, the meeting of the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on 29 October 2024 can be read as a preparatory step to ensuring that the EU and NATO can continue to function as partners, come what may on the 5 November 2024.

The restauration of the transatlantic bond under US president Joe Biden was arduous but progressive, yet no matter the outcome of the 2024 US elections, the EU-NATO relationship will face recurring challenges. While NATO’s jubilee summit in June 2024 in Washington DC missed the chance to foster and bring the EU-NATO relationship to another level, the possible re-election of Trump could likely spell new risks to transatlantic security cooperation between Europe and the US. However, Europeans should also not be disillusioned by Kamala Harris as her foreign policy agenda is likely to keep its focus on the great power rivalry with China, alliances with Asian-Pacific partners and issues relevant to US national security. This CSDS Policy Brief explores possible scenarios for the future of the EU-NATO relationship in the context of the 2024 US elections and argues that European states would do well to strengthen EU security and defence cooperation that is complementary to a more Europeanised pillar in NATO.

Key areas of NATO-EU cooperation

Since their rapprochement in the context of heightened risks and threats in Europe, which emerged from Russian aggression and the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014, NATO and the EU have increasingly strengthened their cooperation, finally making it into a “strategic partnership” that has become “indispensable”. Both organisations have come to recognise the added value and importance of the respective other for European security. With the renewed need for cooperation, their bilateral relationship has been flourishing: a clearly defined agenda for the way forward for their relationship, coordinated military exercises, broad political support and greater alignment on shared security threats.

This deeper level of cooperation was finally manifested in the 2016 Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation and confirmed by the follow-up Joint Declarations in 2018 and 2023. With this new impetus for the EU-NATO relationship, the two organisations agreed to deepen their cooperation in seven strategic areas: countering hybrid threats, defence capabilities, operational cooperation, cyber-defence, defence industry and research, exercises, resilience and capacity-building efforts. While the terms “division of labour” and “joint” have continued to be controversial among NATO and EU policymakers and leaders, the two organisations have demonstrated their ability to more effectively cooperate and coordinate their efforts. Military mobility and countering hybrid threats have emerged as the flagship areas of cooperation. What is more, they have signalled a strong message of alignment against Russia’s aggression in eastern Europe. With the joint statementby the Presidents of the European Commission and European Council and NATO Secretary General after the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, NATO and the EU highlighted their complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in European security.

Yet, different visions and ideas on the future of the EU-NATO relationship exist, which can be divided into two camps. One camp demands the revival of the European pillar in NATO to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and transatlantic security cooperation. The other camp argues that the EU should build up its own security and defence capabilities independently from NATO and the US, labelled as European strategic autonomy. While the EU has made a great effort in strengthening its security and defence structures and capabilities, Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated that challenges to European security are best addressed through coordinated effortsbetween NATO and the EU. Much of the future evolution of the EU-NATO relationship therefore also depends on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential elections.

Scenarios under a Trump administration: return to Realpolitik?

Compared to the assumption of office in 2017, a “Trump 2.0” administration could be more predictable in what it expects from its Europeans allies and partners in terms of security and defence. Indeed, for Europeans it is necessary to understand that any Trump presidency will focus squarely on containing China, and Europe will be seen as a secondary theatre. In terms of China and security in the Indo-Pacific, Trump is likely to pursue a confrontational course as he would aim to ‘eliminate dependence on China in all critical areas’ while further supporting Taiwan, though through transactional relations. As was the case during his first presidency, Trump’s China policy could cause frictions with European partners who are not willing to follow this course.

In terms of Europe, without doubt, a second Trump presidency could have significant implications for NATO and its relationship with the EU, as Trump is likely to continue his “naming and shaming” approach to transatlantic burden-sharing and his attacks against those “free-riding” NATO allies who do not spend 2% of their GDP on security and defence. Under this scenario, a reduction of US involvement in NATO towards a subtle “abandoning” of its European security allies is likely. The term “dormant NATO” has been circulating among American conservatives, which could eventually materialise under a second Trump presidency. This could imply a NATO-led by Europeans with retrenched engagement by the United States and the vanishing of transatlantic security cooperation. The political tone as well as the internal atmosphere within the Alliance could become harsher again and bargaining may be shaped by tit-for-tat politics.

Against this backdrop, European states will be forced to invest even more and better in security and defence, whereby it is likely that a number of member states will push towards 3% or even 4% of their GDP for military expenditure, as exemplified already by Poland and the Baltic states. However, driven by initiatives such as the EU’s comprehensive defence package consisting of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF), as well as renewed pushes by French President Emmanuel Macron, this scenario could also lead to closer security and defence integration in the EU context, possibly leading to greater European strategic autonomy independent of the United States. As a consequence, the EU-NATO relationship could again come to a halt as it faces divisions between those states that enjoy double membership in the EU and NATO, which may benefit equally from both organisations, and those non-EU NATO states that will be left out.

Moreover, as the Republicans have called to reduce US military assistance to Ukraine, a “Trump 2.0” administration is likely to weaken US efforts against Russian aggression. This could also lead to restricting NATO’s own capacity to act, as political blockages and frictions become increasingly likely. This could water-down initiatives by eastern European and Nordic NATO allies that want NATO to play an active role in the deterrence and defence of the eastern flank. However, not only are a coherent approach and a strong NATO presence on the eastern flank essential for securing Europe’s border and for deterring against Russia, but they are also important for the future EU-NATO relationship. Supporting Ukraine and bolstering the security and defence of their eastern border has become flagship projects of effective and successful EU-NATO cooperation. Any return of Trump could thus not only reduce the Alliance’s assistance to Ukraine, but overall weaken a coherent and coordinated European response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

With Trump’s distaste of multilateral security cooperation and his rhetorical attacks against NATO allies, distrust and unreliability could return to NATO. While President Biden contributed significantly to restoring the transatlantic relationship and rebuilding trust among the United States and European allies, an unreliable US could lead to another split in transatlantic relations. This could ultimately lead to EU-NATO cooperation that is heavily dependent on their leadership and bureaucracies. While some mechanisms of cooperation and coordination between their organisations have long been established, such as the EU-NATO Capability Group and the EU-NATO Steering Group, much of the cooperation also depends on their member states. Fortunate for EU-NATO cooperation, Mark Rutte and Kaja Kallas, the designated High Representative of EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are not unfamiliar given their previous leadership positions as the former prime ministers of the Netherlands and Estonia, respectively, as well as their countries’ Atlanticist foreign and security policy orientations.

While any second coming of Trump could significantly weaken NATO as a political alliance as well as affect it as a military alliance through reducing its military support for Ukraine, at the same time, may likely further bolster European security and defence cooperation and integration under the umbrella of European strategic autonomy. This could allow NATO and the EU to continue their cooperation on essential issues such as countering hybrid threats, military exercises and joint efforts to defend their eastern borders, though with reduced capacities from the United States as the largest military power. Moreover, the EU-NATO relationship could heavily depend on, and could be restricted again to, the relationship between their bureaucratic secretariats under new leadership.

Scenarios under a Harris administration: still solid as a rock?

Kamala Harris will be novice as US president, even though she served as Vice-President to President Biden. Regardless, she is still a familiar face for NATO allies and partners and is very likely to continue many of Biden’s foreign and security policies as a staunch supporter of NATO and the transatlantic security bond. While much continuity in US foreign policy is expected to continue under any Harris administration, her presidency could also come with some unknown variables, especially given her inexperience in foreign, security and defence policy. During previous public speeches, Kamala Harris has confirmed the US commitment to NATO and emphasised its importance in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, yet she has not unveiled any hallmark in foreign and security policy.

Under a Harris administration, the United States will thus likely continue its strong support for NATO, military assistance to Ukraine and reassurance to Europe. It is expected that the current level of trust, reliance and amicable relations between the United States and its European allies will remain. Even though tensions will not fully vanish – especially in relation to defence capabilities, EU-NATO interoperability and EU defence industrial policy –, there will likely be general US support for enhancing European security and defence capabilities and integration. For EU-NATO cooperation this could imply a more optimistic outlook in terms of interoperability of their forces and closer cooperation and coordination to deal with emerging threats and security challenges.

Given the increasing polarisation in US domestic politics and the general drift towards nationalisation among Western democracies, a Harris administration will need to spend much of its efforts and resources on domestic issues and national security, including immigration and border security, public health, inflation and the stability of its economy. What is more, and similar to the Obama presidency, US foreign and security policy under Harris will focus on China and the wider Asia-Pacific region, especially in the context of China’s most recent military exercise surrounding Taiwan in October 2024. Relations with China and conflicts over economic issues, technology and Taiwan will take up a greater share in US foreign and security policy. The on-going conflict in the Middle East with the war between Israel and Hamas demand additional diplomatic and military resources from the US, and this could thus lead to a further re-orientation away from European security. Even though a Harris administration will be committed to NATO (e.g. by retaining US troops in Europe), its engagement in Europe will be restricted to keeping the Euro-Atlantic safe and secure. This could mean the continuation of strong cooperation between NATO and the EU, albeit with the US in a supporting role instead of taking the driving seat.

Relatedly, with the United States being heavily engaged in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, the Harris administration is likely to keep the pressure on Europeans to increase their defence spending. Given the political and material potential of the EU, it will keep demanding Europeans to contribute to their own security. This continued debate over burden-sharingwithin the Atlantic Alliance, as well as over a division of labour between NATO and the EU, could rather incentivise European states to build a stronger European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance than to increase their efforts towards European strategic autonomy that is independent of NATO and the United States. As a consequence, a transatlantic bargain between NATO and the EU is expected that is based on shared responsibilities and a revised approach to division of labour based on ‘a certain degree of bureaucratic competition’ that also includes necessary duplication of resources to avoid any asset gaps. This will require a good amount of cooperation and coordination, which will surely lead to a return on investment over the longer term for the EU-NATO relationship.

In sum, under a Harris administration, the EU-NATO relationship could benefit from amicable relations and higher levels of trust among the leaderships of their member states as well as from continued US engagement in European security and Ukraine. While some tensions over burden-sharing and a division of labour will remain in place, a US administration under Kamala Harris could certainly contribute to improving EU-NATO cooperation. However, European states should not be short-sighted and disillusioned in case of the election of Harris as the new US president, as her administration will be heavily occupied with the war in the Middle East, strategic competition with China and, above all, increasing domestic polarisation and frictions.

Conclusion: where do we go for here? 

The Alliance and the EU-NATO relationship at large have been faced with multiple challenges, internally and externally, in recent years. No matter the outcome of the 2024 US presidential elections, it is imperative and desirable for the EU and NATO to work closer together. There will be uncertainties and new dynamics for NATO and EU states regardless of who sits in the White House. We can talk about “Trump proofing” the transatlantic relationship or “future proofing” the relationship based on the US’ strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific and shifting domestic politics in Europe. Since European security and defence fully run by the EU is neither realistic nor does it find wide agreement among European states, a more Europeanised NATO with a more enhanced EU-NATO cooperation based on shared responsibilities is the only viable option. A stronger European pillar in NATO that is compatible with a stronger role of the EU in security and defence cooperation and integration is thus needed to uphold EU-NATO cooperation in the context of increasing uncertainty and volatility in European and international security.

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