Arming Ukraine: Can Europe’s Bilateral Defence Agreements Make The Difference?

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 4/2024

By Lotje Boswinkel

28.2.2024

Key issues

• New bilateral security cooperation agreements between NATO/EU countries and Ukraine seek to provide assurances about western support for Ukraine’s self-defence effort, as long as more fully-fledged security guarantees are put on hold.
• Critically, the agreements lay-out and formalise governments’ long-term intentions to provide ammunition and capabilities, as well as strengthen Ukraine’s defence-industrial base at a time when Ukrainian materiel supply is increasingly in the balance.
• Without concrete and urgent action following in lockstep, the bilateral agreements risk turning into little more than empty promises.

Introduction

In the weeks leading up to the second anniversary of an increasingly attritional war along the eastern flank, various NATO and EU members concluded bilateral defence cooperation agreements with Ukraine. In January 2024, British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, took the lead as he travelled to Kiev and signed the first such document with President Volodymyr Zelensky. In February, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy and Canada followed suit – with a number of countries including the Netherlands expected next in line. While the agreements are explicitly highlighted to be no substitutes for NATO membership, they offer critical long-term military and economic support to Ukraine. NATO and EU governments accordingly seek to signal to friends and foes alike that they are invested in Ukraine’s self-defence effort, even with no immediate end to the war in sight. The timing of these new bilateral agreements is no coincidence: the United States (US) Congress has been blocking critical funding for months, while a looming Trump presidency casts its shadow over the European continent.

At a time when assessments of the war’s trajectory are increasingly bleak, a number of questions arise about the promises and pitfalls of these newfound bilateral security agreements. Who is signing what, and why? What do these NATO and EU members seek to achieve, especially in terms of capability delivery and defence-industrial support? And perhaps most importantly, are they going to make a difference in Ukraine’s armament effort? This CSDS Policy Brief seeks to address these questions.

Who is doing what, and why?

At the NATO Vilnius Summit in July 2023, the leaders of the G7 countries laid the ground for today’s agreements by announcing a framework for negotiating security arrangements with Ukraine. The G7 declaration, which was signed by an additional 25 countries, came in response to repeated calls from Ukraine for long-term and legally binding security guarantees until the country would be able to join NATO. In their pleas, Ukrainian leaders did not just seek long-term pledges for military and financial aid but also commitments akin to those made to Finland and Sweden to bridge the transition period between their applications and full NATO accession. While today’s documents stop short of these sought-after Article 5-like guarantees, they mark nonetheless important steps in formalising European long-term support for Ukraine.

The first bilateral agreement was signed in January 2024 as British Prime Minister Sunak travelled to Kiev and declared that Ukraine ‘will never be alone’. With the 10-year security cooperation agreement, the United Kingdom (UK) pledges to support Ukraine ‘for as long as it needs’ through security assistance, military equipment delivery, defence governance support and economic and financial needs. On 16 February, at the start of the Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron followed suit as President Zelensky travelled to their respective capitals. On 23 February, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen signed Denmark’s agreement in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, while on 24 February – the second-year anniversary of the war – Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni appeared together with European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in Kyiv to each sign their countries’ assurances to Ukraine. The number of bilateral agreements is expected to rise further: the Dutch government already announced that it is set to sign a similar agreement while in countries such as Romania, Lithuania and Norway negotiations are ongoing.

The bilateral defence agreements serve both as an assurance of continued Western support to Ukraine and as a warning to Russia that a war of attrition will not play to its advantage. This signalling comes at a critical moment in which Ukraine’s armed forces may be facing ‘the toughest chapter’ of the war and battlefield analyses of the months ahead are particularly grim. Ukraine’s access to sufficient supplies of ammunition, artillery and other defence capabilities is increasingly thrown into question. Meanwhile, European capitals and experts have raised the alarm about Russian domestic production capacity, foreign supplies and increasingly bellicose intent, including towards NATO territory. To make matters worse, prospects for continued US support for Ukraine are bleak: Congress has been stalling a $60 billion military support package for months now while a Trump presidency is expected to further erode US support. In a year marked by political transitions in Washington but also the EU and various European capitals, the bilateral agreements between NATO countries and Kiev seek to provide some long-term stability beyond electoral cycles.

What they do and don’t say

With the bilateral defence agreements, European states vow to assist Ukraine in restoring its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders as of 1991. They pledge long-term security and military aid in the form of arms deliveries, force design, training, exercises, defence-industrial support and defence sector reform. Beyond military cooperation, NATO and European signatories pledge economic, financial and political aid. This includes supporting Ukrainian businesses, securing energy supplies and countering disinformation. Governments further pledge to step-up efforts to tackle the circumvention of Russian sanctions and bolster Ukraine’s reform process such as through promoting democratic governance and fighting corruption. In the long run, these efforts should smooth the path towards Ukrainian EU membership.

Critically, the documents do not commit signatories to come to Ukraine’s defence. Instead, the parties commit to consult with Ukraine within 24 hours of a future Russian attack to determine ‘the appropriate next steps’ or ‘measures needed to counter or deter the aggression’. The agreements thereby fall short of what Ukraine aims for: fully-fledged security guarantees. Still, they are intended to pave the way for future NATO membership. In each document, the alliance is mentioned explicitly: NATO is mentioned 3 times in the German agreement, 7 times in the Italian, 11 times in the French, 15 times in the Danish, 17 times in the British and 22 times in the Canadian. Each agreement stresses the importance of accelerating Ukraine’s transition to NATO equipment, standards, concepts, operating procedures and command and control. Some signatories are more explicit than others: the Danish agreement goes as far as to state that ‘Ukraine belongs in the Euro-Atlantic family and will become a member of NATO’ and also the French confirm that ‘Ukraine’s future membership of NATO would make an effective contribution to peace and stability in Europe’. In the German document, such language is absent.

Such variation in explicitness about Ukrainian NATO membership is telling of ongoing transatlantic debates about Ukraine’s future and cuts to the essence of why these security assurances are made in the first place. Some NATO allies including the US and Germany are cautious about commencing Ukraine’s accession process at a time when large-scale combat with Russia is ongoing, as it could risk elevating the conflict to the NATO-Russia level. Beyond such wariness, Sweden’s path to membership has shown that the accession process can prove lengthy even with countries that have a history of close cooperation with NATO. Prior to joining, Ukraine will need to reform its security sector and transition to the alliance’s standards, concepts and operating procedures. This will take time.

Capability supplies and defence-industrial support

The 2023 G7 Joint Declaration and recent bilateral defence agreements are thus born out of a necessity to boost Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself for as long as the alliance is not ready to commit to a timeline and path towards Ukrainian membership. Providing assurances about western governments’ long-term intent to provide equipment and support Ukraine’s defence-industrial base are critical in this effort.

While each of the agreements pledge support across the land, air, sea, space and cyber domains, the emphasis placed on different capabilities varies somewhat from agreement to agreement. Most documents highlight the need for air defence, artillery, armoured vehicles and ammunition. The French and British add to this list long-range fires and air combat capabilities. Each country affirms its support for the recently agreed upon Capability Coalitions for which they take the lead of contribute to, with France, Germany and the UK additionally confirming their intention to develop the governance framework of these coalitions. The British government highlights its contribution to Ukraine’s maritime fleet development, but also air, air defence, artillery and armour. Germany underlines its lead in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) and commitment to supply artillery, armour, maritime capabilities, information technology, drones and demining equipment. France in turn highlights its leading role in the artillery and air defence coalitions, and participation in air force and maritime security support efforts. Denmark co-leads the air force coalition and participates in the IAMD, maritime security, demining, information technology and drone coalitions.

Crucially, the individual NATO and EU members vouch to support Ukraine’s defence-industrial base through investments, industrial partnerships and joint production. They further seek to help Ukrainian industries overcome supply chain issues and strengthen the protection of transferred technologies and intellectual property rights in an effort to boost technology sharing. For Ukraine, defence-industrial cooperation is vital to its effort to develop a more self-sustaining arms base. As it prepares for a future in which large-scale foreign-supplied equipment is not necessarily a given, Ukraine has begun shifting from a focus on procurement to domestic production and defence-industrial partnerships. For this to succeed, western defence companies need clear incentives from their governments. Building and maintaining production lines in a war zone is risky and Ukraine’s defence industry is plagued by a range of endemic problems, including a lack of competitiveness, reliance on outdated technology, a lack of human capital, corruption and political interference. The newly-signed bilateral defence agreements seek to boost defence-industrial cooperation between western and Ukrainian defence companies and thereby accelerate Ukraine’s ongoing defence-industrial transformation. Ultimately, this should enable Ukraine to develop a resilient and competitive defence-industrial base allowing it to sustain its territorial defence against Russia.

There are benefits for western defence industries, too. Through closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence sector, NATO countries learn from Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve their own capabilities and defence-industrial base. Ukraine’s unprecedented capability and ammunition demand also means business growth opportunities. Companies such as BAE Systems, Rheinmetall and Thales are already exploring cooperation, with Germany’s Rheinmetall announcing plans to open an ammunition factory in Ukraine as part of a joint venture and MBDA exploring industrial cooperation in air defence systems.

Looking for long-term deeds

Concrete action will ultimately need to put flesh on the bones of the bilateral agreements signed between NATO/EU members and Ukraine. Beyond just saying that they are in it for the long run, Ukraine’s backers should demonstrate that they are. For this, they should agree on more long-term financial schemes that show budget commitments also after 2024. Right now, the documents offer little clarity on long-term financial means for military or other assistance: each country specifies its financial contributions for military aid during the first three years of the war, but nothing beyond that.

Ongoing efforts to ramp up Europe’s defence-industrial production need to accelerate, quickly. For this, long-term financial investments into European industries are needed alongside incentives to support Ukraine’s defence-industrial base. Europeans should also be ready to deliver newer and more expensive capabilities to Ukraine now that they have largely emptied their stocks of older and Soviet-era equipment. Numerous proposals exist to advance these efforts, including the expansion of procurement schemes such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) or the creation of an EU defence and readiness fund through which the EU directly buys equipment for Ukraine and therewith achieves economies of scale. Overcoming incrementalism in capability deliveries – once again shown in Germany’s ongoing debate about the supply of Taurus missiles – is another indispensable step in bolstering the credibility of the defence cooperation agreements.

Somewhat unfortunately, military aid to Ukraine is currently competing with funding and efforts to bolster European NATO allies’ own defence and deterrence capabilities. Prioritising one line of effort over the other is not an option, as Ukraine’s success and future security will also depend on the strength and ability of European armed forces to guarantee the security of the continent. The NATO-provided security guarantee that Ukraine is after will mean little if not backed by military power. European efforts to support Ukraine thus need to go hand-in-hand with efforts to bolster European armed forces and alliance responsibilities. Recent increases in European NATO budgets may well be outpaced by the scale of investment needed and further financial commitment could prove necessary. In the end, there is no better way to show that support for Ukraine ‘will not falter’ than to increase defence spending and take to concrete steps to ramp up European and Ukrainian defence production.

Conclusion

The timing of the bilateral assurances reveals the urgent need of individual European NATO members to step-up their commitment to Ukraine’s security at a time when US support, but also the alliance, is called in question by a looming Trump presidency. The bilateral defence agreements are not only a declaration of intent to support Ukraine but also a demonstration of willingness to step up European leadership and contributions to transatlantic security. The extent to which these documents augment the current war effort by themselves however may prove limited. For sure, the agreements formalise ongoing western military and financial support while also giving a push to more recent endeavours to support Ukraine’s defence-industrial base. Yet the agreements are not legally binding and can be terminated at any time with just six months’ notice. Even if there are reputational risks to withdraw from these bilateral agreements, there is essentially little that would stop a government from abrogating the agreement if, for instance, political will changes. The effectiveness of the bilateral agreements in furthering Ukraine’s armament and defence-industrial resilience will ultimately be contingent on the extent to which their promising words will be backed by concrete action. Europeans should get ready to deliver.