Indispensable Lynchpin or Irrelevant Symbolism? Polish-US Defence Relations and the Second Trump Presidency

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 12/2025

By Tomasz Szatkowski

29.4.2025

Key issues

• Poland has emerged as a major ally of the United States (US) in Europe, and has risen as a stalwart of security in Europe;
• Several factors could jeopardise European security, but Poland is well-placed to militarily reinforce the eastern flank on behalf of Europe;
• Poland has undertaken a remarkable military modernisation, but the defence industrial aspect of this effort is a concern.

Introduction

In his first trip to Europe, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth argued for a division of labour that ‘maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively’, with the expectation that European allies ‘will take ownership of conventional security on the continent’ and that the US ‘will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security’. He also embraced Poland as ‘a model for the continent’ and for being the leader in terms of defence spending – planned close to 5% of GDP this year. Poland was also the destination of his first full bilateral visit to a European ally, likely signalling a new approach and hierarchy of values affecting Washington’s regard towards particular European allies.

How have we gotten to this situation? How has Poland, a former Warsaw Pact member, become singled-out as the model ally by the US regardless of the country’s political affiliations? In this CSDS Policy Brief, we chart the rise of Poland as a major US ally in Europe and we look at the possible consequences of Poland’s role for European security? To this end, we take a brief look at the historical background of US-Polish defence cooperation, before then analysing some political trends and scenarios that can affect the US-Poland relationship.

A brief historical background of US-Polish defence cooperation

There are several symbolic traditions of Polish-US security and defence cooperation that date back to the American Revolutionary War. For example, there stands a statue of Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a Polish general and hero of the American Revolutionary War, in one corner of the Lafayette Square in front of the White House. However, the fully fledged alliance between both countries has been a very recent development. Apart from the small contingent of the US volunteers in the Polish-Soviet War in 1920 led by the later “King Kong” movie director Merian C. Cooper, and the brotherhood of arms in the European theatre in the Second World War, this story of cooperation really starts only with the Polish recovery of independence at the end of the Cold War.

The triumphant post-Reagan America, which had been putting firm pressure on the Soviets, had won the Cold War. The US, which was ascending to the peak of its unilateral moment after the Cold War, hosted the biggest worldwide Polish diaspora community and was an easy object of idealisation for the Polish elites. Already in 1990, the post-communist Polish intelligence service smuggled the Central Intelligence Agency network out of Iraq and significantly assisted the Desert Storm coalition in targeting the air campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime. Since then, and even before the US-backed accession to NATO, Warsaw has never missed an opportunity to be the “top student in the class”, taking part in numerous US operations, from Haiti in 1995 to the coalition to counter-Islamic State since 2014. Few today would recall that Poland together with Australia and the United Kingdom, were the only allies that joined the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

As a NATO ally, Poland has been constantly referred to as one of the few allies that took the Defence Investment Pledge to meet 2% of GDP on defence spending seriously. Nevertheless, Poland’s NATO membership was somewhat stained from the beginning because of the ingrained notion of a buffer zone that limited deployment under the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Still, in those days, when out-of-area operations were an absolute priority, the strategically attractive location of Poland, with sufficient strategic depth and a lynchpin role in the Eastern Flank, already started to attract interest by US authorities. In 2006, this translated into a request to host a missile defence site. Additionally, Poland’s rapidly improving infrastructure and its large training ranges were gradually appreciated by US military planners. Interestingly, it was only with the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 that the US began to appreciate and embrace the role of Poland as a hub for the US presence in Europe and as their main partner in the Eastern Flank. Since this time the US presence grew steadily and Poland has thus become a centre of gravity in terms of operations and stationing of the US Army manoeuvre troops; command and control (C2); maintenance and logistics; combat aviation; reception staging onward movement and integration; special forces; US Air Force combat; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); and some enabling assets.

The strategic role of Poland as a hub became fully apparent in 2022, when the overt Russian invasion of Ukraine placed Poland as the platform of deterrence signalling and as a lifeline for Ukraine. Right before the Russian attack, when NATO’s decision-making process was still paralysed by those fearing to provoke Russia, southeast Poland was quickly reinforced by the US Immediate Response Force of the 82 Airborne Division, while the deployment of dual capable F-15 planes to the town of Powidz was meant to send a clear signal on where the red lines rested. Thus, it was of key significance that, following the Polish decision to set up a multi-modal hub for military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and to reinforce the strategic signalling, the US followed suit and quickly addressed the reinforcement of the hub’s air defence with US Patriot batteries – among other allied temporary detachments.

In the critical first months of the war, Poland provided Ukraine with hundreds of armoured vehicles and air defence systems and facilitated the great majority of allied assistance through its logistical and maintenance hub. Warsaw subsequently led, organised and hosted much of the training provided to Ukrainian troops. This effort and risk-taking would not have been possible without the tangible shielding by and strategic signalling of NATO, and, in particular, by the US forces. The US in turn found in Poland a capable and willing partner for the strategically vital effort. The meaning of the most recent US decision to pull out of the operations in the Rzeszów hub, should not be exaggerated in this context. If anything, it could rather indicate a changing emphasis in the approach to Ukraine, but not for the role of Poland in US planning perceptions.

The state of play of US-Polish military cooperation and Poland’s renewed military posture

Polish-US military relations are currently formalised under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which was forged in 2019-2020 under negotiations misleadingly referred to as “Fort Trump”. Although no tangible fort was built, the agreement transferred the US posture in Poland from the Pentagon’s single-handed discretion to a bilateral political process. Moreover, the US presence in the country was defined as “enduring” which was a significant win in Warsaw’s efforts to breakout from the NRFA paradigm of non-permanence. In turn, Poland agreed to fund the infrastructure of the agreed locations, and to partially cover the running costs of operations in the country. This agreement was going to be the model for Trump’s first-term approach to relations with allies. The first Trump administration showed less attachment to conventional restrictions to force posture, like the NRFA, than more mainstream US administrations. It also did not adhere to the dogma of “Partnership in Leadership”, which marked Berlin’s perspective towards Europe. Trump’s first term emphasised a “policy based on strength” towards Russia, represented by the tough negotiation approach to the New START extension. In turn, the first Trump administration expected more concrete burden-sharing arrangements from those seeking benefits from it.

Interestingly, the ascendence of Poland as one of the key US military partners in Europe is not only due to the role of Poland as a gracious host. Warsaw was one of the first allies to seriously take into consideration the consequences of Russia’s aggressive policy. Since the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2017, the paradigm for the development of Polish forces has been the creation of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) complex. This approach would either allow for an autonomous repelling of a Russian conventional aggression – the worst-case scenario – through the imposition of an unacceptable attrition cost from the very first inch of incursion; or it could provide NATO/coalition forces with a safe multi-domain sanctuary, granting freedom of manoeuvre to relieve the Baltic States or to check Russian forces in Belarus and Ukraine.

This doctrinal approach capitalises on the Clausewitzian notion of defence as a stronger form of warfare. Poland’s proximity to the source of the threat renders the otherwise costly and vulnerable power projection platforms and related infrastructure unnecessary. Poland can thus base its approach on cost-effective, sometimes asymmetric, solutions. Polish Armed Forces field the most advanced and thick multi-layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) systems in NATO and the largest and most modern key capabilities portfolios of missile coastal defence; rocket and tube artillery inventories; tank parks; and attack helicopter fleets in European NATO. This paradigm has been symbiotic and synergistic with US power projection and dynamic employment approach. Additionally, while US forces fill some of the deficiencies in the Polish capability portfolio – Sea Control, Strategic ISR, Multi-domain C2, persistent air superiority –, Polish forces complement the US contingent with a land-centric mass. This approach was very harmonious with the principles laid out in the US National Defense Strategy of 2018. Together with the US and US-led assets and enablers, Polish forces can form a very potent manoeuvre force, capable of shaping the main continental theatre in Europe. Both under NATO or a coalition of the willing, Poland would be an indispensable lynchpin in any setting to check and deter Russian aggressive actions in eastern Europe. Warsaw could also play this role in the framework of possible future guarantees for Ukraine.

Additional factors have enabled the development of this US-Polish synergy in a military technical domain. Indeed, building an ability to seamlessly integrate with US forces was higher on the Polish procurement list of preferences than investing in domestic and/or EU protectionist considerations towards the defence industrial sector. An interesting example is the Polish decision to centre its multi-layered IAMD complex on the new generation, net centric, “plug and fight” Integrated Battle Command System, currently being introduced in Poland before most of the US IAMD batteries receive it. Coupled with some opportune US defence industrial investments in the country, Polish procurement decisions have been targeting a gradual establishment of the sustainment and maintenance base for US forces equipment, especially helicopters, IAMD and F-16s – but not F-35s. The downside of the pursued design of the Polish forces is also connected to defence industrial and logistical aspects and may become an acute problem in any two-front scenario. Poland did not secure the software control of most of the US equipment, neither the domestic production of their armament – missiles, etc. – nor the key spare parts. Unsettlingly for Poland, if it does not find a way out from this conundrum, it will rely excessively on the US industrial and logistical chain. Moreover, different priorities in Washington, both in terms of policy and logistics, might cripple the effectiveness of this costly equipment. Lately, the issue has become more evident and publicly discussed which may potentially influence forthcoming procurement decisions, like the possible extension of the F-35 purchase. These issues will be key in assuring Polish decision-making autonomy, including the ability to deter Russian forces independently, or in settings beyond those led by the US.

Three factors that could influence the prospects of US-Polish defence cooperation

There are three key factors that could influence the prospects of US-Polish defence cooperation. The first one is the perceived need to shift the US Department of Defense (DoD) force posture priority to the Western Pacific. The question of whether a reduction of the US posture in Europe is necessary and whether this might free up capabilities needed for the Western Pacific merits a separate discussion. Eventually, and regardless of its result, political realities responding primarily to perceptions and beliefs are likely to prevail. As a result, one could foresee a shift of some US Air Force and US Navy assets, which are more easily swung across theatres. Considering the rather limited achievements of the Russian Air Force and Russian Navy in Ukraine, even a diminished US Air Force and US Navy posture that leads a coalition of capable and willing allies should be able to attain, at least, a localised air and sea superiority. The US Army’s IAMD and the Multi-Domain Task Forces, with their long strike, will be in critical shortage everywhere. The Army’s manoeuvre capabilities, less relevant for the Taiwan contingency, would however be most relevant in the European theatre. Thus, cost saving for the benefit of the Western Pacific theatre could be achieved through the conversion of the US Army posture: moving from a dynamic employment into a more stationary one, including a shift towards permanent garrisoning. Poland and its potential within the theatre can buy time and erode Russian forces by offering a critical platform and a key location to concentrate the diminished US combat presence. This location would also serve to receive and integrate possible reinforcements, rendering it an even more critical asset for European security.

The second factor to be addressed is President Trump’s intent towards Europe. Here, two scenarios are possible. The first scenario is that the US might try to differentiate its level of engagement and proximity to particular allies – including basing arrangements – depending on their commitment to security burden-sharing. Poland’s favourable position in this regard could endorse it as a redeployment destination. While it is unclear whether US troop basing might work everywhere as an incentive, Hegseth’s encouraging gestures towards Poland signal that the above-mentioned scenario is likely to happen. Geostrategic realities might nonetheless limit the logic of inducing European behaviour by exposing those perceived as free-riders regarding Russian pressure and rewarding Poland by maintaining a US presence and security guarantees. Ensuring security in Poland from the Russian threat means achieving security in western Europe as a whole, as Poland is essentially a “gate keeper” of the northern European Plain. Reinforcing Poland’s security means shielding others from Russian onslaught. Punishment of free-riders could come through the principle of not rewarding those political elites that fail to deliver, including barring these elites from top positions at NATO, or changing the geometry in NATO’s decision-making process by integrating those allies that reflect new values and realities. The second scenario is one where there is a division of Europe into respective zones of influence between the US and Russia. Regardless of how probable this second scenario is, similar dynamics would apply. Yet again, if the Polish-US alliance remains strong, it will considerably limit much of the adverse effects in Europe if this scenario does unfold.

The third and final factor that might influence President Trump’s approach to Poland relates to non-geostrategic, or rather internal and ideological, considerations. The current set-up of executive authorities of Poland – barring President Duda, who will soon end his term – is made up of a centre-left coalition which used to criticise the former conservative government for their arguably excessive reliance on the US for national security policy, especially through a perceived alignment with Trump’s political camp. However, despite purposefully exaggerated political differences, the current government coalition has so far remarkably pursued several policies initiated by their predecessors. Among others, these policies include a tough stance on illegal migration and the increase of defence spending, notably required to fund force development plans put in place by the former conservative government. Other examples include the preservation of the Polish procurement spree in the US, which has so far not suffered from the change of government, like the monstrous AH-64 E procurement deal with Boeing.

These intentions of keeping “business as usual” between Poland and the US, regardless of the political party in power, may not last if internal politics come to the forefront. Any short-sightedness by either Polish or American authorities in managing this relationship could have significant and negative consequences not just for Poland but for European or Transatlantic security more broadly.

Poland is a lynchpin for European security

Even if any of the negative scenarios mentioned above materialise, the Polish contribution to European security is likely to become even more meaningful. While the same dynamics would apply in the theatre – the criticality of the Polish role in the reinforcement of the Baltic States,  on checking Belarus and possibly assisting/coordinating with Ukraine –, Warsaw would need to invest more in regional or wider European settings. For instance, it could strengthen ties with the Northern Group or the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), where Poland could pose a horizontal dilemma to Russia. When it comes to the south, Poland can also consider a range of options. The horizontal escalation option could be achieved by stimulating deeper cooperation with Turkey, the Visegrád Four (V4) group or the Polish-Romanian alliance. Furthermore, Polish capabilities could offer a crucial added-value thanks to the symbiotic effects attained when collaborating with power projection-oriented actors like France and the United Kingdom mostly, and additionally Italy, Spain or the Netherlands – as these nations benefit from highly competent navies and air forces. The heralded strategic treaty with France, blessed by both Presidents, and currently negotiated by the two governments, is a particular signal, that regardless of the scenario, Warsaw does not intend anymore to put all of its eggs into one basket.

Ultimately, the limits of any European alliance of this sort will continue in the area of logistical depth. Whilst Polish-US relations suffer from sub-optimal defence industrial cooperation, the Polish participation in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base has been equally dissatisfying thus far. The reasons for this situation are two-fold: on one side of the coin is the ineptitude and lack of political will to reform state-owned segments of the defence industry by different Polish governments. The other side of the coin is the short-sightedness of European defence industrial champions, which so far did not display a willingness to make space for Poland and other central and eastern European countries as partners – rather than just clients. The provocative answer to this question might eventually lie in the 1,000 years old elephant in the room of this article: Polish-German relations. If Warsaw manages to defy its lack of trust towards Berlin, and if Berlin accepts to include central and eastern European nations, and most notably Poland, as genuine and equal level partners, at least some of the issues of industrial and logistical depth could be solved more effectively.

Summing up, the further blossoming of the Polish-US strategic relationship should be in the interest of more than those two allies. The Polish forces are optimised for symbiotic effects with the US contingent in the European theatre. While their hypothetical withdrawal would send shockwaves across the Atlantic, Warsaw would be able to pursue several options that could partly mitigate the resulting damage.

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