Keep it Moving: From Mobility to Logistics in European Defence

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 26/2024

By Daniel Fiott

25.9.2024

Key issues

• The European Union (EU) has been developing military mobility, but so far with mixed results. It is time to rethink these efforts by investing more generally in military logistics.
• With the forthcoming “Niinistö Report” and defence White Paper, there is an opportunity to develop the EU’s defence preparedness and make a wider contribution to European defence.
• Working with NATO where possible, the EU could develop an integrated approach to military logistics that includes transport, depots, mobile camps, air and missile defence and more.

Introduction

Logistics has always been at the core of defence and military power, even if it continues to be viewed as a largely technical issue. It was once said that “amateurs discuss tactics, while professionals discuss logistics”, but the truth of the matter is that military logistics do not get the political attention they deserve. While the EU’s “Strategic Compass” does refer to the importance of logistics for military operations and civil defence, there has been an almost wilful neglect of logistics in high-level guidance and pledges such as the Versailles Declaration. At its most basic level, “logistics” can be defined as the art and science of moving and storing – securely, rapidly and at scale – military personnel, systems, equipment and supplies. For all its importance, however, there is perhaps limited political mileage in opening a new ammunition depot or railway line: what politicians want is that photo opportunity in tanks or jet fighters. “Logistics” lacks an attractive political narrative around which politicians can rally, and most members of the public would only think of the term in relation to their online deliveries of consumer goods (“Amazon rather than Ammunition”).

However, Russia’s war on Ukraine has certainly shone a light on the importance of producing and delivering ammunition and military equipment in a timely fashion. The European shortfalls are well known and there is a growing appreciation that storing and moving weaponry and supplies at speed and scale is a must. However, in many respects the EU’s own understanding of logistics is perhaps behind the curve – the EU thinks largely of “mobility” rather than “logistics”. “Mobility” relates to the timely movement of soldiers and equipment across Europe, but this neglects crucial reflections on basing, depots and protection. While mobility remains relevant, it is but one facet of military logistics writ large (as military planners indeed know all too well).

In the coming weeks, the EU will produce two further guidance documents that should have a bearing on how the Union conceives of military logistics. The first document, the so-called “Niinistö Report” on defence preparedness and civil defence, will no doubt stress the importance of stockpiling critical military supplies. The report to be drafted by the new Defence Commissioner within 100 days of the next European Commission will also no doubt have much to say about critical capability projects, defence investments and security of supply. Such efforts will build on some already important signalling by the European Commission, which has started to reflect more seriously on policies such as stockpiling and logistics. What is more, with new leadership in the EU and NATO there is an opportunity to ensure that the two organisations work together constructively on military logistics.

This CSDS Policy Brief argues that any reinvigoration of “military mobility” in the coming years cannot be made solely through more money or dual-use transport investments – as important as these elements are. Instead, it is argued here that there is an opportunity to rethink more generally how the Union approaches military logistics. If Europeans are serious about making more of a contribution to European defence via the EU and NATO, then a practical area of cooperation such as logistics could be a wise place to start. As this Policy Brief argues, it is time to move beyond “military mobility” and to include it in a broader approach to European military logistics. This would include the development and protection of transport networks, weapons depots and strategic stockpiles, as well as air and missile defence. Working with existing NATO efforts, the EU can invest in key areas of Europe’s common defence.

Mobility at a standstill?

The track-record of military mobility is less than ideal, despite it being a key defence project for the EU and a so-called flagship project for EU-NATO cooperation. The reality is, however, that regulatory, legal, security and political considerations and sensitivities have conspired to slow down the speed at which Europe develops its military mobility. Although an amount of €1.5 billion has been made available for investment in dual-use transport links up to 2027, the reality is that the regulatory dimension is the source of continued barriers to fluid military transportation in Europe. On the political side, certain member states are still reluctant to fully engage with military mobility because of their national defence and constitutional arrangements. On the technical side, it is far from simple to transport military equipment via rail. As the military mobility project has progressed it has become clearer that 1) military loads operate at slower speeds; 2) existing locomotives, rolling stock and wagons are not well-suited to military transport; and 3) military trains cannot always connect to railway interlinkages within and across member states. There are many more technical and regulatory hurdles that could be mentioned, and the new Defence Commissioner has been given the specific tasking to remove ‘all remaining barriers’ to military mobility.

EU institutions and European governments are aware of the challenges, as attested to by the efforts of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU in March 2024 to support dual-use military transport investments and measures. Furthermore, in its July 2023 proposal for a Regulation on the use of rail infrastructure capacity, the European Commission – with a nod to military mobility – recommended that civil authorities should be provided more leeway to prioritise military transportation in times of crisis. Indeed, requests for movements of military equipment along railways can usually take up to 8 months for commercial freight operators, but this simply will not do for military customers that may need to use railway lines within 2 to 3 hours after a request to rail operators. Providing greater leeway for rail usage is therefore critical, but so is understanding what the trans-European network for transport can take in terms of military requirements. This is why the Commission has proposed to publish a study by 2025 that analyses which existing railway lines in the EU can handle military requests.

We should also acknowledge that the EU has attempted to concretely develop military mobility through specific projects and initiatives. In fact, in 2024 the Council of the EU agreed to a new Military Mobility Pledge that seeks the removal of remaining barriers by 2026. This pledge also includes a call to rapidly develop Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects such as “Military Mobility” and the “Network of Logistics Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations”. It also makes clear that it is important for further EU-level exercises to test the Union’s mobility capacities, including through table-top exercises such as “Rubikon”. We should also acknowledge minilateral efforts by EU and NATO member states that are designed to speed up military movements across Europe. This includes the recent agreement signed by Germany, Poland and the Netherlands to create a “military transport corridor” based on the alignment of administrative requirements and regulations across the three countries. Military mobility will, therefore, continue to be relevant in an EU and NATO context but there is clearly a long way to go before Europe realises this absolutely essential feature of its defence.

Moving swiftly along…

Logistics is an all-encompassing term that moves beyond the idea of mobility. The ability to move at speed and mass is, of course, essential to militaries, but focusing solely on mobility neglects how logistics is comprised of a complex, and at times vulnerable, web of supply lines, weapons production sites, medical centres, barracks, weapons stores and more. Although the initial logic behind “military mobility” remains essential, namely that it is vital to be able to move troops and equipment in times of crisis, we miss a great deal of the vulnerabilities and needs that emerge out of logistics more generally. One only has to look at the prevailing strategic context to appreciate the pertinence of logistics. Rivals and adversaries continue to use cyber techniques to disrupt and manipulate core societal and military infrastructure – including command and control systems. Think also of the recent disruptions to key energy and electricity infrastructure in Europe such as undersea cables. Additionally, in Ukraine Russia has directly targeted military, energy and defence industrial production sites.

It is for such reasons that the majority of European governments accept that Europe is being openly contested in the so-called “strategic domains” in space, air, land, sea and cyber. This underscores the need to invest in resilient space systems for the detection of military threats (e.g. ballistic missiles), but it may also eventually call for the establishment of naval bases or maritime hubs located in “hotspots” where Europe’s maritime security interests are threatened. Such bases or hubs would seem like a logical, albeit ambitious, step after the Union has invested in naval operations and a greater maritime presence in places such as the Gulf of Guinea, Red Sea and the North West Indian Ocean. As much as there is a need to eventually discuss the Union’s global maritime logistics priorities at some point, the pressing need will be to ensure secure and effective logistics on European soil. In many ways this is already becoming a reality. In addition to military mobility, Europeans are seeking to develop air and missile defence and counter drone capabilities, as well as increasing the production sites of ammunition and military equipment. In essence, there is a nascent – albeit incoherent – plan in Europe to secure supply lines, which is an important step given that Europe’s transport links, storage depots, defence factories and more would be direct targets in case of full-scale war.

Relatedly, putting in place a coherent military logistics plan could also contribute to deterrence by signalling Europe’s overall military preparedness. Yet, there cannot be just a military approach to the question of logistics – not least because armed forces use a range of civilian contractors for military services. However, bringing together civilian and military actors is notoriously challenging due to different operational requirements and organisational cultures. What is more, organisational techniques that appear to work well in the commercial world falter in the military. For example, the idea that technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) can revolutionise inventory management have so far failed to up-end the military’s business model. Furthermore, it should also be obvious that the commercial world’s logic of “just in time” and diversified supply chains is not well-suited to the needs of military planners, who cannot wait on the battlefield for a delivery driver to show up.

Logistics and “total defence”

The time appears ripe to take military logistics more seriously at the EU level and to ensure that European allies in NATO are prepared for the worst case military scenarios. Indeed, in a few weeks former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö will present his report on “civil and defence preparedness”. Although the report will try to encourage a more comprehensive approach to defence – akin to the “total defence” concepts in Finland and Sweden –, the messages it contains pertaining to military logistics will be important. Not least as they will hopefully add weight to a more integrated approach to supply security, weapons production, storage and transport in Europe. In this respect, there are already interesting steps being taken to boost security of supply in the defence sector (with the hope of introducing and supporting stockpiling of materials, components and spare parts). Elsewhere, the European Commission has called for the creation of a European Air Shield to protect the continent from air and ballistic missile threats. Then there is, of course, military mobility which continues to search for ways to enhance military transport links in Europe.

As Figure 1 shows, there are the makings of a more coherent military logistics plan in the EU, although at present these individual efforts fail to form part of an overarching endeavour. What is required is an identification of all of the major elements that contribute to military logistics in Europe. One way of doing so, as Figure 1 depicts, is by distinguishing between production, supply, mobility and protection. Bringing these major elements together has the benefit of providing for a more comprehensive understanding of the entire military logistics process. It also has the benefit of allowing defence planners to identify any potential vulnerabilities in this logistics process, which is particularly important given that each aspect of the logistics process results in fundamental geopolitical considerations. These questions indeed include: 1) do existing air and missile defence systems in Europe provide adequate cover for defence production?; 2) are logistics hubs and depots located in the most geographically ideal location in case of war?; and 3) are there sufficient enough defence stockpiles and where are they located?

Figure 1 – Military Logistics

Such questions do give pause for thought on how best to organise and invest in Europe’s military logistics. Essentially, Europe needs to have in place a sufficient level of stocks of vital supplies and equipment, but there is a need to reflect on how best to store strategic stockpiles. For strategic purposes, it is best not to concentrate stockpiles into single locations but dispersing stockpiles across Europe implies the need for transport links to move stocks to where they are most needed in times of crisis. Additionally, another important reflection will be the relationship between static and mobile logistics hubs and overall command and control functions. During times of acute crisis there may be a need to physically move logistics hubs across Europe, especially if static hubs fall directly in range of ballistic missiles, and this will call for a highly adaptable and mobile logistics plan. Europe would need to be able to set-up mobile logistics hubs at short notice that combine core maintenance (stock inventories, 3D printing, waste, water, fuel, medical etc.) and security (counter missile and drone capacities, detection systems, local surveillance and sensors) functions.

The EU and NATO dimension

Such questions could certainly be addressed in an EU-NATO context. The Alliance’s Logistics Committee already provides advice and support to the NATO Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council – this advice is complemented by other committees (e.g. petroleum, medical services, civil emergency, standardisation, etc.). One of the core functions of NATO’s logistics plans is to ensure that the NATO commander has all available information on logistics from across the alliance, and this presupposes that allies provide this information to NATO. Another key role of the Supreme Allied Commander is to ensure that the Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) can be effectively distributed across the alliance in times of crisis. NATO principally identifies its logistics inventories and needs through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which helps NATO commanders develop strategic stockpiles and identify sustainment requirements (i.e. re-supply, industrial capacities, contracting, etc.). NATO’s Logistics Vision and Objectives (V&O) mechanism also helps plan NATO’s logistics needs over a 10-year period.

NATO has a clear added-value in overseeing military logistics in Europe, not least because the Alliance frequently brings together allied logistic directors and it has the function of learning lessons from alliance-wide exercises such as Steadfast Defence 2024. Nevertheless, we know that the EU has considerably higher financial resources to commit to defence efforts, but for EU-NATO members the Union can play an important role in identifying and overcoming regulatory barriers and interfacing with civil authorities and commercial actors (which are vital for military logistics). With new leadership both the EU and NATO, it appears more than likely that a fourth EU-NATO Joint Declaration will be signed. Since 2018, the two organisations have stressed the importance of cooperation on military mobility and the 2023 joint declaration even called for cooperation on critical infrastructure protection and resilience. We also know that EU and NATO staff are engaged in structured dialogue on military mobility. As the EU invests more in initiatives such as stockpiling, common defence projects, civil defence, air and missile defence and military mobility, it will be necessary to deepen cooperation with NATO in the broader area of military logistics.

Conclusion

Russia’s war on Ukraine has exposed the vital role of logistics in defence. While Europeans have been working to improve military mobility in Europe, the context has rapidly evolved to include a need for ammunition production, critical materiel stockpiling, infrastructure protection, air and missile defence and more. Logistics is at the heart of European defence. In this regard, this CSDS Policy Brief has called for a shift in mindsets: Europe needs to build on “military mobility” with a coherent plan for “military logistics”. Of course, NATO already conducts much of the work in this domain, but the EU is increasingly investing resources and time on key aspects of logistics including critical infrastructure protection and ammunition production. The Union is also using tools such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund to finance relevant defence projects. In the coming years, the EU seeks to invest more money into joint procurement and the European Commission is developing a security of supply agenda that includes stockpiling and air and missile defence. Thus, for all the talk of a need to Europeanise NATO, there have been very few concrete action plans for how to achieve this. “Logistics” will never grab the news headlines, but logistics is the glue that keeps European defence together.

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