CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 28/2024
By Henry Haggard
16.10.2024
Key issues
- There is untapped potential to boost policy alignment and implement capital-intensive initiatives through a diplomatic grouping between Japan, the United States (US), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) (“JUKE”). The group will build on common elements from the trilateral Camp David statement, the US-EU China Dialogue and the JUKE commerce-led dialogue on supply chain security to coordinate policy.
- Nuclear power and the energy transition require immense investment that JUKE economies would support to marshal the research and capital needed to power the energy transition and achieve NetZero goals.
- Track 2 dialogue in a JUKE grouping could identify the areas with most potential, and should be followed by Track 1.5 and Track 1 meetings. A few areas for potential focus are Ukraine support and reconstruction and deterring and engaging the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Introduction
Globalisation has been achieved for all practical purposes – not only are executives in Papua New Guinea tracking the New York Stock exchange in real time and investors in Europe forecasting Indonesian nickel supplies and prices, but kids from Paris, France to Columbus, Ohio exchange Pokémon cards and anticipate BTS concert dates. Global citizens think about issues that impact the world such as climate change and the next pandemic. Countries are increasingly interconnected and interdependent, however, diplomatic groupings tend to be regionally focused based on decades-old relationships. While these groupings are well intended and effective, it is necessary to review the diplomatic approach to transnational issues and adjust to galvanise an effective response to crises. Regionalisation of diplomacy is particularly acute in Europe and Asia. For good reasons, these two large continents have focused on their own regions. To spur action in response to global issues, it is important to consider minilateral groupings between Europe and Asia that are both more extensive than ASEAN, NATO or the Quad, and more cohesive with significant areas of alignment to facilitate diplomatic initiatives. NATO has done extensive outreach to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) but remains limited given the sensitivities of focusing too much on hard security in such proximity to China. Beijing stalemates action in any grouping it holds membership and therefore it is impossible to achieve a useful consensus or meaningful outcome.
Minilateral and ad hoc diplomatic groupings are most focused and effective when they attempt to respond to current and future threats and challenges, especially those emanating from China. While Europe-Asia dialogues need not focus exclusively on China, the groups could indeed discuss ways to constrain China while also looking at ways to respond together to transnational threats and challenges such as climate change and the energy transition, cyber security, etc. And, ultimately, when countries can discuss “China without China” there is more room to manoeuvre. For example, discussions of mineral security or supply chain security can rightly focus on potential actions from allies and partners. However, such discussions would be discussions of “China without China” since allies and partners would seek to achieve a collective response to protect from China’s malign intentions and/or predatory practices.
The US since 2017 has attained clarity on its approach to China and secured not only executive branch continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations, but also bipartisan agreement that China is a threat and a challenge to international order. While this is arguably the right starting point to compete and constrain China’s more hegemonic and malevolent goals, this does not offer a prescription for how to uphold the Biden administration’s strategy to “invest, align, compete”. Groups such as JUKE could do exactly that, working in concert with regional groupings, allies and partners.
In addition to revitalising NATO (thanks Vladimir Putin) and energising our bilateral alliances through outreach and friction reduction, the Biden administration brought new life to minilaterals such as the Quad and created new formats such as AUKUS and the Camp David Trilateral with Japan and the ROK. However, each of these formats has limitations and not one of them present options for significant impact on global policy coordination and implementation or provide an answer for how a non-China grouping could contribute to advancing prosperity and security. Furthermore, none of these groups specifically addresses the issue that I will seek to highlight – how to build more Europe-Asia connections, diplomatically and geopolitically.
The US has worked hard to expand its coordination with the largest economic bloc, the EU, and had great success in building trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK. This work could serve as a jumping off point for the JUKE. If the US, along with the second and fourth largest economies (the EU and Japan), and the sixth most “powerful” country economically and militarily (the ROK), combine efforts, there is unlimited potential for what the JUKE grouping could accomplish globally. The EU could piggyback on trilateral work being done in ASEAN countries as outlined in the Camp David statement. Both the US-EU dialogue and the Camp David Trilateral suggest greater cooperation on the Pacific Islands. A JUKE grouping would combine and expand that conversation to develop and enhance cooperation and investment. The investment needed over the coming years to stay ahead of China, let alone continue to offer opportunity and prosperity to the world, will require vast amounts of wealth and R&D from the US and its allies and partners. In addition, establishment of this partnership will provide a platform for current and future areas of mutual interest and global impact.
This CSDS Policy Brief will highlight potential areas where a JUKE grouping will contribute to increased policy alignment and support collective efforts by allies and partners in other multilateral fora. Additionally, the brief will outline a path forward to initiate a JUKE partnership.
Ukraine
Japan and the ROK have provided billions in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people as it continues to suffer an ongoing conflict with Russia. JUKE could serve as a useful vehicle to not only find ways to increase current support to ensure Ukraine can continue to hold off the Russian attack, but also to organise reconstruction once peace or an armistice is achieved. The group could discuss how to provide much-needed energy infrastructure to help bolster the grid that Russia targeted throughout the spring and summer of 2024. Reconstruction of Ukraine will require upwards of 500 billion dollars and not only will that money need to come from somewhere, Ukraine and its people will need support from companies and countries that can build and build quickly. Japan and the ROK are particularly well positioned to contribute, and coordination of these future efforts should start now.
Innovation and technology
The ROK, Japan, Taiwan, the US and the Netherlands have collectively managed to keep a five-year lead on China in commercial manufacturing of advanced logic chips and this serves as a prime example of how we can, collectively, keep our lead in critical industries of today and the future. Building on existing government support such as the US’ CHIPS act funding, the JUKE grouping could augment and complement the work of the Chip 4 Alliance. In addition to semiconductors, a building block for future development across all industries, the JUKE grouping is well positioned to discuss space, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum-related research, investment and regulatory policy. The grouping could look to the December 2023 US-ROK meeting of the Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET) Dialogue and increase cooperation in biotechnology and other technologies of the future. The Commerce Department-led meeting on supply chain security serves as a prime example of how this group could seek to develop answers to our most pressing questions and prescribe a response to China.
Energy transition and civil nuclear power
Currently, China is up to 15 years ahead of the US and its allies on the construction of advanced nuclear power technologies thanks in no small part to massive governmental investment and favourable loans that will result in the construction of up to 150 new reactors before 2035 in China. This is a particularly important technology where we should not fall further behind for two important reasons. First, the International Energy Agency suggests that to meet our NetZero goals, we should build dozens of new reactors each year to generate 550 gigawatts of new nuclear power by 2050. Second, a 1-gigawatt plant costs about $5 billion, which means almost three trillion dollars are both needed and up for grabs over the next 25 years. Despite lagging China currently, if the JUKE countries made nuclear power generation a key priority, it could catalyse rapid growth in large and Small Modular Reactor (SMR) plants since this grouping, if it cooperates rather than competes, has both the research and construction capability to lead this important field and retake leadership in the industry globally from China. There are currently 80 different SMR reactors in the design stage and numerous countries are signing 123 agreements to further civil nuclear cooperation with the US and partnering through the FIRST programme. Construction of SMRs and traditional plants globally will expand rapidly in the next 20 years and now is the time for us to work together to support this effort.
Cybersecurity and counterterrorism
Japan and the ROK could join efforts ongoing between the US and the EU to share information concerning identifying and responding to foreign information manipulation and interference. The work on this topic as well as exchanges on human rights could be enhanced and amplified if Japan and Korea joined their voices to the ongoing conversation and, using the September 2024 US-EU dialogue on China and the Indo-Pacific as a framework, pick up on themes of concern such as the DPRK’s continued arms transfers to Russia and Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Additionally, the grouping could serve as an effective forum to discuss ways to collectively respond to transnational threats such as cyber-attacks and terrorism. While cyber-attacks could come from China, they also could emanate from Russia, DPRK, terrorist groups and other malign actors so such discussions could offer the grouping more latitude to discuss ways to deter China as well as other actors without specifically calling out China, something that is problematic especially for the ROK. Another potential positive outcome from such discussions could be an increase in information and intelligence exchange between the countries and help the countries react more effectively and collectively in the case of a new threat in the future.
G7
The ROK, along with Australia and several other candidates, hopes to join a “G10” that expands the G7’s mandate beyond the current exclusive group and offers a greater voice to the Indo-Pacific. A JUKE grouping would offer the ROK a chance to showcase how aligned it already is with the G7 while also highlighting to the group the fact that the ROK brings capability, especially in construction and manufacturing both batteries and semiconductors but also tanks, artillery and other defence articles, that the other G7 countries lack. Shipbuilding, chips, batteries, nuclear power and arms production are a few areas where the ROK shines, but overall, the South Koreans retain a capability to produce goods and complete large scale, complex construction projects in a timely manner. This could be a critical piece of the puzzle as the JUKE (and future G10) seek to implement policies and produce results.
Cultural exchange and global health
The impact of soft power to address all global challenges should not be underestimated. The collective cultural influence of the US, EU, ROK and Japan can shape global narratives, counteract authoritarianism, promote human rights and sustain a rules-based international order. The JUKE grouping could develop both new ways to build cooperation and also augment current programmes such as Fulbright and Erasmus+ that have lasting impact. Research coordination amongst institutions and governments could boost ongoing efforts such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) to fight infectious diseases and prepare for or prevent the next pandemic.
DPRK
Japan and the ROK face an existential threat from the DPRK. While perhaps some in Europe can see the North Koreans as more of a regional threat, given the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as well as its cyber attacking capabilities, and its “strategic partnership” with Russia, it is a nation that poses a global threat. The JUKE grouping could offer the EU a chance to engage on the DPRK more actively. To more effectively deter the isolated nation, more information sharing and cooperation could make cyber defence against the DPRK more effective. On the engagement front, if the EU or some of its member countries participated in a new dialogue on and with North Korea, this could create a more balanced approach to talks and, ultimately, more buy-in for support for aid and ultimately the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the DPRK.
Action plan
Think tanks, experts and government officials could work together and develop JUKE along the lines below:
- Start a Track 2 JUKE grouping with a leading think tank and/or academic representative(s) meeting to suggest pillars for JUKE’s activities;
- Follow this with track 1.5 meetings based on the pillars with the most promise – supply chain resilience and Ukraine support and reconstruction are two that appear to have the most potential; and,
- In Seoul, Tokyo, Brussels and Washington, embassy representatives could meet to discuss informally, the way many capitals host Quad-format meetings, the merit of the JUKE grouping. Other capitals could also lead meetings on the topic with embassy representatives, thus sending back messages about potential areas for cooperation among the JUKE members.
Conclusion
The world is increasingly more interconnected and it requires a diplomatic forum to coordinate a global effort to ensure peace, security and prosperity across regions. Whether JUKE becomes as effective as the next Quad or AUKUS or not, Asia and Europe could and should engage in more formal and informal diplomatic coordination. The US, as an Atlantic and Pacific power, should continue to take on the role of pulling Europe to engage more in Asia and pushing Asia to invest more in its relationships with Europe. This trend is ongoing, but groupings like JUKE could accelerate and focus the evolution. Additionally, it could facilitate industry-government cooperation that will be needed to tackle the big challenges and marshal the necessary investments required to maintain economic security, counter China and tackle global challenges such as finding ways to satisfy Asia’s need for an additional ten terawatts of power by 2050, doubling the current demand.
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The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).
ISSN (online): 2983-466X