Sisyphus at Work: The Japan-South Korea Rapprochement and its Implications for Europe

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 7/2024

By Eva Pejsova

15.3.2024

Key issues

• The recent improvement of bilateral relations between Japan – South Korea has been an important stepping stone in building a more robust and resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
• Overlapping agendas and shared areas of interest, such as defence, technology or economic security, provide opportunities for Europe to explore convergences and avenues for trilateral cooperation – both at the political and practical levels.
• To sustain the positive momentum, the two partners should focus on institutionalising functional cooperative linkages, coordinating approaches within multilateral settings and third countries and delivering concrete results.

Introduction

The rapprochement between South Korea and Japan under the leadership of President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio stands out as one of the few bits of good news to emerge from East Asia in a decade. The formulation of a ‘future-oriented security cooperation’ during the historical bilateral summit in March 2023 embodies well the rationale behind the rapprochement: the need to embrace a forward-looking foreign and security policy against an increasingly deteriorating security environment in Northeast Asia and globally.

The move has set in motion a unique and positive momentum for the broader dynamic of cooperation, providing a much-needed and hitherto missing link in an emerging, increasingly interconnected cross-regional security architecture. As an indirect effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the new-found sense of strategic convergence has brought Europe and its East Asian partners much closer together. Both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have stepped up security and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, focusing on an almost identical sets of issues, with a view to improving interoperability and building regional resilience over the long run.

A stable and constructive relationship between Seoul and Tokyo is key to this endeavour. However, historical grudges and domestic politics continue to put pressure on bilateral ties, casting a shadow over the future prospects for cooperation. This is why rapprochement efforts are sometimes compared to the legendary struggle of Sisyphus, condemned to repeat its efforts for eternity. In this CSDS Policy Brief, we look at the opportunities that the current positive momentum represents for Europe’s engagement in the region. Placing the development at the centre of the evolving regional security architecture post-Ukraine, it explores the benefits and the possible avenues for deepening cooperation with extra-regional partners, before suggesting mechanisms to prevent a possible relapse or at least attenuate its negative effects in the future.

An emerging security architecture post-Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 represents a true watershed moment in Indo-Pacific and global geopolitics. The alignment between Moscow and Beijing, best embodied by the “no limit” partnership declaration shortly before the invasion, has accentuated the deepening divide between liberal democracies and revisionist powers. North Korea’s political and material support of Russia, as well as its continuous missile testing, has further added to the growing sense of anxiety in both Tokyo and Seoul, sharing concerns over an increasingly hostile neighbourhood environment.

Prime Minister Kishida’s now famous quote that ‘Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow’ sums up the rationale behind the now mainstream strategic thinking, highlighting the interconnectedness between the transatlantic and the Indo-Pacific theatres. Against the odds, the war in Ukraine did not distract Europe’s engagement in Asia. If anything, it made it more sympathetic to regional security threats and more eager to expand security and defence cooperation with key like-minded partners, with Japan and South Korea at the forefront. NATO’s intensifying cooperation with the so-called “IP4” countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea), as well as the EU’s decision to work towards a security partnership with Japan and South Korea, are tangible examples of an emerging cross-regional security architecture that should help to increase interoperability and resilience in the long term.

In turn, both Japan and South Korea have been quick and firm in condemning Russia’s aggression, adopting sanctions and providing substantial financial and military assistance to Ukraine. In doing so, they strongly signalled their commitment to democratic values and the rule of law, strengthening ties with allies and partners across the Eurasian landmass – be it the EU or NATO. Joining the NATO Summits in Madrid and Vilnius, Japan and South Korea vowed to step-up cooperation with the alliance across a range of issue areas as part of their respective Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPPs). Long-standing “Strategic Partners” of the EU, both countries have developed strong political and economic ties with Brussels over the past decade. The Union’s strong resolve in support of Ukraine and sobering attitude towards China has raised its profile as a geopolitical actor, making Tokyo and Seoul more eager to deepen cooperation with Brussels also in the field of security and defence.

Many aspects of the agendas for cooperation addressed by both NATO and the EU with the two respective partners overlap. The content of the ITPPs with Japan and South Korea is very similar, including cooperation on cyber defence, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and strengthening interoperability through personnel exchanges and joint trainings. The EU’s expanding security cooperation with Japan and South Korea is broader, covering cyber security, maritime security, critical technologies, outer space and economic security among others. While bilateral relations remain the prime channels of engagement, many of the ongoing and future work strands could be streamlined in a trilateral fashion, including joint trainings and personnel exchanges. In practical terms, exploring complementarities and synergies could avoid a duplication of efforts and resources on all sides.

Some not-to-be-missed opportunities

Opportunities stemming from the bilateral rapprochement abound, both at the political and operational levels. Security and defence cooperation is indisputably the greatest beneficiary. While the upsurge in North Korea’s malicious activities has been the initial driver, renewed security and defence dialogue between Seoul and Tokyo pave the way for deeper cooperation with other partners and allies, with the United States (US) at the forefront, thus boosting prospects for a more robust regional security architecture. The commitment to boost the trilateral US-Japan-South Korea partnership, sealed at the Camp David Summit in August 2023, is the most significant in this respect. The partners vow to hold regular trilateral consultations to align messaging, exchange information and coordinate responses to regional security concerns, moving a step closer to Washington’s idea of integrated deterrence.

Information and intelligence sharing has been one concrete example. The decision to normalise the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between Japan and South Korea is important, as it aims at exchanging information on North Korea’s missile launches and flight tracking. The bilateral agreement has further facilitated the establishment of a trilateral real-time missile data sharing mechanism between the US, Japan and South Korea in December 2023, becoming a first concrete deliverable of the Camp David partnership, along with a multi-year trilateral exercise plan that started in January 2024. Needless to say, such an agreement could, in time, be expanded to monitoring other type of malign activities in the region too, be it by China or Russia. As a next possible step, Japan and South Korea could join some of NATO’s activities, such as the flagship air and missile defence exercise “Formidable Shield” that uses the same information-sharing mechanism and which is next scheduled for 2025.

Greater security coordination between Seoul and Tokyo can be also leveraged within multilateral settings. In 2024, both Japan and South Korea sit together at the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC), with their two-year non-permanent membership overlapping for the first time in 27 years. This provides a unique opportunity to join efforts in pushing forward their shared strategic objectives, notably in the sphere of non-proliferation for instance. North Korea’s supply of weapons and military equipment to Russia to sustain its offensive in Ukraine is in clear violation of the UN sanctions regime from 2006. As temporary members of the UNSC Sanctions Committee on North Korea, Japan and South Korea could push for better enforcement mechanisms. Within the UNSC, both countries could also work with European Permanent Members to push for a number of common objectives, including UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) compliance, human rights and climate policies.

Beyond the traditional security realm, enhanced bilateral cooperation can be of significant value in both countries’ quest for economic security and technological competitiveness. As high-tech giants deeply enmeshed in the global economy, Japan and South Korea share many common concerns and have been multiplying efforts to secure their supply chains, especially in the semiconductor sector. Economic security features high on the Camp David agenda, which calls for the establishment of a trilateral Supply Chain Early Warning System among other initiatives. Cooperation on the digital economy and supply chain resilience is also at the core of the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific, addressed within the Digital Partnership Agreements in place with both Japan and South Korea since 2022. Both partners also have free trade agreements with the EU. Resuming their high-level economic dialogue in December 2023, Tokyo and Seoul should strengthen bilateral ties in this domain, which has been a missing link in building a more comprehensive economic deterrence network. Trilateral EU-Japan-South Korea cooperation could be a logical next step, providing a framework for exchanging best practices, setting up of early warning and a collective anti-coercion mechanism or solutions for supply swaps in case of a disruption.

Finally, Japan and South Korea could coordinate efforts to engage with ASEAN and the so-called “Global South” countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Both countries have been longstanding partners of ASEAN and part of the “ASEAN Plus” regional architecture, including the ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) Plus or the East Asia Summit. Their Indo-Pacific outlooks both emphasise the centrality of ASEAN and they engage actively in promoting economic development, integration, sustainable connectivity and functional security as a means to boost regional capacity and resilience. Rather than competing, Seoul and Tokyo would have much to gain in coordinating activities and implementing joint projects in third countries. The EU could play an active role in this endeavour, notably through its Global Gateway connectivity initiative, exploring ways to involve both partners in its projects in Southeast and South Asia.

“Sisyphus at work”

Despite the current positive momentum, the bilateral relationship is still fragile and subject to domestic political moods in both countries. President Yoon’s decision to move past the historical contention with Japan has been labelled by the opposition as the ‘most humiliating moment’ in Korean history, with close to 60% of the population opposing the move in March 2023. With the legislative elections coming up in April 2024, the approval rating of the current administration at the beginning of 2024 has fallen to over 30%. President Yoon’s appeal on the Independence Movement Day on 1 March 2024, where he pushed relations with Japan to a higher level for a ‘brighter future in bilateral relations’ against the deteriorating ties with the North, marks an effort to rally public support for his policies ahead of the coming elections and make sure they stand the test of time.

Due to the unresolved historical disputes, Japan-South Korea relations have always evolved in cycles, with the thawing and re-freezing of diplomatic ties in different periods. This is why previous rapprochement efforts have been sometimes described as ‘Sisyphus getting muscles’. If the comparison to the mythological struggle implies a sense of resignation, there is also place for optimism. To begin with, it means that both parties fully realise the difficulties in pushing the relationship further, and, while they keep trying to learn lessons from the past, they are better prepared to deal with the challenges in each cycle: what is most important is that they never give up trying.

Playing along with the metaphor, there are several ways to ease Sisyphus’s ordeal in today’s particular context. First, by indeed “getting muscle” (i.e. making the Seoul-Tokyo couple stronger, faster and more efficient in bouncing back up the proverbial slope). To do so, it is necessary to boost the bilateral relationship itself, by forging institutionalised forms of cooperation across a variety of activities and sectors, ranging from trade, economy, security and technology. The newfound strategic convergence is highly instrumental in this respect. As much as identifying North Korea as the greatest common threat can help to strengthen defence cooperation, focusing on economic security could build lasting connections through “friendshoring”, industrial cooperation and joint innovation programmes.

Secondly, demographic change has been slowly lowering the inclination of the metaphorical slope, with younger generations of Japanese and South Koreans having an increasingly positive image of each other. In 2023, the share of South Koreans having a favourable impression of Japan hit a record-high 44%, with Japan’s favourable opinion surpassing the unfavourable responses for the first time in decade. Education exchanges, tourism and cultural phenomena like K-pop and manga, have played a crucial role in improving people-to-people connections over the past three decades, shifting the perceptions of the electorate and political elites alike. To sustain this trend and turn it into politically tangible results, both parties need to meet half-way. Japan, in this case, should not dismiss the importance of signalling appreciation and understanding for Korea’s concerns and continue to be mindful of the sentiments of the domestic population.

Finally, intensified cooperation with external partners and engagement within international organisations provide institutional frameworks that can act as “wedges” along the way, preventing the bilateral relationship from relapsing into the lowest low. Washington has played a key role in furthering trilateral security cooperation, which constitutes a centrepiece for enhancing deterrence in Northeast Asia. Zooming out, Japan and South Korea’s expanding ties with NATO and the EU will enmesh both countries into the broader cross-regional security architecture that is currently in the making. The most important and overarching condition for this to succeed is to deliver concrete results. Short-term gains, demonstrating tangible benefits stemming from such international cooperation, are necessary to convince the domestic populations in both countries, generating the political appetite needed to sustain the positive momentum.

In 2025, Japan and South Korea will celebrate the 60^th anniversary of the normalisation of their diplomatic relations, calling for the formulation of a new joint declaration. While history cannot be completely banished, there is a unique window of opportunity for the political leadership in both countries to mark their legacy by opening a new chapter in the bilateral relationship. Beyond the immediate benefits for Northeast Asia, it would be excellent news for Europe’s engagement with the two partners, as well as for the overall stability, security and prosperity of the entire Indo-Pacific region.