South Korea and a Taiwan Contingency

By Ramon Pacheco Pardo

12.9.2024

There is an ongoing discussion regarding South Korea’s (ROK) position in a Taiwan contingency, namely a conflict involving China and Taiwan. In recent meetings with government officials and advisors, as well as previous meetings over the past three years with both conservative and liberal policymakers and experts, it has become clear that the question is not whether South Korea would be involved in a Taiwan contingency, but rather how it would support Taiwan and the United States (US). Some South Korean policymakers argue that their country has a duty to actively support Taiwan, others make the point that the ROK-US alliance today is global and includes a Taiwan contingency, and yet others believe that South Korea would reluctantly be dragged into providing support to Taiwan. But no mainstream policymaker in a position of real power doubts that South Korea would be involved in a Taiwan contingency.

In fact, South Korea has become more open regarding its position towards a potential conflict between China and Taiwan. It has done so through speeches and other documents issued during the Yoon Suk-yeol government, joint statements with the US agreed by both the Yoon and Moon Jae-in governments, trilateral statements issued together with the US and Japan and also via joint exercises and training together with countries including the US, Japan or the Philippines. In return, the Taiwanese government has publicly thanked South Korea for its position on several occasions over the past two years. It should be noted that most South Korean policymakers and defence officials are sceptical that China wishes to launch a strike on Taiwan any time soon. But this does not mean that they are not thinking about this possibility, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent war in Europe.

Why would South Korea get involved in a Taiwan contingency?

There are several reasons why South Korea would get involved in a Taiwan contingency, whether out of its own volition or forced by external pressures. The most obvious one is geographical proximity to both China and Taiwan. Taiwan is located just slightly over 1,000 kilometres from Jeju Island. Seoul is a two-hour flight from Beijing and less than three hours away from Taipei by plane. In the same way that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now involves all NATO members – including countries further away from Ukraine than South Korea is from Taiwan – geography would pull South Korea into a Taiwan contingency. In this sense, the idea that Seoul could avoid entanglement in a Taiwan contingency runs counter to the reality that South Korea is a neighbour to the two countries that would be involved in a war.

Another reason that would draw South Korea into a Taiwan contingency is the direct economic and security impact that a conflict would have for the country. Starting with the economic consequences, China continues to be South Korea’s largest trading partner, over 90% of South Korean trade transits the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and the strait is a key route for South Korean oil imports. Furthermore, Taiwanese firms are important partners for South Korean ones in sectors such as semiconductors. Simply put, South Korea would take a substantial economic hit from a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

When it comes to security, South Korean policymakers understand that the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula are interconnected. A Chinese strike on Taiwan would draw in the US, potentially including its troops in the Korean Peninsula. At the very least, South Korea would need to take an even more central role in the deterrence of North Korea while the US focused on the Taiwan Strait. A strike by Beijing on Taiwan could also prompt the Kim Jong-un regime to seek to destabilise the Korean Peninsula. If this were to happen, South Korea would be compelled both to defend itself against North Korea and to support Taiwan in its fight against China. This is before considering a worst-case scenario – from a South Korean perspective – that China would decide to also strike South Korean targets or US targets inside South Korea or elsewhere across East Asia.

The ROK-US alliance would be another factor driving South Korea to participate in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The oft-cited line that the alliance is now global in scope is not a cliché but reality. In fact, South Korean troops have been dispatched to multiple US-led wars over the decades, including in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam. In case of conflict over Taiwan, the US would call on its partners to provide support to American troops involved in the conflict. Going by the history of ROK-US relations and joint statements issued in recent years, South Korean policymakers see a conflict in the Taiwan Strait as one of the issues covered by the alliance.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that intervening in a Taiwan contingency would send a powerful message to China that South Korea is against changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force, which should be off limits. South Korea is one of the few countries outside of NATO openly and clearly siding with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia’s aggression. A key reason why Seoul has taken this position is to signal that Moscow should respect Kyiv’s sovereignty and refrain from attempting to change the status quo in the Russo-Ukrainian border by force. The same would apply were China to launch an invasion of Taiwan. Some South Korean strategists also believe that South Korea would be next if China successfully takes control of Taiwan. (It should be stressed that it is a minority of strategists who share this belief, but their views should be considered.) Furthermore, intervening in a Taiwan contingency would also send a message to North Korea that South Korea stands to ready to counter any strike from the Kim regime.

How would South Korea get involved in a Taiwan contingency?

The most obvious way in which South Korea would get involved in a Taiwan contingency would be by taking the lead in the deterrence of North Korea, thus freeing up US military resources that could be deployed in support of Taiwan. The US maintains some 28,500 troops in South Korea. According to a 2006 agreement between Seoul and Washington, the two sides decided that there should be “strategic flexibility” in the deployment of US Forces Korea (USFK). In other words, USFK could be re-deployed elsewhere in case of need for the United States. This would help the US avoid overstretch. In fact, a USFK unit was already deployed to Iraq when the US-led invasion of the country took place in the early 21^stcentury. Considering South Korea’s geographical proximity to Taiwan, it would make sense for one or more USFK units to be deployed in case of war with China.

Other types of support that South Korea would be very likely to offer include participation in sanctions against China, diplomatic and political support for Taiwan in the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral forums, and intelligence and information sharing including on China-North Korea discussions. With regards to the first two types of support, South Korea’s position vis-à-vis Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicates that Seoul would be willing to take this stance were China to strike Taiwan. South Korea has been among only a handful of countries joining US- and European Union-led sanctions on Russia, as well as one of the countries condemning Moscow’s invasion in UN General Assembly votes. Certainly, the economic relationship that South Korea has with China is much deeper than its economic ties with Russia. But South Korea has taken a hit to its economy by reducing oil and gas imports from Russia, while South Korean firms have written off decades-old investment in the Russian market. Seoul has also stuck to its decision to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system throughout three successive administrations in spite of undeclared economic sanctions imposed by Beijing. In other words, there is precedent in South Korea prioritising its security interests and international commitments over its economy. As for intelligence and information sharing, Seoul’s intelligence about North Korea and its relations with China would be valuable in case of a Sino-Taiwanese conflict. Seoul already regularly shares intelligence with the US and Japan, especially, and would be expected to continue to do so in case of war in the Taiwan Strait.

The question about the military support that South Korea could offer is the most difficult to answer. As a starting point, it is likely that the Ulsan shipyard could be used by the US Navy for repairs and maintenance. Thus, it would serve as a military support hub. Also, in the same way that South Korea has been providing arms and munition to Ukraine via third parties such as the US or Poland, South Korea would be likely to also transfer arms to the US for use in a Taiwan contingency or for the replenishment of its own stocks if a request from Washington were forthcoming. South Korea would not necessarily want to provide direct military support – even if this depends on the government official or expert one talks to – but the longer a Sino-Taiwanese conflict went on, the more likely it would be that the ROK Armed Forces would get involved. This is especially the case if the US requests military assistance from South Korea, which Seoul would be very likely to agree to. To begin with, the ROK Navy could very well support its US and other counterparts in seeking to overcome the naval blockades that the PLA Navy would be expected to try to implement in the East and South China seas. Seoul often frames ROK Navy joint exercises with the US Navy and other navies as freedom of navigation or North Korea-related activities, but it is no secret that they have China in mind as well. As for the deployment of South Korean troops in support of Taiwan, this would be a frightening scenario for the country’s policymakers but one that they may not be able to avoid if at Sino-Taiwanese conflict drags on. On this point, it should be noted that South Korean troops regularly train in the Philippines along with Filipino and other counterparts. As government officials acknowledge in private, this training is related to a Taiwan contingency. In this respect, South Korean policymakers actively follow the debate in Europe regarding the possibility of NATO member state troops being deployed in Ukraine, since this is a question that they may have to grapple with themselves in case of conflict over Taiwan.

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