CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 31/2023
By Nanae Baldauff
13.12.2023
Key issues
- Japan has finally published a space security strategy in the form of the Space Security Initiative (SSI). To do so, Japan had to overcome various internal challenges and a sluggish mindset on space security.
- The conceptual framework of Japan’s SSI rests on three pillars: 1) security from space; 2) security in space; and 3) the promotion of a space industry that is underpinned by cross-sectoral technological innovation.
- Japan’s space ambition and space architecture for national security matters to Europe because Japan looks to Europe to cooperate on enhancing security in and from space.
Introduction
On 13 June 2023, Japan published its first-ever “Space Security Initiative”, marking a major milestone in Tokyo’s endeavour to be a credible space security actor. Since 1969, when Japan established the National Space Development Agency – the present-day Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) –, until the Basic Space Law was adopted in 2008, the country was principally a civilian space actor. Led by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan was single-mindedly focused on space technology. While MEXT was at the helm of managing national space activities during this time, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were not allowed to own space assets for their own use. This changed after the 1998 Taepodong-1 shock, however, when North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over Japan. This event prompted Japan to have its own information gathering satellites (IGS) and to switch national space planning from MEXT to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office in order to manage space activities in pursuit of national strategic objectives. In 2003, the first of a series of IGS were launched by a domestically manufactured H-IIA rocket from Kagoshima. With the adoption of the Basic Space Law, 2008 was supposed to be an opportune moment to put forth a national space security strategy, especially as it was the year when a 40-year ban on using space for national defence purposes was lifted.
The ending of this ban came at a time when China was testing an Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASW) and where there was a United States (US)-Russia satellite collision, but the situation today is not any better. In 2022, some 36,500 pieces of trackable debris were recorded, of which 6,900 were recorded as active satellites. Space is therefore a congested arena, which is troubling given that capable militaries depend on space systems for military operations and intelligence. Access to space must therefore be protected from a national security perspective. Declared as a warfighting domain, some states are developing, testing and deploying counter-space capabilities which can be both offensive and defensive, and further categorised into kinetic physical, non-kinetic, electronic and cyber. The hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) recently tested by China are but one example of these modern capabilities, which allow militaries to operate at lower trajectories in a highly manoeuvrable manner.
Given the congestion and contestation over space, the 2023 SSI marks a major milestone in the country’s endeavour to be an indispensable space actor. After briefly surveying the current status and challenges associated with the security environment in space, this Policy Brief sketches out key drivers for Japan’s SSI. It identifies Japan’s space security policy objectives, the three approaches designed to achieve them and Japan’s vision of a space architecture for national security. This ambition matters to Europe because Japan’s objective is to enhance security in and from space not only with the US, but also with like-minded countries in Europe.
The trajectory and ascent of Japan’s space and defence strategy
It took some time for Japan to resolve the disconnect between national security and space policy. Various factors prevented Japan’s MoD from actively making use of space. Although it was common knowledge that satellite networks were an integral part of command and control in military operations, the SDF depended on US capabilities – especially for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles. As the MoD was kept out of space-related activities such as investment, research and development (R&D) and ownership and operation for such a long time, they lacked knowledge in space technology. As defence costs had to be kept low, there was little possibility of investing in space, and there was hardly an incentive to do so either. Moreover, as the geographical scope of the SDF was limited to areas surrounding Japan, operational needs to actively use space assets were limited as well. Finally, as the SDF delegated the development and operation of satellites to private companies, it remained only a passive user of space assets.
However, the 2008 Basic Space Law required that a Basic Plan on Space Policy be formulated. Between 2008 and 2023 the Basic Plan was revised five times, providing sustained direction to Japan’s overall national space policy. Though the revision was to be done every five years, a rapid and deteriorating strategic landscape required a shorter interval. Given the ever-growing importance of space for security and defence, as well as the dire situation Japan was facing with its dwindling space industry, Prime Minister Abe issued a directive in 2014 giving a clarion call to action. For the first time, the 2015 Basic Plan placed pre-eminent priority on the security and defence aspects of space.
This strategic direction provided guidance in two policy areas. First, the revised Basic Plan gave direction to space security policy. Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy in 2013 had already stated that ‘Japan will […] maintain and improve the foundation of science, technology and industry that supports the development and utilization of outer space, and promote the utilization of outer space from a security perspective’. Yet, the 2018 “National Defense Program Guidelines” confirmed that Japan will aim to pursue superiority in the use of space by building ‘a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based space situation monitoring’ and strengthening ‘capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information’. This was the first time Japan decided to have offensive capabilities in space and the 2022 National Security Strategy reinforced this trajectory by calling for a space security strategy.
Second, the 2015 Basic Plan gave direction to Japan’s space industry. Although Japan’s first satellite launch dates back to 1970, its domestic space industry was handicapped largely by the 1990 US-Japan Satellite Procurement Agreement. This stipulated rules for purchasing government satellites, effectively privileging American satellites. Despite this disadvantage, Japan’s space industry survived thanks to its technological edge, although technology development alone failed to generate sufficient profits because R&D was disconnected from the promotion of Japan’s international economic competitiveness.
Despite the fact that Japanese satellite manufacturing companies faced fierce competition from US competitors, both Japan and the US governments gradually aligned their space policy. Starting with the Japan-US comprehensive dialogue on space in 2012, space cooperation became a key area of the alliance. In 2013, Japan became the second country after Australia to sign a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) agreement with the US. It was decided that Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite (QZSS) would host US-provided SSA payloads to be launched by the end of 2024. To this end, US Space Domain Awareness (SDA) sensors have just been delivered to Japan. This is the first time that the US military has paid for its space assets to be carried on a foreign country’s satellites.
Towards the Space Security Initiative
The SSI is packed with new and interesting space initiatives. Japan’s overall space security objective is to promote the peace and prosperity of Japan and the safety and security of its citizens through outer space, together with allied and like-minded countries. The goal is to maintain the stable use of and free access to outer space and ‘promote the development of international norms and rules for the use of outer space’. Japan intends to achieve this through three inter-related approaches.
The first is the concept of national security from space. The aim here is to strengthen Japan’s capabilities in space systems that encompass space segment, ground segment and data links. Specifically, intelligence, missile defence, communications, position, navigation and timing (PNT) and space transportation will be the main focus. The intelligence pillar embraces the use of data from space systems in order to strengthen comprehensive national power. The missile defence pillar is about space systems that detect and track missile threats including HGVs coming from neighbouring states, which is fundamentally aligned with reinforcing integrated air and missile defence capabilities – as put forth in the 2022 “Defense Buildup Program”. The third pillar is to establish a multi-layered, anti-interception and anti-jamming satellite communication posture which will be interoperable with the US and like-minded states. The last two pillars, related to PNT and launch capabilities, are areas where Japan already has a competitive advantage. Japan is one of the handful of countries that has an autonomous launching infrastructure in its own territory, and QZSS is the Japanese version of the US’ Global Positioning System.
The second approach is the concept of security in space. It is divided into four specific areas: 1) SSA and SDA; 2) satellite life-cycle management; 3) whole-of-government space governance based on private-public partnerships in order to respond to contingencies in space; and 4) a contribution to international rule-making in space. Japan intends to fundamentally reinforce SDA, which is a fusion of military and civilian space awareness. Japan is now an official member of the Combined Space Operations Initiative, which is a multilateral grouping of the “Five Eyes” countries, plus France, Germany, Italy and Norway, to defend their own governmental and commercial satellites. This is a key aspect of strengthening SDA. The Japanese MoD will join with JAXA to establish cross-servicing in the provision and receiving of higher-resolution SSA satellite data with commercial satellite operators. To manage the life-cycle of satellites, Japan aims to establish satellite servicing which includes technologies such as upgrades, repairs and refuelling. In terms of space governance, Japan wants to take a leadership role in shaping rules and norms for responsible behaviour in space. Japan is among the nations which made a commitment not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent ASW testing against other countries.
The third approach is to promote Japan’s space industry through cross-sectoral technological innovation. First, Japan will publish a space technology strategy that will identify challenges relating to the sustainment and development of technology and industrial and human resource issues, as well as to determine technologies that Japan must prioritise within a viable timetable. Second, with the aim of boosting Japan’s international competitiveness, the country will identify which critical technology components – and relevant supply chains – must be maintained autonomously. Third, Japan will pursue effective R&D so that the MoD can acquire actively and rapidly space capabilities based on strategic and operational needs. Fourth, JAXA will become a centre of excellence for space development. Fifth, Japan will promote commercial sector-led innovation so that both spin-off and spin-on technologies will be exploited. Sixth, cutting-edge industries critical to national security will be supported. Last but not least, Japan will diversify investment and contractual frameworks to incentivise new business opportunities.
Ensuring Japan’s national defence through space
Japan decided to acquire long-range counterstrike capabilities at the end of 2022, as part of the strategic thinking found in three strategic documents designed to deter invasion against the country. To support this capability, a robust indigenous satellite architecture is indispensable. Japan has responded to this challenge by adopting a space architecture that resembles the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (formerly the National Defense Space Architecture), developed by the Space Development Agency of the US Department of Defense. Japan’s MoD will build satellite constellations to detect and track HGVs in real-time and to establish multiple layers of communications bands with higher resiliency. To complement these efforts, Japan could consider a multi-layered network of satellites in conjunction with the US’ space security architecture. For example, Japan and the US could develop optical links to make their spacecraft interoperable. Although specific details are not yet disclosed, Japan’s space security architecture will involve enhanced Japan-US cooperation.
Japan’s plan to build a space architecture for national security also matters to Europe. The future European Union (EU) satellite constellation IRIS2 (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) will integrate military needs. In fact, IRIS2 was among the topics of discussion at the recent Japan-EU summit in July 2023. The recent Tellus-Copernicus Earth observation data-sharing agreement, as well as the ongoing cooperation between Galileo and QZSS, illustrates the growing complementarity of space assets between Europe and Japan. These reflect a healthy implementation of the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement, which includes space cooperation. And even here, industrial cooperation is underway with NTT and Airbus joining forces for R&D on future space-based connectivity. As Japanese space start-ups eye to expand their businesses beyond the US market, their presence in Europe will only grow.
While Japan and NATO have included space in their latest menu of bilateral cooperation, nothing concrete has taken place yet. But military requirements such as the interoperability of satellite data will only necessitate closer space cooperation between Japan and NATO. Both NATO and the Japan-US alliance consider that attacks to, from or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the respective alliances, and such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article V of the respective treaties. Washington has politically committed to defend Japan if Japanese satellites are attacked. Today, it is unclear how Japan, NATO and the EU could act in case of an emergency in or from space, but what is true is that Japan’s SSI calls for cooperation not only with the US but also with like-minded countries; the majority of which are found in Europe.
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The author would like to thank Dr. Yasuhito Fukushima of the National Institute for Defense Studies for his valuable comments on an earlier draft.
The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).
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