The EU-South Korea Security and Defence Partnership

By Ramon Pacheco Pardo

5.11.2024

On 4 November 2024, the European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral Security and Defence Partnership. This has made South Korea one of the first two Asian countries to sign such a partnership with the EU – the other being Japan. The partnership was signed on the same day that South Korea and the EU held their first-ever Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue. It comes in a context where, over recent years, several European countries have upgraded their bilateral security and defence relationship with South Korea via new agreements and contracts, including France, Germany, Poland, Spain or the United Kingdom (UK), among others. The EU – South Korea Security and Defence Partnership also comes in the context of the EU taking the decision to become a more geopolitical actor, including a greater focus on security and defence matters to complement NATO and the EU’s own member states. Finally, the partnership comes in the context of the Ursula von der Leyen Commission having appointed the EU’s first-ever Defence Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius.

Global geopolitical shifts such as China’s growing assertiveness, enduring US-China competition, the past negative experience with alliance-sceptic Donald Trump, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or, more recently, North Korea-Russia cooperation explains the EU’s growing focus on security matters. With the EU strengthening its focus on security and defence matters, the Union has quickly identified South Korea as one of the two Asian countries it wanted to swiftly sign a Security and Defence Partnership with. South Korea, for its part, was receptive to this proposal, including due to the same geopolitical shifts identified by the EU as well as North Korea’s growing hostility. Thus, Seoul also sought a rapid conclusion to the negotiation process between the two parties.

Why has the EU decided to sign a Security and Defence Partnership with South Korea?

The EU is one of several European actors that, in recent years, has upgraded the status of South Korea as a reliable and desirable security partner. Long-term factors include shared interests, goals and values, coupled with South Korea’s strong military, economic, technological and diplomatic capabilities. From a European perspective, few countries share its interests, goals and values. This has become clear in the responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with South Korea being one of a handful of non-NATO members to openly and decisively side with Kyiv. In the particular case of shared values, South Korea being one of a small number of full democracies in Asia makes it an attractive, non-controversial partner. Crucially, the fact that South Korea has strong capabilities that it can share with its European partners makes it an appealing partner for the EU at a time of strained budgets.

South Korea’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has enhanced the profile of Seoul in the eyes of the EU and European countries. South Korea is the only Asian country to provide defensive military and economic support directly to Ukraine, as well as meaningful offensive military capabilities indirectly via third countries. In particular, South Korea’s ability to deliver artillery shells, howitzers or tanks at short notice and in spite of its own security needs has been much appreciated across European capitals. In this respect, South Korea’s arms deals with Poland, followed by others with countries such as Estonia, Finland or Latvia have helped South Korea to see a growing number of EU member states calling for deeper security ties.

The complementarity and similarities between the EU’s and South Korea’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies is another important reason why the Union has sought to sign a Security and Defence Partnership with Seoul. Both strategies identify similar threats in areas such as cyber or maritime, as well as similar approaches emphasising cooperation with like-minded partners. South Korea’s strategy, in particular, identifies the EU as one of Seoul’s preferred partners – which greatly pleased EU decision-makers. The complementarity between the two strategies further reinforced the belief across the EU that South Korea is a partner to work with on security and defence matters.

What are the key areas of focus of the Security and Defence Partnership?

European and NATO policymakers have noted that South Korea’s approach to security cooperation agreements and partnerships is based on a premise of focusing on achievable goals, rather than laying out a shopping list of desirables. The EU-South Korea Security and Defence Partnership is no exception. Of the different areas included in the Partnership, however, three appear to be key, also based on my own regular conversations with EU, European and South Korean policymakers over the years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, cybersecurity prominently features in the Security and Defence Partnership. The EU and South Korea already have a Digital Partnership Agreement and a high-level Cyber Dialogue. Furthermore, EU member states such as the Netherlands and Poland have strong cybersecurity partnerships with South Korea. Plus, South Korea is part of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence – with Seoul having been the first Asian country to formally join. There are clear synergies between the EU and South Korea. They can learn from each other about how to address cyber warfare and malicious activities from countries such as China, North Korea or Russia, think about conducting joint tabletop exercises potentially with other countries as well or support each other’s resilience.

Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation is another key area highlighted in the Security and Defence Partnership. The EU and South Korea have long been worried about the proliferation of these types of technologies and weapons from North Korea to the Middle East, given the economic and political benefits for the former and the potential to create instability in the latter. More recently, North Korea has been transferring missiles to Russia as Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine continues. Iran has also allegedly transferred missiles to Russia. Thanks to the Security and Defence Partnership, the EU and South Korea now have a strong framework to coordinate counterproliferation activities including EU member state navies helping to patrol the waters around the Korean Peninsula, sharing information about these proliferation activities or approaching third countries to remind them of their obligations under multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions to prevent North Korea’s proliferation activities.

Interestingly, the development of new technologies and weapons systems has also been included in the Security and Defence Partnership. As the EU ramps up its spending in this area under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework and the European Defence Fund (EDF), and while member states boost their national spending on new weapons systems following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an internal debate about whether to include non-EU countries in these efforts. Along with other countries with strong defence industries such as the United States or the UK, South Korea would certainly be keen in the EU being open to cooperation with third countries. However, some EU member states would rather use EU funds for EU firms, with countries such as France, Germany or Sweden seeking to prop up their own defence industries. Led by Poland under its co-production agreement with South Korea, most Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries have indicated greater openness to collaboration with South Korean arms manufacturing firms, which would help reduce research and development (R&D) costs and should also result in greater interoperability. It should also be noted that several European arms firms already provide components to their South Korean counterparts in any case. Thus, supply chain collaboration could be an avenue to expand this type of cooperation, along with joint R&D.

__________