Assuming Primary Responsibility for Conventional Defence: Implications for European Security

The debate is no longer whether Europe should assume greater responsibility for its defence, but how quickly and effectively it can do so. Washington’s strategic repositioning has clarified a new division of labour within NATO: Europeans are expected to act as the primary conventional defenders of their continent, with the United States (US) providing more selective support. This shift requires Europe to generate frontline mass, sustain deterrence on the Eastern Flank, rebuild industrial depth and ensure long-term support to Ukraine.

In what has been termed a “NATO 3.0” moment, Europe must translate economic weight into credible military power. Readiness without industrial capacity is illusory; deterrence rests on sustained production of ammunition, air and missile defence, armoured systems and the ability to regenerate combat power at speed. Backed by rising defence spending commitments after the Hague Summit and EU financing tools, this transformation marks not just burden-sharing, but a structural redefinition of Europe’s strategic role for decades to come. At this event, CSDS and its partners sought to address the following questions: 

– Is Russia containable by Europe? Does Europe possess the capacity required to manage the Russian challenge without substantial US conventional backstopping — or does the transition risk creating temporary deterrence gaps? 

– Is time on Europe’s side? As the US increasingly prioritises the Western Hemisphere and its campaign against Iran, are transition timelines accelerating? To what extent might compressed timelines test Europe’s ability to assume primary responsibility credibly and coherently? 

– What does a Europe-as-primary-defender model mean operationally? How must force posture, readiness cycles, command arrangements and capability priorities evolve to sustain credible conventional deterrence across the Eastern Flank? 

– Is defence-industrial reform the true centre of gravity? To what extent do procurement speed, scalability, munitions depth and surge capacity determine the success of Europe’s deterrence posture? Can Europe align political ambition with industrial output at the scale and tempo required? 

At this event, senior officials from NATO, the EU and the defence industry engaged in a discussion about the operational, doctrinal and industrial dimensions of greater European conventional responsibilities.