Europe and the Indo-Pacific: The Possible Effects of Growing Right-Wing Influence

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 20/2026

By Michael Reiterer and Mason Richey

13.10.2026

Key issues

• Right-wing influence will narrow and renationalise, but not end, EU-Indo‑Pacific engagement. However, divergent views on China, Taiwan and Russia could weaken EU coherence.
• Europe’s right-wing parties, especially in France and Germany, risk reframing EU policy from shared values and interests to leveraged sovereignty and populist short-term gains.
• Pragmatic minilateral coalitions on issues of common interest (e.g., critical minerals, semiconductors, shipbuilding, etc.) are needed.

 

Introduction

Europe’s shift to the right is no longer a contingency but an ongoing process. The domestic consequences of a European rightward turn are well understood, but the foreign policy effects of this shift, particularly in terms of relations with the Indo-Asia-Pacific, remain understudied. This CSDS Policy Brief addresses that gap.

Populist right-wing leaders are not new in Europe, of course. Viktor Orban generated European Union (EU) foreign policy friction, especially over Russia and China, but he was often isolated. Other central and eastern European right-populist leaders have had only limited European influence, especially on Indo-Asia-Pacific policy. Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni has pursued a right-populist domestic agenda but generally centrist international policies, including in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

EU Indo-Asia-Pacific policymaking has therefore remained manageable under right-populist influence. That may change as France and Germany drift toward the hard right. Hard right leadership or influence in the EU’s two main member states would affect the EU’s cohesion and the Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy, including measures addressing China as a predatory trade partner and competitor.

In this context, this policy brief first examines the rightward shift in French and German politics and its implications for foreign policy toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It then assesses the likely effects on specific EU relationships (Japan, Korea, China, India, Australia, New Zealand) and regional strategies before concluding with policy recommendations for securing future cooperation.

France: from Jupiter to Venus

The “Jupiterian” presidency of Emmanuel Macron ends in 2027, likely closing a period of centrist French foreign policy channelled through the EU. The presidential election may bring to power Marine Le Pen or an alter ego from the Rassemblement National (RN). Its nationalist-right ethos links domestic socio-economic malaise to supposedly uncontrolled immigration, and extends to anti-EU and anti-globalisation/-cosmopolitan sentiment, “France first” economic and trade policy, non-interventionist rhetoric and accommodation toward (albeit increasing distance from) Russia.

A right-populist French president could strongly influence EU foreign affairs, including Indo-Asia-Pacific strategy. Institutionally, the consensus norm in the European Council would allow Le Pen to constrain or obstruct policy. Moreover, France significantly shapes the selection of EU officials, including the Commission President and High Representative/Vice-President. Le Pen’s choices for foreign, defence and trade ministers and the permanent representative would likewise affect relevant Council formations.

RN policy content, especially on the Indo-Asia-Pacific, remains uncertain because the party’s populist nationalism is more political style than coherent platform. Hostility to the EU, NATO and global institutions implies shifting from EU amplification of French interests toward bilateral relations with major powers such as the United States (US), China and India and middle powers including Japan, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN states. Le Pen would probably devalue EU and French Indo-Pacific strategies for their European, Macronist and regional framing, although this would change décor more than substance.

Trade is likely the clearest area of substantive difference between Le Pen and Macron, with Le Pen favouring broader protectionism. Macron has backed trade reform and, together with Germany, restrictions on China for economic security while otherwise upholding liberalised global and regional trade. As trade is an EU core competence, an RN president sceptical of liberal trade would mean a tougher task for the EU to update its Indo-Asia-Pacific trade agreements with non-China partners. Inter alia, a Le Pen-led France may turn to national-level industrial subsidies and non-tariff barriers to gain relative international competitiveness (as an EU member state official stated to one of the authors). Le Pen is likely, however, to back continuing EU efforts to protect European (including French) markets from a growing “China shock” while building supply-chain and critical materials security outside Chinese pathways.

Another Indo-Asia-Pacific area in which Le Pen has a clear commitment different from Macron is human rights in China. Like many hard-right parties, the RN holds little store in including human rights among priorities for dealing with China. This is partially out of rhetorically realist antagonism to universal values as outlined by the EU and the United Nations (UN), and partially out of belief that human rights discussions with China are likely to fail.

Le Pen is also less likely to engage in numerous ongoing EU Indo-Pacific Strategy initiatives for specific action areas. Green transition, biodiversity preservation, ocean governance, promotion of EU standards and regulations, digital partnerships and security and defence partnerships (including coordinated enhanced naval deployments) are areas of RN scepticism. Notably, the latter, which are more about order-building than immediate deliverables, will likely have limited support from Le Pen in the absence of short-term concrete benefit for France.

The RN appears favourable toward India but lacks a strategic vision for Japan, South Korea or ASEAN. Its China policy is trade-centred and leaves unclear its positions on Taiwan, Beijing’s “One China Principle” versus the “One China Policy” and the EU position framing China as partner, competitor and systemic rival. Russia, which has cultivated financial and political ties with Le Pen and the RN, would seek to use them to advance its Asian interests, including toward China.

Arguably the most significant Le Pen effect on EU Indo-Asia-Pacific strategy could be indirect. Namely, she is likely to disagree with member state counterparts and EU institutional leaders on a range of issues related to her domestic priorities or, with respect to foreign and EU policy, at odds with her populist nationalism. She may in turn use the European Council and influence via the Council of the EU to hold hostage unrelated matters, and Indo-Asia-Pacific measures would not be exempt.

Germany: democracy arsonists test the firewall

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is now Germany’s most popular party despite questionable bona fides in supporting constitutional democracy. Its narrative of national emergency has produced a clear polling lead over the next most popular party, the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Sachsen-Anhalt’s September 2026 Landtag election, the AfD doubled its vote share, nearly achieving an absolute majority of seats. Two weeks later it also won Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s Landtag election.

AfD support comes despite incoherence regarding both domestic and foreign policy. The AfD’s three wings – a neo-imperialist faction represented by Bjoern Hoecke, and two rivalrous but more mainstream hard-right factions led by party co-chairpersons Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla – agree primarily on two things: first, immigration is supposedly ruining Germany; and second, the centrist parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, FDP) are failing to reverse ostensible German decline. The AfD’s factions are thus united on what they oppose but disagree on a positive agenda.

That is especially true for foreign policy, and à fortiori for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. While France’s RN has grudgingly accepted EU membership and the euro, the AfD is avowedly Eurosceptic and anti-globalisation/-cosmopolitan with a “Germany first” platform reflected in protectionist economic/trade policy, non-interventionism in regional/global conflict and close relations with Russia. These are negative positions, rather than a proactive programme, and indeed the AfD has no dedicated policy on China, Japan, South and North Korea, ASEAN, India or Australia.

Unlike the RN, the AfD is unlikely to gain federal executive power soon because centrist parties maintain a political “firewall” (Brandmauer) against governing coalitions that include it. It could nevertheless break the firewall indirectly through state governments (such as Sachsen-Anhalt, where it gained state parliament speakership with supporting votes from a far-left populist party and renegade votes from mainstream parties) and their Bundesrat votes. Its substantial Bundestag caucus and committee presence also provide leverage over Indo-Asia-Pacific policy. More importantly, consistent AfD polling above 30% would narrow coalition options for EU cooperation, revisions to Germany’s China and Indo-Pacific policies and regional initiatives, pushing outcomes toward the lowest common denominator. The parliamentary leader of the CDU has said a powerful AfD would “have an effect on everyone” in government. Chancellor Merz admitted its Sachsen-Anhalt victory “changes all of Germany”. The Mecklenburg-Vorpommern result was a “disaster”, as a weakened CDU failed to reach the 5% threshold for entering the regional parliament.

Messaging from an increasingly powerful AfD would attempt to make it harder for the German chancellor to advance numerous otherwise standard elements of the EU’s policy priorities for the Indo-Asia-Pacific area: green transition, biodiversity preservation, ocean governance, promotion of EU standards and regulations, trade and digital partnerships and security and defence partnerships.

AfD policy toward China remains unclear, beyond some form of increased trade protectionism. The party would likely use political power to undermine current EU policy, and rejects the categorisation of China as partner, competitor and rival. An AfD member could not clarify to one author whether the party supports the “One China Policy” or Beijing’s “One China Principle”. Its Bundestag group has also served as a vector for Chinese (and Russian) espionage, sending non-public EU and German deliberations to Beijing (and Moscow). This history may complicate further reflection and action on China, especially if the AfD gains formal power at federal or state level.

Russia has become a subject of slippage between the two right-wing parties. The RN has recently elaborated its position on outside influence in French foreign policy to include Russian meddling, while the AfD continues unabated relations, including financial, with Moscow. This reduces Russia’s possibilities to use its ties synergistically to advance its interests in Asia, including with respect to China.

Indo-Asia-Pacific stakes

Europe, through the EU and its member states, has important relations across the Indo-Asia-Pacific: healthy strategic partners such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia; a malignant strategic partner in China; multi-aligned partners including India, Singapore and ASEAN; and rogue state North Korea. Each relationship has distinct features and stakes. This section assesses relations with Japan, South Korea, China, India, Australia and New Zealand under stronger right-wing influence in Paris, Berlin and Brussels.

Japan

Japan is the EU’s most important cooperative strategic partner in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Under prime minister Takaichi Sanae, Tokyo has a right-leaning nationalist government. Indeed, that Europe’s nationalist right-wing is unenthusiastic about cosmopolitan cooperation (at least via the EU) with distant strategic partners may, in Japan’s case, be ameliorated by the commonalities that Japan and the European right-wing parties have on restrictive immigration policies. This might facilitate smoother cooperation than expected.

This dynamic could be reinforced by overlapping interests, since Japan and many European states, including France and Germany, are increasingly aligned on tougher China policy. As both a technological and industrial/security partner, Japan matters in critical minerals, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cybersecurity, supply-chain resilience and defence industrial sectors, all areas important to Europe as it advances its de-risking from China, which threatens a “China shock” that would decimate European industry, employment and social stability. The French and German populist-right also have equities in preventing this.

However, despite conservative nationalism, Japan remains cosmopolitan in outlook, and its cooperation with Europe is often routed through the EU. The RN and AfD range from indifferent to hostile towards certain Europe-Japan defence projects, such as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) or the EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership; the same applies to potential cooperation in areas like radar, missile guidance systems, robotics, dual-use advanced manufacturing and environmental (especially climate change) policies. Additionally, a more hard-right-wing-influenced EU might struggle to update its Free Trade and Digital Partnership Agreements with Japan, since these are routed through the EU and deprivilege national-level autonomy.

Substantial right-wing influence would not unwind Europe’s cooperation with Japan but would narrow its scope and make it more transactional. The partnership would become less focused on order-building just as the EU and Japan seek to fill gaps created by revisionist behaviour from China, Russia and the US. Cooperation would therefore rest more on short-/medium-term interest alignment than shared liberal values.

South Korea

For Europe, South Korea rivals Japan in importance for the Indo-Asia-Pacific’s industrial and security architecture. Like Japan, it fits a wider coalition model: it cooperates with NATO’s Indo-Pacific Four, is a recurring G7 guest, manufactures critical semiconductors and supplies weapons to European states. It also supports supply-chain diversification as Seoul and European capitals navigate US economic coercion and China’s predatory trade practices. Also like Japan, its politics balance nationalism and cosmopolitanism. One difference, however, is that Seoul’s current government is friendlier to China. Cooperation with Europe often runs through the EU strategic partnership, including the Free Trade, Crisis Management, Security and Defence and Digital Partnership agreements.

Given the foregoing, a Europe with greater right-wing influence in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and beyond would likely have a profile for cooperation with South Korea like that for Japan. There could be difficulty in modernising the EU-South Korea Free Trade and Digital Partnership Agreements. The Security and Defence Partnership could wither, especially as Seoul’s interest in this area is incentivised by the possibility of getting deeper and broader access to the European defence market, a prospect that Berlin and Paris may try to curb (to protect their domestic defence industries).

A more right-wing-influenced Europe would not roll back collaboration with Seoul, but, as with Tokyo, the strategic partnership would likely become more transactional (and thus less strategically oriented toward middle power order-building) and less based on aligned values.

The French and German hard-right’s ties to Russia could also indirectly impact the Korean Peninsula. Current discourse recognises that Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation in Russia’s war against Ukraine links European and Korean security. Because the RN and AfD are open to diplomatic outcomes granting Russia more than its battlefield position warrants, they see little reason to pressure Moscow or Pyongyang over military cooperation. On the one hand, this increases risks to South Korea and could weaken Europe’s credibility with Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei and other partners that view the Russia-North Korea-China nexus as a single challenge. On the other hand, the current government in South Korea is cautiously exploring economic opportunities involving Russia, a line that the RN and AfD could welcome.

China

Europe-China relations are the most important non-Russia foreign policy area exposed to an RN victory in France and continued AfD gains in Germany. Yet this combination would probably facilitate neither a coherent hawkish nor dovish EU approach, but paralysis and renationalisation: the parties partially diverge on China even as they share Eurosceptic elements.

The Europe-China policy area with the greatest likelihood to remain similar despite a more powerful European right-wing is trade and economic relations. Both the RN and AfD have become more concerned that a “China shock” in Europe is a risk to domestic industry, employment and prosperity, social stability, economic security and state sovereignty. As such, both parties are broadly aligned with the goal, shared by Europe’s mainstream parties, of defending against certain Chinese trade and investment practices.

There is significant nuance, however. The RN’s protectionism is likely compatible with supporting continued EU trade defence instruments (anti-dumping measures, anti-coercion instrument, the proposed EU-market access “kill switch”) against Chinese overcapacity in strategic industries. This would align with the European Commission’s de-risking agenda. The AfD is more transactional with respect to China policy, reflecting German industry’s (declining but still real) dependence on Chinese markets. Notably, industry lobbies – e.g., the auto sector, selected Mittelstand with China exposure – would push against China tariffs that invite retaliation above a certain level. An increasingly powerful AfD could try to influence the German government in a way that would reflect this positioning.

The net effect: EU trade defence measures could become harder to pass by qualified majority, and case-by-case sectoral fights, including beggar-thy-neighbour efforts by states to gain comparative advantage, could replace unified European strategy.

A stronger populist right would depart more clearly from current China policy on human rights. Neither the RN nor AfD prioritises pressure on Beijing, reflecting scepticism toward universal values, a transactional view that sees little direct benefit in provoking China and the belief (shared with one author by several hard-right legislators) that pressure is unlikely to work.

A harder-right Europe would also perhaps change its support for Taiwan. Europe’s military role in maintaining the cross-Strait status quo is limited, but its economic presence and diplomatic support matter. The EU and almost all member states support a “One China Policy” that helps keep Taiwan free, democratic, prosperous and protected from coerced unification. The RN and AfD have not clarified whether they support that policy or Beijing’s “One China Principle”, which treats Taiwan as a renegade province. Lacking a principled position – in interviews with one author, AfD and RN legislators were unable to clarify their respective parties’ positions – they might remain neutral or side with Beijing during coercion, assuming a Taiwan Strait crisis would be brief and spare Europe-East Asia trade.

Finally, close RN and AfD relations with Russia might also affect the French and German posture toward China, with repercussions on the EU position. Russia and China are strategic partners, with China providing a lifeline to Russia’s economy and military, given its struggles in the Ukraine war. Current EU policy is to pressure Russia on all fronts, including via China, to end the war. The ambivalent, accommodationist tendencies of the RN and AfD towards Russia would likely mean less bandwidth for Europe to press Beijing to stop or limit its support for Russia. This might or might not improve relations with Beijing, but it would communicate to Chinese leaders that the EU is weak, inviting further Chinese undermining of Europe.

India

India has become an important EU strategic partner, supporting supply-chain resilience, diversification from China and cooperation in pharmaceuticals, technology and industry. The EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) – still requiring ratification – is therefore both economic and strategic. The Trade and Technology Council proves that cooperation can deepen despite differences over Russia, China and international norms. Given India’s strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, it will work selectively with the EU, US, Quad and BRICS states rather than join fixed geopolitical camps. For the EU, India should be treated as an autonomous power, not an ideological ally.

A rightward nationalist shift in Europe would bring mixed effects. Emphasis on sovereignty, borders, counterterrorism and non-intervention may resonate with Indian Hindu-inspired politics and could reduce human rights conditionality, making diplomacy more transactional. The main frictions would concern mobility and trade. Restrictive immigration policies could limit access for Indian students, skilled workers, researchers and service-sector professionals, a central Indian negotiating demand. Europe’s diversification from China may create production and investment opportunities, while protectionism, domestic-content rules and tighter market access could weaken the FTA. India will therefore cooperate on security, technology, supply chains and pharmaceuticals, while resisting mobility limits, trade barriers and pressure to align on Russia (energy) or China. The growing importance of New Delhi necessitates pragmatic cooperation irrespective of ideological stance, but migration policies, protectionism and strategic autonomy will test the relationship.

Australia and New Zealand

Serving as a resilience-focused partnership, Australia has become increasingly important to the EU’s economic security agenda because of its critical minerals and strategic location. It is a natural partner for diversifying supply chains and securing access to raw materials, especially rare earths. Concerning the latter, cooperation is already under discussion in the G7 and among the US, UK and EU. In a right-leaning Europe, ties with Australia would likely gain further political support because they serve the goal of industrial sovereignty.

New Zealand plays a smaller, yet important role. Brussels already links its relationship with Wellington to raw materials, trade diversification and supply-chain resilience. The government is interested in pursuing this cooperation, drawing on the Energy and Raw Materials Chapter of the EU-New Zealand FTA. In strategic terms, New Zealand helps diversify the EU’s external economic base, is a door to Antarctica and can help with Australia to reinforce the EU’s outreach to Indo-Pacific island states, which is important in terms of maritime security.

Conclusions and recommendations

The geopolitical order is intensely contested: a revisionist US is reconfiguring priorities, while Russia’s alignment with China makes European and Indo-Asia-Pacific security inseparable. A more transactional, nationalist Europe would approach the disputed geopolitical order as a contest over leverage rather than shared values. It would invoke security and stability in a sovereigntist register, asserting national flexibility unmoored from consistent liberal commitment to rules-based internationalism. Cooperation with Indo-Asia-Pacific partners would remain possible but become narrower, more selective and interest-driven – consistent with a right-wing emphasis on “sovereignism”, migration control, scepticism toward supranational authority and national priorities over common principles.

A post-Trump “MAGA” US remains a major risk. Washington could remain leader-focused, sceptical of alliances, soft on Russia and open to recognising a Chinese Indo-Asia-Pacific sphere of influence in exchange for Chinese recognition of US primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Europe and the Indo-Asia-Pacific would then face difficult reassessments. Cooperative action would help, and a populist-right European foreign policy would make this harder.

In this context, the question becomes: how to preserve order without relying on a liberal internationalism in which Europe would no longer believe? Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India could remain adaptable counterparts for such an effort, with success depending on whether pragmatic coalitions could emerge without being submerged by cynicism. Strategically, the goal would not be to create a single anti-China bloc, but rather to create flexibility in which Europe could cooperate with partners when the US acted unreliably, Russia remained revisionist and China acted as a systemic rival.

Such adaptation would not be automatic under an RN administration and an ascendant AfD constraining a mainstream German government and a muscular pro-EU Indo-Asia-Pacific agenda. The EU, its member states and like-minded regional partners should therefore prepare around several linked principles.

First, frame functional cooperation around sovereignty, resilience and industrial capacity rather than abstract moral universalism. This could satisfy hard-right rhetoric long enough for practical benefits and vested interests to constrain later reversals. One author’s interviews with EU officials indicate that Brussels is therefore working to ensure that numerous measures and policies are implemented, institutionalised, programmed or planned. Second, make Indo-Asia-Pacific policy more operational and less declaratory, improving continuity and implementation. Third, preserve EU coherence to withstand efforts by China, Russia and the US to divide Europe.

Specific actions could include:

• Deepening cooperation with Japan beyond GCAP to include a small number of realisable projects in which national-level contributions by European states would have positive domestic political benefits.
• Using EU-level mechanisms to strengthen South Korea’s role as a defence industrial and semiconductor partner, including production in Europe.
• Cooperating selectively with India where EU member states benefit directly, including maritime security and pharmaceutical supply-chain diversification, while respecting India’s strategic autonomy. Implementing the FTA and investment agreement and maximising the Trade and Technology Council’s work on pharmaceuticals, IT and semiconductors would be mutually beneficial.
• Adapting Indo-Pacific strategy to a Russian-Chinese alignment policy, without turning the Indo-Pacific into a direct military theatre for the EU, yet pursuing a comprehensive policy in effectively coordinating trade, technology and security policy.
• Preparing for a more transactional US by reducing dependence on US strategic guarantees, where possible, as well as on technology, finance, arms and communication platforms.
• Locking in selected areas of middle power cooperation and cooperation with Global South countries in maintaining support for ASEAN to promote centrality and serve as a regional anchor.
• Forming, in parallel, wider partner networks of minilateral arrangements in the region (e.g., QUAD-related cooperation as an enabling security framework) while engaging with Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) partners to foster economic/trade links.
• Reaching out together with New Zealand and Australia to the Pacific island states to avoid a vacuum filled by others.
• Accelerating ongoing EU trade and digital negotiations to weave a strong European economic layer with partners in the region.
• Building a multi-partner critical minerals architecture: treat Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea as complementary partners in a mineral-security network, not only for access, but for processing, recycling, strategic stockpiling and transport resilience. Message this as diversification away from overreliance on both the US and China, bolstering state autonomy.
• Deepening AI and semiconductor cooperation through digital partnerships and broader technology coalitions: expand digital partnerships and research links with Japan and South Korea, while creating broader technology coalitions on secure compute, chip supply and trustworthy AI standards.
• Adding a maritime-industrial pillar by integrating South Korea’s shipbuilding strength into EU thinking on logistics, capacity-building and resilient sea lanes.
• Selectively engaging with right-populist leadership on Indo-Asia-Pacific issues and relationships, using their relative inexperience in this area as an opportunity to socialise them into supporting and developing responsible policies.

__________