Plus ça change? France and European Defence After the Legislative Elections

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 23/2024

By Gesine Weber

25.7.2024

Key issues

• Legislative elections have reshuffled the French political spectrum, but President Macron will most likely keep grip on security and defence policy.
• The French elections will reshuffle leadership within the EU, and leadership and coalitions in European security more broadly.
• The EU institutions could help contribute to maintaining the momentum set by France in European defence in recent years.

Introduction

France is looking back on a few weeks of political turbulence: in reaction to the disastrous defeat of his party in the European Parliament elections, French President Emmanuel Macron decided to dissolve the National Assembly, the lower house of France’s parliament. After many anticipated a far-right government led by the Rassemblement National (RN) – which clearly won the first round of the legislative elections –, French voters sent a clear “non merci” to this option, relegating the RN to third place (with 142 seats) after the left bloc, the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) (181 seats) and President Macron’s centrist Ensemble (162 seats). The French parliament now reflects a reality that was already visible ahead of the election, juxtaposing three blocs with very different agendas, yet without either of them holding an absolute majority. This majority in parliament is, however, critical for passing any kind of meaningful legislation, and, at the moment, France is still in search of a prime minister who would take on the immense task of trying to find consensus among the political forces.

This CSDS Policy Brief presents potential scenarios for forming a government in France, and outlines their consequences for France’s approach to EU security and defence. It also analyses the potential spillover effects from domestic politics on to EU decisions and policies, and it looks at the implications for French leadership in Europe.

Instability at home almost guaranteed, but presidential prerogatives on defence are likely to remain

As none of the three blocs holds a majority in the French parliament, France will now have to go through a phase of coalition-building. Under the Fifth Republic, France has never seen a comparable situation before: even when the majority in parliament differed from the party of the president – a situation referred to as cohabitation –, this majority was usually sufficient to pass legislation. This time, parties will have to find either formal or informal agreements, demanding an unprecedented political effort. While it is still unclear how much leverage President Macron himself can have on this process to influence coalition-building, it is almost certain to say that he has to brace for much more opposition to his projects domestically. Under every scenario, ambitious reform projects seem almost illusional. Overall, President Macron might, however, maintain his critical role in security and defence, including on the European level. Defence policy is, according to the French constitution, a shared domain (domaine partagé) between the president, who keeps central powers like the command of the armed forces and the nuclear force, and the prime minister, who defines defence policy. However, in either scenario that currently seems possible – a government led by the left with the support of the centrists, a multi-force coalition government structured around President Macron’s Ensemble or a technocratic government – European security and defence is unlikely to be a priority for the next prime minister.

As the left bloc obtained most seats in the elections, it is now up to the forces within this group to come up with a proposition for a prime minister. Yet, the diversity and divergences of political forces within this bloc, ranging from far-left forces like La France Insoumise (LFI) to the Greens and the Socialists, will make it immensely challenging for them to agree on a candidate for the prime minister, as well as a common agenda. While the bloc pulled together a programme very quickly after the announcement of the elections, coming to terms on priorities and personalities will most likely take more time. Furthermore, the NFP will need partners outside their own bloc, likely among the centrists, to form a majority for legislative work. Even if NFP managed to form a government, political tensions within the government as well as within the majority in parliament, would render governing very challenging. If President Macron’s centrists decided to support a government, it is likely that their left coalition partners would rather ask for concessions on socio-economic policies rather than defence policy, hence allowing the president to keep his critical role in this field.

The same outcome with regard to President Macron’s role in European security and defence can be anticipated if the left bloc does not manage to form a government. In this case, President Macron would most likely task the leadership of his Ensemble movement to join forces with the centre-right Les Républicains, as well as forces within the left bloc, namely the Greens and the Socialists. In this case, a prime minister would either be appointed directly from Ensemble, and hence align with President Macron on security and defence policy, or, for example, from civil society – and in this case, it seems unlikely for this person to challenge President Macron on European security and defence.

If both options to form a government fail, President Macron could alternatively appoint, in coordination with the forces in parliament, a personality as a technocratic prime minister. In this scenario, the government’s task would consist in running ongoing affairs smoothly; such a government would focus on maintaining the status quo at the lowest common denominator, whilst any political initiatives would have to be postponed – most likely until a new dissolution of the parliament in summer 2025, the earlier date for another dissolution. A technocratic prime minister would also be highly unlikely to interfere with President Macron’s agenda for European defence, given that this person’s role would be one of a high-level administrator rather than politician.

Spillover effects of domestic politics: funding and credibility at stake

However, the implications of instability in French domestic politics for France’s role in European security and defence are broader than just the division of labour between the president and the prime minister. The consequences of the reshuffling of French domestic politics will most likely become significant for European security and defence once the National Assembly has to vote for the next budget – which is normally the case at the rentrée, after the long period of France’s summer vacation. This year’s budget negotiations can be expected to be particularly tense: although none of the coalition scenarios outlined above would imply that the governing majority opposes strengthening European security and defence – traditionally seen as a power multiplier in France – or European support for Ukraine, a government would have to reconcile very different priorities due to the diversity of forces represented. Just as in the electoral campaign, the parties will most likely prioritise socio-economic issues, and be less likely to make cuts in this field.

An additional challenge for French lawmakers this year is that the European Commission intends to launch an excessive deficit procedure against France, demanding spending cuts of more than 15 billion euros (0.6% of France’s GDP). As none of the political parties will want to sell cuts in social spending to French voters, who still suffer from cost of living increases, ambitious measures supporting European defence, more broadly defence spending, or even support for Ukraine could fall victim to these negotiations. Accordingly, it would be difficult for President Macron to claim political leadership on European defence when France is punching below its weight in terms of financing these ambitions.

Another factor affecting French leadership in European defence after the elections might be the increasing gap between President Macron’s perception of himself and the perception of France in other European countries. While President Macron’s first international appearances after the elections demonstrated his usual self-confidence, the image French domestic politics displays to the outside world is one of a deeply divided country, of messy domestic politics and of a country that might become more inward-looking with the challenges it faces. If internal games for power and policies require more presidential attention, it will be increasingly difficult for President Macron to position himself as legitimate leader among Europeans.

In light of the presidential election in 2027, political uncertainty in France is likely to endure and increase scepticism about deeper cooperation with France on European defence – or, indeed, following France’s initiatives on defence. Although the RN was relegated to third place in the legislative elections, the party has still won the popular vote, with 37% of voters casting a ballot for Marine Le Pen’s party. The scenario of a far-right government may be off the table for the moment, but the scenario of a far-right president in 2027 cannot be excluded – with implications for the EU that cannot be overestimated. Against this background, it is highly questionable whether other Europeans, including Germany, will want to put all their eggs in the “cooperation with France” or “following French initiatives in the EU” baskets.

Leadership on European defence is becoming more diffuse

The domestic developments in France do not imply that the political impetus for European defence – and most importantly European sovereignty, one of the key themes of President Macron’s Sorbonne speech shortly after taking office in 2017 – is now lost. In fact, many of the policies suggested by France in the last years, such as the European Peace Facility or the Rapid Deployment Capacity, have found their way into the EU’s toolkit. Furthermore, the ambitions to build a stronger European defence have now clearly become part of the Commission’s agenda, not least because of the geopolitical shock and the changing threat environment following Russia’s war on Ukraine. Even in the absence of strong leadership for European defence initiatives from France, the Commission has proven over the last few years that much can be achieved on the supranational level through the smart mobilisation and use of already existing tools. Furthermore, the Commission demonstrated its ability to shape European defence policy through measures on the defence industrial side, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP). With the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as president of the European Commission, and the likely appointment of Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), two key positions will be held by politicians who have made it crystal clear that European defence will be among their top priorities. The planned appointment of a European Commissioner for Defence could lead to positive synergies and further catalyse a stronger role for the Commission in security and defence.

The domestic weakening of French President Macron gives, however, also rise to other actors which were less able, or less willing, to shape European defence in the last years, including from an institutional point of view. While the United Kingdom (UK) was clearly at the forefront of leading the European effort in support of Ukraine and had worked effectively with smaller groups of European states, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), there was little willingness in London to engage in a structured way with the EU on topics of security and defence. Under the new Labour government, this is likely to change, and London might indeed seek closer cooperation with Brussels, including through an agreement on security and defence. The new impetus in London for strengthening structured cooperation with the continent could also clearly manifest in Franco-British co-leadership on European security. This is especially true in light of the United States (US) elections and long-term shifts in US’ strategy, where Paris and London – as the European nuclear powers – will have to play a critical role in leading the European conversation on burden-sharing and constructing a truly European pillar in NATO. The UK’s more visible role could therefore also constitute an opportunity for France to stay at the forefront of actors shaping the European security order.

The picture might look different within the EU. Over the past few years, France had significant leverage in the EU not least because of the relatively pale stance of other member states in this policy field. Before Russia’s war on Ukraine, Germany was not particularly eager to shape policy in security and defence; beyond a new political Franco-German impetus after Brexit, neither the Merkel governments nor the traffic light coalition presented wide-ranging initiatives for the future of European security. The eurosceptic government in Poland mostly mobilised against further cooperation within the EU, and clearly preferred security and defence cooperation in the framework of NATO – not least because of the presence of the US in the alliance and its implications for deterrence and defence in case of an attack on an ally. Italy, another key player in the EU, has equally faced domestic instabilities over the last few years, and it has sought to claim leadership in Brussels on migration rather than defence.

This picture has now substantively changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a wake-up moment for Germany, and, although it still remains to be seen how the country will implement its special fund for defence (and, more importantly, maintain the level of defence spending beyond 2027), it has become a more active player in European defence. However, initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative – bringing together NATO allies to work on air defence, using US and Israeli systems – or the procurement of US weapons systems are clearly at odds with the French vision of European defence, where military equipment should be “Made in Europe”. It remains to be seen whether the new French ministers of foreign affairs and defence will be able to keep the short positive momentum that emerged, including in the Weimar triangle, over the last year – for example, the signature of a memorandum of understanding on the joint battle tank (Main Ground Combat System, MGCS). Following the Polish elections, Warsaw’s pro-European government might also play an increasingly important role in Brussels, and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is equally becoming more vocal on European security and defence. These trends add new dynamics to the politics of European defence, and it remains to be seen how France navigates them whilst facing domestic challenges.

Beyond the EU, these trends could also play out at the NATO level. Although France has significantly stepped up its commitment to the Alliance’s “eastern flank” in recent years, its credibility still suffers from accusations of “cheap talk”, meaning that its support for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance is a position that was easy for Paris to adapt in light of the US opposition to it. Particularly in light of the domestic developments in the UK and Poland, many eastern European allies may be more likely to look to these states than to France for leadership. And while French domestic politics is unlikely to constitute major challenges to enhancing efforts within the EU or minilateral formats in European defence, President Macron would have a harder time selling a substantive strengthening of France’s role in NATO domestically. France’s positions as seeing itself as “an ally but not aligned” and “never a vassal” of the US is widely shared among all forces from the centre-left to the centre-right. However, forces on the left of the political spectrum are particularly sceptical of the Alliance, with the far-left LFI even calling for France to leave NATO. Accordingly, bold initiatives with a “NATO label” that might potentially also require parliamentary approval as part of a budget process, would be rather challenging. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely for President Macron to prioritise such initiatives, given his focus on European strategic autonomy and a stronger role for the EU. The President will certainly choose his battles and priorities wisely, and will find good partners in the European Commission pursue them.

Conclusion

How will the French legislative elections ultimately affect the direction of EU defence? Over the very short-term, significant shifts on the French side, as well as a significant impact on EU policy, seem unlikely. Particularly at the moment, with many European capitals in their annual summer slowdown period and the European Commission still in a process of confirming personalities and portfolios, the French elections will not disrupt EU action in this field. In any case, on the horizon is potential turbulence in the transatlantic relationship, with the election of one candidate in particular threatening to up-end the status quo in European defence. Over time, shifts in the US domestic scene may have larger ramifications for European security than France’s own situation.

French domestic politics will most likely remain characterised by instability, marked by the challenge to strike consensus. In fact, even another dissolution of the National Assembly, albeit only possible after a year, cannot be excluded, nor can future replacements of the prime minister be discounted. The full impact of domestic politics on the perception of France in other European capitals, and its legitimacy as a leader in European defence, still remains to be seen. However, given how much President Macron has prioritised European defence over the last few years, it seems unlikely for him to back down on his claims, objectives or ambitions. President Macron will stay in office for almost three more years, and under the French Constitution he cannot run for re-election in 2027. In a scenario of political deadlock domestically, an option could be a “fuite en avant”, a leap forwards, to build his political legacy beyond the borders of France – and going all in on European sovereignty.

__________