Sink or Swim? Revitalising NATO in European Maritime Security

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 29/2024

By Piero Barlucchi

21.10.2024

Key issues

• After decades of crisis management and cooperative security, NATO maritime capabilities are once again needed for deterrence and defence.
• European maritime security is threatened by persistent low-end threats and the return of strategic competition, while European naval capabilities suffer from decades of atrophy and sea-blindness.
• European NATO allies should relaunch the maritime dimension of NATO, chiefly through a new Allied Maritime Strategy, strategic collaboration with the European Union (EU) and increasing deterrence through enhanced naval capabilities and exercises.

Introduction

From the outset, NATO prominently focused on the land and air domains, while playing an important maritime role. Beyond initial maritime references in its name and symbolism, the Alliance hinged on viable power projection across the Atlantic to reinforce the European theatre and contain Soviet fleets. 75 years later, the emphasis and strategic calculus remain firmly anchored in land, air defence and deterrence. However, growing maritime insecurity threatens NATO members, raising the profile of naval dynamics. The emerging security environment is particularly threatening for European allies, whose navies have significantly atrophied over the past few decades, while the centrepiece of NATO’s maritime forces – the United States (US) – is drawn to the Indo-Pacific and could likely pull significant maritime assets from Europe in the event of an Asian contingency.

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of the sea in interstate competition, as Kyiv broke the Russian maritime siege, sinking more than a third of Moscow’s Black Sea fleet. In this respect, European seas are threatened by strategic competition and non-state threats persevere. As underscored by James Bergeron, in such a threatening environment NATO is shifting its maritime posture and its members need to effectively deter adversaries, while both preparing and boosting naval capabilities and addressing non-conventional maritime threats. In order to re-establish credible deterrence and defence under Article 5 across NATO territory, European allies need to step up their naval game. At the same time, the demands on some European navies are also growing in faraway seas. Some European NATO allies are raising their engagement with the Indo-Pacific region and certain European states have ventured into the region with naval deployments.

In this context, this CSDS Policy Brief inquires how European NATO allies can better address existing maritime challenges. After a long period of focus on crisis management, it examines the return to collective deterrence and defence at sea in an increasingly complex and contested maritime environment. The Policy Brief then turns to NATO’s and the EU’s maritime visions, means and relationship. Lastly, it advocates for NATO to overcome its sea-blindness and reawaken maritime warfighting skills, including by drafting a new maritime strategy, better liaising with the EU and investing in naval capabilities.

A harsh awakening

After four decades of high-end naval activities to deter and defend against the Soviet bloc at sea, and to ensure a safe transatlantic maritime bridge for reinforcement and resupply, NATO was faced with a very different, albeit low-end, strategic environment. After the Cold War, NATO did not face the prospect of conventional naval warfare versus a peer competitor, and there was no longer a need for the powerful and numerous fleets of the Cold War. The new, post-Cold War, maritime threats were increasingly low-end, out-of-area and perpetrated by non-state actors. Consequently, NATO’s maritime focus shifted to crisis management, cooperative security and support for land endeavours. Thereby, navies engaged in low-end constabulary and diplomatic activities, while underplaying their military function.

The less demanding maritime security environment and declining defence budgets of the post-Cold War era shaped the strategic outlook and evolution of maritime forces. Overall, this strategic context led to a general atrophy of European navies in terms of unambitious and lower-end fleet procurement, low/medium-intensity operations, neglecting warfighting capabilities, shortcomings in training and readiness, etc. For instance, between 1991 and 2014 the navies of major European NATO naval powers (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) collectively decreased from a total of 302 to 190 vessels and submarines. Additionally, the assets of the new alliance members did not offset NATO’s shrinking naval means. Hence, NATO and its members demonstrated a high-degree of sea-blindness (i.e. a political and cultural lack of appreciation of naval forces and the maritime domain in peace- and war-time).

In 2011, NATO released its Alliance Maritime Strategy to align maritime efforts with its latest Strategic Concept and security environment. The document mostly looked at the contributions of naval forces to NATO’s prevailing core objectives for maritime security – at the time, framed almost exclusively in terms of threats from private or non-state actors. The Strategy emphasised hard security and naval power, which are joined by more diffuse and soft maritime security tasks. Yet, in practice, the absence of a sea control challenger led allies to favour constabulary and diplomatic activities over deterrence and defence. Most notably, the Strategy did not prescribe an immediate change to the naval capabilities of the Alliance, nor did it mention Russia or China.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine three years later in 2014, the Strategy became outdated. Russia’s renewed aggression revived the prospect of naval warfare. As Bergeron has argued, NATO re-emphasised deterrence and defence within its area of responsibility, including its traditional role of conventional naval deterrence. Since 2014, the Alliance has reoriented its maritime posture, while allies relaunched naval investments, rescuing their navies from a historic low in numbers and capabilities. Additionally, allies worked to reawaken their collective naval warfighting skills, while enhancing readiness and developing ambitious high-intensity exercises to show strength and resolve. Besides, NATO re-adjusted its maritime posture by establishing a new operational command to protect transatlantic sea lines and a centre for the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. Due to Russia’s growing presence in the Mediterranean, allies adjusted NATO’s naval deployments by closing the out-of-area anti-piracy Operation Ocean Shield, and developing force generation mechanisms to ensure that high-end naval assets in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces could focus on the Russian navy.

Despite these measures by NATO, the number of combatants allocated to NATO’s Standing Naval Forces has highly fluctuated, both through time and between groups, occasionally dropping to just one or two vessels in a group. This uneven participation undermines the effectiveness, planning and credibility of the Standing Naval Forces. Thereby, it exacerbates naval dynamics that create uncertainty and complicate deterrence at sea, including the impossibility of permanently occupying the oceans and the heightened mobility, stealth and strategic value of warships which allow navies to easily withdraw. Russia’s fully-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 temporarily lowered this participation issue without actually solving it.

Lastly, references to the maritime domain at NATO Summits have remained general and scattered, without articulating a proper maritime framework or strategic vision. Rather, they just mention at times the importance of maritime security, situational awareness, secure sea lines, critical infrastructure, etc. Thereby, allies continue to demonstrate a remaining degree of sea-blindness when it comes to the maritime threats emanating from Russia and China.

Indeed, the potential to strike strategic targets across Europe and interrupt Euro-Atlantic sea routes makes Russia arguably the most significant maritime threat for Europeans. Despite losses in the Black Sea, shipbuilding difficulties and an ageing fleet, Moscow retains a powerful blue-water navy with 265 vessels, featuring a large and sophisticated submarine fleet and powerful missile systems. Besides, Russia is active in the Black, Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and in the High North, where it can employ anti-access/area-denial and hybrid warfare strategies. Furthermore, Russia exploits no-notice snap exercises – often with China – to gain operational experience, undermine rivals’ cohesion and send strategic signals. Likewise, over the past decade, China has modernised and expanded its navy, making it the largest in the world. Beijing has also developed its proxy maritime militia and undermined the law of the sea. China is increasing its worldwide influence with bases, investments, exercises and naval diplomacy operations. Additionally, various middle powers – especially Iran and North Korea – are expanding and advancing their naval capabilities and leveraging hybrid warfare at sea. Meanwhile, non-state challenges have not gone away with piracy, seaborne migration, climate change and terrorist attacks continuing to threaten maritime security.

The EU and NATO at sea

Free, safe and stable maritime spaces are vital for Europe’s prosperity and security due to its heavy reliance on sea trade. After decades of secure and open oceans under US supremacy at sea, and despite a recent surge in US naval presence in European seas to reassure allies, it is increasingly likely for the US to shift some naval assets to enhance forward presence in the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of the degree of US involvement, Europeans must prepare for naval warfare, while addressing low-end threats. In short, for the first time, they must prepare to cover the whole spectrum of maritime security challenges.

In order to effectively address maritime insecurity, European allies should start in their own neighbourhood, leveraging NATO’s unique strengths and capabilities, especially for high-end challenges. However, European allies are presently constrained by insufficient naval means, ageing platforms and a lack of combat readiness. After retiring a third of main surface combatants over twenty years, Europeans need a mass of high-end naval capabilities. However, most of the vessels currently under development – including aircraft carriers, frigates, offshore patrol vessels, submarines etc. – will only be available after 2030 due to long development times and delays in naval procurement.

Unlike the Cold War, NATO is no longer the only way for Europeans to collectively address maritime threats. Over the past decades, the EU has emerged as a relevant actor for maritime security, moving from an interest circumscribed to environmental and economic concerns to branding itself as a ‘global maritime security provider’. The EU and NATO present converging maritime security visions, as well as offsetting strengths and weaknesses. Hence, members of both the EU and NATO can select on a case-by-case basis under which flag to operate collectively – or they can and do choose ad hoc deployments from time-to-time (e.g. Operation Agénor).

In general, NATO retains primacy for high-end deterrence, defence and kinetic operations through training and expertise in naval warfare, heightened interoperability and command structures. In turn, the Union is best suited for low-intensity roles, including crisis management, maintaining good order at sea and maritime policing, thanks to its politico-diplomatic tools, naval missions and maritime initiatives. Besides, the EU is generally better perceived than NATO by third parties due to its low-key security profile, non-military instruments and distinction from the US.

While NATO’s maritime thinking is anchored in the 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy, the main strategic direction at sea for the Union is its Maritime Security Strategy, which was updated in 2023. It details the EU’s holistic interpretation of maritime security and anchors the maritime strategic thinking in four guiding principles of a cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles and maritime multilateralism. Besides, the Union’s interests at sea extend beyond security to encompass ocean governance, the blue economy and the safety of shipping. Furthermore, the Union’s engagement at sea is also guided by the maritime dimension of its global and regional security strategies. Overall, the EU has developed a thick net of cross-cutting strategic documents and policies which particularise its role at sea, but also undermine consistency and raise the risk of forum shopping. In any case, while the EU recognises the full spectrum of maritime security threats, its focus is mainly on non-state and non-traditional threats.

NATO and the EU have different, yet similar, ways to pursue maritime security. The maritime posture of the transatlantic Alliance relies on its Standing Naval Forces. These comprise four high-readiness and permanent groups which support the core tasks of the Alliance by embodying resolve, unity and deterrence, contributing to crisis management and engaging in security cooperation and naval diplomacy. Besides, they perform a variety of specific tasks including strategic signalling, situational awareness, mine-hunting, maintaining a secure maritime environment, infrastructure protection, defence and supporting operations. Moreover, NATO runs specific operations and activities which also provide presence, deterrence and cooperation opportunities. Currently, these include Operation Sea Guardian, which engages in counterterrorism, maritime situational awareness and capacity building in the Mediterranean, and the Aegean monitoring activity, which assists with seaborne migration flows.

Additionally, NATO’s command and control structure is the cornerstone of the Alliance. Regarding the maritime domain at the strategic level, the Allied Command Operations plans and executes NATO’s operations. At the operational level, NATO relies on three Joint Force Commands, entrusted with different areas of operation, and at the tactical level it relies on the Allied Maritime Command. Furthermore, the Alliance draws on decades of experience and from additional structures including its Shipping Centre to liaise with merchant shipping, a centre dedicated to critical undersea infrastructure, high-quality education, research and training, etc.

The efficiency and capabilities of NATO’s forces and commands are tested through military exercises. Notably, exercises are used to send strategic messages, demonstrate deterrence and readiness, develop interoperability and train warfighting skills. Recent exercises have been tailored to demonstrate the capacity to secure Atlantic sea lines of communication and revive warfighting skills, especially for submarine warfare and maritime strike capabilities.

Compared to NATO’s agile Standing Naval Forces, the EU faces bigger force generation issues. The Union currently runs three naval operations: the counterpiracy Operation Atalanta in the Western Indian Ocean; Operation Irini, which primarily enforces the arms embargo on Libya; Operation Aspides, which protects vessels against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and North-West Indian Ocean (NWIO). Most notably, European allies preferred the EU to NATO to secure shipping from terrorist attacks due to different operational preferences and the Alliance’s re-focus on Russia. Besides, Atalanta occasionally engages in joint low-end naval exercises, which are mostly directed towards naval diplomacy, cooperation and capacity building with partners. Moreover, the EU developed the Coordinated Maritime Presence concept to advance coordination and interoperability between national navies by sharing information, analysis and operational awareness.

These operations focus on low-intensity policing roles against non-state actors and are embedded in the Union’s comprehensive approach. The added value of the EU in low-conflict missions is its capacity to complement military missions with civilian instruments, including development assistance, politico-diplomatic engagement and numerous maritime trainings, capacity-building, information collection and sharing mechanisms and situational awarenessinitiatives to enable partners to contribute to maritime security. While the former are better suited to address the symptoms of offshore non-state threats, the latter are more effective for onshore causes. Moreover, since the EU does not have a maritime headquarters for its naval operations, it relies on national headquarters; this entails duplication of efforts, complications in coordinating forces and missions and a higher influence for the state which provides the headquarters. While in principle the Union can access NATO’s resources and structures thanks to the Berlin+ Agreement, in practice any ally can veto this possibility.

Lastly, the EU and NATO recognise the risk of hybrid threats, especially for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. However, each addresses them according to its relative strengths and competencies, with the EU emphasising awareness, resilience and response, while NATO stresses preparation, deterrence and defence. Similarly, both encourage cooperation in the development of national capabilities: the Alliance supports the coordination and standardisation of naval assets, including by defining capability objectives through the NATO Defence Planning Process; the Union indicates capability development priorities and provides frameworks and limited resources to deepen integration, strengthen the naval industrial base and develop strategic enablers.

Overall, there is significant untapped cooperation potential between NATO and the EU to improve burden-sharing, efficacy and resource allocation. Currently, the EU and NATO are aligning themselves at the organisational level through staff-to-staff cooperation, regular consultation, information sharing and research support. These endeavours concern chiefly naval operations, critical maritime infrastructure, countering sea mines and capability development. At the operational level, they seek to enhance coordination and complementarity. Initially, this was pursued through collaboration between naval operations on information-sharing and logistical support through informal and ad hoccooperation mechanisms and fora. However, rising tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the unresolved Cyprus-Turkey dispute has significantly cooled informal cooperation between the EU and NATO. In turn, NATO and Frontex openly cooperate through the Aegean activity to address seaborne migration in the Aegean Sea. Without Cyprus-Turkey reconciliation, the prospects for ambitious cooperation between NATO and the EU at sea drastically decrease; however, bottom-up informal cooperation unencumbered by political issues might prove a viable way to address shared issues in search for common ground.

Conclusion

NATO European allies must gear up in the maritime domain by building on past achievements: chiefly, the Standing Naval Forces, exercises and deterrence at sea. It is necessary to overcome sea-blindness and develop the adequate means and vision to effectively address the return of strategic competition at sea and persistent low-end issues. NATO is the ideal site to reawaken maritime warfighting and high-end skills due to its traditional mission, expertise and structures. Updating the outdated Alliance Maritime Strategy would be a good first step, in order to align maritime strategy with the new Strategic Concept and clearly state the level of ambition in naval warfighting.

Since the strategic environment at sea has dramatically evolved, allies need a new strategy to navigate the full spectrum of sea challenges. Given the Alliance’s primary expertise in high-end challenges, the updated analysis of threats and strategic objectives should reflect the renewed primacy of interstate competition and clearly indicate how to address naval challengers without escalation. Besides, updating the strategy would give the Alliance a long-term maritime vision and the prescriptive measures to establish effective deterrence, while maintaining warfighting skills. After pivoting to crisis management and out-of-area operations, the Alliance should now fully re-prioritise collective deterrence and defence, inprimis in its area of competence. Meanwhile, it should retain capabilities to pursue maritime crisis-management and naval diplomacy, as well as consider how to share expertise with partners without deploying under the NATO flag in far-away seas. Similarly, it should emphasise the warfighting capabilities of navies as well as their policing and diplomatic functions. Furthermore, the strategy should place the Standing Naval Forces at the centre of NATO’s maritime posture and prescribe high and consistent participation to preserve and hone naval warfighting skills and underpin effective deterrence at sea.

Effective deterrence and defence at sea hinges on shared operational planning, a mass of high-end naval capabilities and constantly advancing interoperability and warfighting skills. This can be achieved through training, exercises or naval operations. In contrast with the 2011 Strategy, NATO should now insist on developing a mass of high-end naval assets and encourage shipbuilding cooperation. Notably, European defence planning should focus on conducting complex operations without the US and address the gaps of its possible departure to maintain credible deterrence and defence. Besides, when planning and exercising for contingencies, allies should look outside their neighbourhood and plan for short- and long-term developments.

Lastly, European allies should capitalise on the role, instruments and off-setting strengths of the EU in addressing low-end threats. Europeans should not turn a blind eye to non-state threats, nor disregard crisis management and cooperative security. Rather, NATO can contribute to EU-led maritime endeavours, especially in maritime situational awareness and by reviving informal cooperation. In this way, it would also gain expertise in dealing with strategic competitors and hybrid warfare. Finally, by increasing cooperation allies can better address challenges, reduce duplication and develop an integrated approach to maritime security.

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