By Maximilian Ernst
6.6.2025
Introduction
From China’s perspective, Lee Jae-myung was the preferred candidate. Lee has, in the past, advocated for a balanced, pragmatic diplomacy and emphasised that South Korea should not be forced to choose between the United States (US) and China. Lee criticised the previous Yoon administration for being unnecessarily antagonising against Beijing and vowed to improve the bilateral relationship. Kim Moon-soo, on the other hand, was seen in China as a presidential candidate who would, much like President Yoon, emphasise the alliance with the US, China’s main geopolitical rival, and improve security cooperation with Japan, thus challenging China’s hegemonic ambitions in the Western Pacific.
China’s assessment of President-elect Lee Jae-myung
Beijing has long been wary of South Korea’s strategic drift toward Washington and Tokyo under conservative administrations. The Yoon administration, in particular, deepened trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan, and expanded the US missile defence infrastructure in Korea despite China’s strong opposition. During the Yoon administration, South Korea furthermore joined the “Chip-4 Alliance”, which China views as a US containment strategy against China. Lee Jae-myung, on the other hand, is perceived as more pragmatic and less confrontational. His campaign emphasised the need for balanced diplomacy, rejecting the binary logic of choosing between the US and China. This aligns with Beijing’s preference for regional actors to maintain autonomy and equidistance from the US-centric alliance system in the region.
Lee’s past criticisms of the deployment of the missile defense system THAAD (short for Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) further bolstered his standing among elites in the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing does not expect an immediate reversal of THAAD deployment or the reduction of US military installations; for now, China sees an opportunity to at least forestall further alignment between Seoul and Washington, and to inhibit the deployment of further US sensors and power projection platforms on the Korean Peninsula that could be used against China.
President-elect Lee’s plans to advance inter-Korean reconciliation further aligns with China’s consistent advocacy for stability on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing views Seoul’s engagement with Pyongyang as a counterbalance to US pressure against North Korea. Should President Lee succeed in improving relations with Pyongyang, China will be able to question US military presence, mobilise anti-American sentiment in South Korea and across the region and thereby drive a wedge in the US-South Korea alliance.
Chinese leaders view Lee’s election as an opportunity to recalibrate bilateral ties away from the friction-prone trajectory of the past years. He is, from Beijing’s perspective, more focused on economic cooperation with China and political integration with North Korea, and thus less likely to prioritise ideological alignment with Washington at the expense of economic and diplomatic pragmatism.
China’s short-term priorities towards South Korea
In the coming months, China will pursue four objectives in its engagement of the South Korean government.
1) Enhance economic ties: in the past years, South Korea has joined Western countries’ push to de-risk from Chinese dominated supply chains. China’s immediate objective will be to re-establish South Korean business- and political leaders’ trust in China as an economic partner. Relatedly, Beijing will seek to discourage Seoul from joining US-driven semiconductor and technology containment strategies against China. The first steps will likely include high-level dialogues on trade and investment. China may also propose the resumption and further development of culture- and tourism exchanges, which were paused during the THAAD dispute and remained low throughout the pandemic.
2) Reset security political relations: after the fall-out of the THAAD dispute in 2016-2017, South Korea aligned more closely with the US, a process that was perpetuated under the Yoon administration. In particular, the deployment of strategic assets such as theatre range missiles, missile defence as well as trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan, are areas which Beijing opposes. Beijing will not expect South Korea to degrade the alliance with the US immediately. Instead, it will seek to shape Seoul’s behaviour through signalling, such as enhancing its military presence in the Yellow Sea. Simultaneously, China will likely offer reassurances about its commitment to regional stability and position itself as a constructive actor for peace on the Korean Peninsula.
3) Support Inter-Korean Engagement: China supports Lee’s commitment to reopen communication channels with North Korea and to resume humanitarian and economic exchanges. Beijing views a Korean detente not only as a contributing factor for regional stability, which benefits China, but also as a source of leverage over both Koreas and Japan, thus diluting Washington’s influence over Korean Peninsula affairs and Northeast Asia.
Chinese diplomats will likely propose a trilateral consultation framework involving Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang to foster confidence-building measures and to ensure that China remains a central actor in any future security architecture. Notably, Beijing is almost certainly worried about the rapidly advancing Russian-North Korean relationship. Beijing will seek to maintain influence over the Korean Peninsula, which it regards as its sphere of influence, and mitigate both American and Russian influence in the region.
4) Pull South Korea away from the US alliance: in the short- to mid-term, Beijing will seek to manage the relationship with Seoul in the context of the larger Sino-American competition. The uncertainty that the Trump administration introduced into the international system, especially the doubts that were cast over the US’ commitment to defend its allies, allows Beijing to drive a wedge into the US-South Korean alliance and to push Seoul towards hedging. China may launch a charm offensive, presenting itself as a reliable and constructive partner while subtly encouraging Seoul, especially the elites from the centre-left and liberal political spectrum, to question the reliability of US security commitments.
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This Korea Chair Explains note is part of a post-election series including notes on the priorities of President-elect Lee Jae-myung, inter-Korean relations and perspectives from the United States and Japan.
The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).
