Bridging the Chip Divide: EU-Taiwan Cooperation in a Fragmenting Geopolitical Landscape

As global geopolitics are increasingly shaped by United States (US)-China strategic competition, both the European Union (EU) and Taiwan face shared risks and opportunities, including in the semiconductor industry. While the EU has deepened its engagement with the Indo-Pacific, its approach to China and economic and technological security diverges in some respects from that of Washington. At the same time, transatlantic tensions, exacerbated by divisions over the war in Ukraine, have left the EU navigating an increasingly complex strategic environment, with repercussions that go beyond the security sphere, and include trade and technology. Meanwhile, Taiwan, despite its strong political and industrial ties with the US, faces persistent uncertainty about long-term American commitment. This concern is heightened by China’s increasing assertiveness and the geopolitical unpredictability surrounding the new Trump presidency. The US and China have imposed export control measures on semiconductor design capabilities and critical raw materials, respectively, and the Trump administration has threatened tariffs on TSMC’s advanced chips. In this context, semiconductors offer a privileged lens through which to view geopolitical competition and a potential bridge for deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation.

Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor manufacturing, particularly in cutting-edge chip production, is paired with the EU’s ambition to reduce reliance on external suppliers and build a more resilient semiconductor ecosystem through the European Chips Act. Significant gaps remain between EU aspirations and Taiwan’s strategic priorities. The feasibility of European based Taiwanese foundries, the EU’s focus on cutting-edge technology and the absence of a bilateral investment framework all pose challenges to deeper cooperation. Given the technological interdependence between Europe, Taiwan, the US and China, exploring pragmatic avenues for collaboration, both political and technical, could be crucial for advancing mutual interests in the semiconductor supply chain.

Against this backdrop the event brings together European and Taiwanese experts on the politics of semiconductors and policymakers to reflect on the following questions:

• What are the main strategic objectives of the EU and Taiwan in semiconductor cooperation, and where do they diverge?
• In the context of competition between China and the US in the semiconductors, how can Europe and Taiwan enhance strategic and technical cooperation in this sector?
• What lessons can the EU learn from Taiwan’s existing semiconductor ecosystem to refine its own industrial policy?