CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 6/2024
By Diego Caballero-Vélez
11.3.2024
Key issues
- Recent border challenges for the EU, including the instrumentalisation of migration flows, have posed a significant challenge for the EU and its member states;
- Although “hybrid” border threats have become part of broader geopolitical rivalry with actors like Russia, the EU has not sufficiently defined how such threats should feature in the existing EU legal framework;
- In responding to hybrid border threats, the EU needs to develop a policy response that continues to protect the rights of migrants.
Introduction
The recent border risks experienced in the Mediterranean and (North)Eastern Europe have given rise to an increasing securitisation of border and migration policy in the European Union (EU). The Union is experiencing a dynamic and increasingly risky fusion of migration and geopolitics, which forces policymakers to develop policy responses that fall across multiple policy domains (justice and home affairs, defence, etc.). This CSDS Policy Brief argues that as migration is increasingly securitised as a geopolitical challenge and “hybrid threat”, it will be necessary to balance border-related geopolitical risks with the existing EU legal order, which emphasises the protection of migrants’ rights. Furthermore, this Policy Brief also examines how the greater geopoliticisation of migration will require the development of migration diplomacy strategies to counter the instrumentalisation of migrants across borders. In the first section of the Policy Brief, I highlight some of the recent instances of border securitisation. In section two, I turn to some of the policy challenges faced by the EU and I sketch-out what policy steps can be taken. Finally, in the last section I reflect on how the challenge of borders, migration and geopolitics could be addressed by the new European Commission and European Parliament.
Borders as chess boards?
In March 2023, the Italian government observed a more than threefold increase in undocumented migratory flows across the Mediterranean Sea compared to the same period the previous year. The Italian Minister of Defence, Guido Crosetto,posited that this upsurge was part of Wagner’s clear strategy of hybrid warfare, enabled by its influence in specific African countries like Libya. In December 2023, Russian authorities were observed facilitating an influx of migrants towards Finland, raising concerns and prompting Finland’s defence minister to characterise the surge as a potential tactic in the realm of “hybrid warfare” orchestrated by Russia. Then President Sauli Niinistö, during a state visit to Germany, described Russia’s actions as “malice” in response to Finland joining NATO. This characterisation suggests a broader geopolitical context, linking the migration issue to Finland’s recent NATO membership, which raises questions about the complexity of relationships between NATO allies and Russia. The decision by Finland to close half of its border crossings with Russia in response to an upsurge in undocumented migrants draws parallels with Poland’s border closure in 2021.
In 2021, Belarusian-owned travel enterprises collaborated with airlines to facilitate the movement of migrants to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. These countries experienced a humanitarian emergency due to an orchestrated surge in migrants by Alexander Lukashenko’s administration. The EU swiftly condemned the events, introducing the concept of “instrumentalisation” to describe a situation where a third country actively encourages irregular migratory flows into the Union. The subsequent border situation led the European Commission to express solidarity with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. In response, the Commission proposed a Council Decision to address the instrumentalisation of migration by external aggressors. This marked the EU’s first legal act in recognising migration as a potential “hybrid threat” capable of destabilising EU member states. This crisis introduced novel political aspects, most notably the framing of migration as a geopolitical tool wielded by aggressors to disrupt the EU, a concept often referred to as a “hybrid threat”. While it is not unusual for refugee flows to become intertwined with ongoing state conflicts, offering states an opportunity to pursue their international objectives, the Belarus-Poland border crisis signified a substantial shift in this paradigm. In this instance, refugee movements are intentionally channelled toward a specific international border, serving the geopolitical interests of Belarus and Russia.
The coercive instrumentalisation of population movements is not a new phenomenon, as demonstrated by instances such as former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Gaddafi’s use of threats to induce outflows. Gaddafi employed this tactic with varying success from 2004 to 2010, notably promising to “turn Europe black” if the EU did not meet his demands. However, his aggressive approach led to fatal consequences in 2011 during the NATO intervention in Libya, where he overplayed his hand. The exploitation of refugees and migrants, colloquially referred to as foreign policy bargaining chips or, less politely, as a coercive weapon, is not a novel concept. Target states’ vulnerability to this unconventional form of non-military coercion is also not unprecedented. Gaddafi initially used it as a deterrent against EU officials at the onset of the uprising and later as a means of compellence against neighbouring NATO allies during the civil war and bombing campaign.
Migration and geopolitics: the challenges
However, recent developments at the Finland-Russia border have added another layer of complexity to the challenge. As Europe grapples with these border challenges, it becomes crucial to view them as interconnected events that collectively shape the geopolitical landscape of the region. The intentional manipulation of migration by Russia highlights the evolving nature of challenges faced by EU member states in managing their borders and addresses the instrumentalisation of migration as a geopolitical tactic. Notably, Finland’s move includes the creation of fences, mirroring Poland’s approach from the previous years. The act of closing border crossings and contemplating the installation of physical barriers reflects a shared concern about managing and controlling migration flows, highlighting a common trend among nations facing similar challenges.
Irregular migration, previously framed as a matter of internal security within the Union, is undergoing a notable transformation in its significance. The act of instrumentalising migration at the EU’s borders now serves as an indicator that irregular migration is evolving to become an integral component of the EU’s wider geopolitical agenda. This commitment to addressing migration as a geopolitical concern is exemplified by the European Commission’s endorsement of the non-entrée responses implemented by Poland and Finland. The increasing use of migration as a hybrid tool by external actors has elevated its status to a pivotal aspect of the Union’s broader geopolitical strategies. Consequently, any notion of a “Fortress Europe” concept now encompasses not only stringent border controls, but also the safeguarding of the EU against external threats by expanding partnerships with third countries and the delegation of competences to specific EU actors such as Frontex and Europol.
During the 2021 Polish-Belarus border crisis, while not explicitly condoning push-backs, the European Commission provided measures and operational support for humane and orderly emergency management, demonstrating solidarity with frontline countries. The evolution of Poland’s stance to migration, which transitioned from scepticism towards EU migration policies to a call for European unity in response to Belarus’ actions, highlights the dynamic geopolitical nature of the threat. These recent experiences coincide with heightened tensions between Russia-Belarus and NATO-EU, signifying a distinctive and concerning development in the use of migration as a geopolitical instrument. It is for such reasons that migration and borders have become crucial issues for both the EU and NATO.
For example, the formal consideration of migration as a geopolitical issue for the EU occurred with the release of the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Despite the document reiterating the objective, as identified in the EU Global Strategy, of fostering stronger linkages between the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the specific inclusion of migration marks a significant development in the EU’s strategic approach to defence. In this context, the Strategic Compass highlights the necessity of enhancing collaboration between CSDP and JHA to effectively tackle security challenges, drawing insights from prior collaborative endeavours in Ukraine, Libya and the Sahel, among others. This includes the establishment of a crime information cell within the EU’s naval operation in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Strategic Compass calls for closer cooperation between the CSDP and bodies like Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and NATO. For NATO, the 2022 Strategic Concept recognises migration as a potential hybrid threat. This framing becomes particularly relevant when there are indications of malicious intentions by external actors seeking to exploit migration for their strategic objectives. This alignment of perspectives underscores a shared concern between the EU and NATO regarding the security implications of migration, reinforcing the need for comprehensive and cooperative approaches to address the multifaceted challenges posed by migration in the realm of external security and defence.
For the EU, the closer cooperation between JHA actors, such as Frontex, and defence policy, underscores the evolving nature of the EU’s security and migration policies. This shift reflects the EU’s acknowledgment of the interconnectedness of security, border management and migration. An example of this is the mention of Frontex in the 2022 Strategic Compass, which signifies a broader recognition that border security plays a pivotal role in maintaining the EU’s stability, integrity and geopolitical influence. The EU’s commitment to a more balanced approach is evident as it navigates from solely humanitarian objectives to an integrated strategy that involves border enforcement, security considerations and the mitigation of potential security threats associated with irregular migration. The closure of borders and the European Commission’s acquiescence to this situation further illustrates the adaptation of policies to the evolving geopolitical context.
Destabilising political events and the evolving concept of a more “geopolitical” Union have prompted a reconsideration of migration as not solely a matter of internal security but also an issue of external security and defence. This shift underscores the integration of migration into the fundamental fabric of the EU’s external action. The frame of migration as a geopolitical issue is increasingly viewed as a diplomatic tool, prompting a burgeoning literature on the concept of “migration diplomacy” governance. This transformation is palpable in the evolution of migration policy-making, which has shifted into a pragmatic strategy within external dimension policymaking. Notably, concepts like “reversed conditionality” – referring to third countries leveraging migration to secure concessions from the EU – have become integral components for understanding the geopolitical dimension of the EU migration policy. A key facet of this approach involves the implementation of migration diplomacy as a method to delegate security responsibilities, often termed “responsibility outsourcing” to third countries, externalising the control of refugees to these states. This is particularly relevant in addressing the challenges posed by irregular migration in transit and origin countries, showcasing a comprehensive integration of security and diplomatic considerations in the management of migratory flows.
Future responses to the securitisation of borders
The gradual perception of migration as a geopolitical issue for the EU represents a strategic response to the complex challenges posed by border crisis management, underscoring the need for a comprehensive and adaptable approach. The recent approval of the “New Pact on Migration” in December 2023 reflects the growing securitisation of migration and borders. The Pact introduces significant advancements in surveillance technology and biometric data exchange, among other measures. These policy developments prompt reflection on the evolving perspective of migration governance, which is increasingly adopting a geopolitical approach. Notably, even actors such as NATO have assumed a more prominent role in migration-related matters, marking a departure from the alliance’s previous level of significance in this context.
However, within the dynamic landscape of migration, where the conceptualisation of migration as a tool of “hybrid war” gains prominence and migrants often find themselves at risk, a new mode of governance emerges as a pivotal imperative for the EU. This calls for a nuanced and responsive approach to address the multifaceted dimensions of migration in contemporary geopolitical strategies. This recognition aligns with the growing significance of migration governance in EU’s capacity-building initiatives, notably observed in regions like the Sahel. Within the framework of the CSDP, there is a distinct emphasis on bolstering capacity-building through CSDP civilian missions. This focus signifies a comprehensive approach considering the interconnected dynamics of migration and border security in maintaining the Union’s geopolitical influence.
To enhance the effectiveness of responses to the instrumentalisation of migration, a clear definition of the threat in the context of migration is essential, recognising the humanitarian dimension inherent in the movement of people. The outsourcing of responsibilities to third countries in managing migration introduces complexities, potentially conflicting with the EU’s commitment to its laws and values. It is imperative to establish more control over these dynamics, especially when designating third countries like Libya or Tunisia as safe, necessitating a thorough assessment of their capabilities. The current geopolitical landscape calls for a deeper integration of concepts like migration diplomacy. This involves conceptualising migration diplomacy within the legal framework of the EU, empowering relevant actors with the competence to protect individuals and providing a clearer delineation of responsibilities in migration matters. Despite the strides made in the New Pact on Migration, certain crucial elements remain missing. There is an absence of a clear definition of what constitutes a safe third country, a comprehensive list of such countries and a diplomatic dimension in the Pact. Addressing these omissions is paramount to developing a comprehensive approach to migration that prioritises the well-being of the most vulnerable individuals amidst a landscape fraught with threats.
Lastly, addressing the geopolitical dimension of migration necessitates a cooperative approach and solidarity. This involves refining bilateral agreements with third countries, exemplified in 2023 by both the Italy-Albania and Italy-Tunisia Memorandums of Understanding (MoU). While Italy holds significance in the Mediterranean region, the involvement of the EU becomes crucial. The risk lies in these agreements potentially strengthening the national competence of certain member states in migration issues, ultimately reducing the EU’s ability to ensure the protection of asylum seekers’ fundamental rights. I argue that the experiences of Poland and Finland highlight the shortcomings of unilateral responses, emphasising that such approaches can undermine migrants’ rights. In the context of the growing securitisation of European borders, there is a clear need for a collective European response grounded in solidarity among member states. This ensures a more effective and rights-respecting approach to address the challenges posed by migration on a geopolitical context.
