An Arsenal of Democracy? Building Trust and Defence Complementarity for a Sustainable EU-South Korea Strategic Partnership

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 31/2025

By Myong-Hyun Go

11.12.2025

Key issues

• Europe faces unprecedented security challenges requiring urgent rearmament, while South Korea has emerged as a major global defence supplier capable of delivering sophisticated weapons systems rapidly and cost-effectively.
• South Korea’s defence industrial base offers Europe the means to address critical gaps in its own defence production capacity, and there is scope for capability development cooperation between South Korea and the European Union (EU).
• South Korea and the EU need to move beyond transactional arms sales toward genuine strategic cooperation – requiring joint defence industrial initiatives, policy coordination and sustained mutual commitment.

Introduction

In November 2024, the EU and South Korea signed a bilateral Security and Defence Partnership, making South Korea one of the first Asian countries to formalise such an agreement with the bloc. This partnership arrives at a critical juncture: Europe faces what European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called ‘a clear and present danger on a scale that none of us has seen in our adult lifetime’, requiring Europe to take charge of its own deterrence and defence, a shift driving one of the most ambitious rearmament efforts since the Cold War. Meanwhile, South Korea is emerging as an arsenal of the free world, capable of producing sophisticated weapon systems such as combat aircraft and submarines and delivering them rapidly.

Yet, South Korea remains something of an overlooked partner for Europe. This is surprising given that they are already well aligned in terms of shared political norms and values and extensive trade relations, and existing strategic cooperation in areas such as Indo-Pacific policy, cybersecurity and maritime security. The challenge is how the two partners can elevate the emerging partnership to a comprehensive strategic alignment based on common values and mutual trust.

It is increasingly evident that the strategic cooperation between the EU and South Korea has entered a new phase, driven by converging threat perceptions and complementary capabilities. However, overlapping interests by themselves do not guarantee a long-term, sustainable strategic partnership. The foundation for such a partnership must be trust, and defence cooperation represents the best <space where trust can be earned and sustained. As this CSDS Policy Brief shows, South Korea should demonstrate a shared threat perception with Europe, while Europe should work to integrate South Korea’s defence industrial base over the long run, a clear demonstration that Korean capabilities complement rather than compete with Europe’s.

South Korea’s emergence as a major defence supplier

South Korea has become a major player in the global defence market, with exports surging from roughly US$2-3 billion annually before 2021 to US$17.3 billion in 2022 and $14 billion in 2023. The country now ranks among the world’s top ten arms exporters, with SIPRI data showing a 12% increase in exports over the past decade. In 2024, South Korea’s defence exports reached US$9.5 billion, while the defence order backlog reached $73.1 billion. Much of this growth has been driven by European demand, particularly from Poland.

Poland-South Korea defence ties are the linchpin of South Korea’s success in the global defence market, proving to potential buyers that South Korean weapons are not simply cheaper alternatives to the United States (US) or first-tier European producers, but fully competitive alternatives in their own right. In 2022, Warsaw signed a framework agreement worth approximately US$12.4 billion – the largest arms export contract in South Korean history. The agreement included 600 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft, more than 200 K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launch systems and, remarkably, up to 1,000 K2 main battle tanks. This relationship is robust enough to survive political changes in both Warsaw and Seoul, and in June 2025, the two countries signed the second binding deal for 180 additional K2 tanks worth US$6 billion that followed the first K2 contract in 2022.

The factors behind South Korea’s meteoric rise in the European defence market are by now well known. First, Korea’s defence industrial base benefits from economies of scale: Korean defence manufacturing firms maintain large-scale production facilities catering to the steady demand of the country’s military, which enables shorter delivery timelines than European or American counterparts. Second, Korean weapons systems are combat-proven, reliable and comply with NATO standards while incorporating the latest technology, all of which makes them readily interoperable while remaining cheaper to acquire and operate. Third, South Korean defence firms work closely with the government to offer attractive financing terms and technology transfer arrangements, including joint production agreements. The South Korean defence industry offers Europe not only reliability and interoperability, but also the production scale and cost competitiveness that it thoroughly needs.

Can Europe rearm without partners?

However, South Korea’s success in the European market was not solely due to its competitive advantages. It also reflects structural weaknesses in Europe’s own defence industrial base. The European defence sector remains plagued by fragmentation, inefficiency and undercapitalisation. Defence procurement in the EU is characterised by a home bias, low production volumes and a high dependency on the US market. As a result, European militaries operate five times more weapons systems than the US (179 versus 33), particularly in main battle tanks (19 types versus 1) and fighter aircraft (20 types versus 7). This fragmentation stems from the combination of a post-Cold War downsizing of the defence sector and prioritisation of domestic industrial capacity, even at the expense of economic efficiency. The European Defence Agency’s former Chief Executive, Jiri Sedivy, lamented that ‘the European defence base remains fragmented, characterised by a lack of joint procurement and national preferences for defence spending‘. The EU has attempted various initiatives to address this issue, including the Defence Procurement Directive and the Intra-Community Transfers Directive (both in 2009), but their effectiveness – even by the European Commission’s own admission – has been limited.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighting the urgent need for industrial reform, the European Commission unveiled the “ReArm Europe” Plan in March 2025. Now called “Readiness 2030”, it proposed to unlock approximately €800 billion in additional investment for defence over four years by loosening fiscal spending restraints and expanding loan facilities for defence projects. The ReArm Europe initiative explicitly aims to reduce fragmentation and increase the share of EU-based defence procurement from 20% in 2022 to 50%, and collaborative procurement to 40%, by 2030. Some EU member states strongly advocate the policy of “Buy European”, using EU funds exclusively for EU defence firms to achieve military independence. The European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) requires at least 65% local production content and is not subject to third-country restrictions such as the US’ International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).

“Buy European” provisions are meant to address one of Europe’s fundamental strategic weaknesses, namely, military dependence caused by inadequate arms production and development. But the price for championing the European defence industry could spell lost opportunities for industrial collaboration with South Korean defence firms that possess competitive advantages in production scale and rapid delivery. Korean defence firms are already major players in the European defence market, yet they may only be eligible for partial participation in many of the ReArm Europe tools. It would be a huge missed opportunity were Europe to regard the Korean defence industry’s contribution as a stop-gap measure until it rebuilt its defence industrial base.

Converging threat perceptions: “CRINK”

The growing alignment between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, dubbed the “Axis of Upheaval” – or, in more neutral terms, “CRINK” – provides the strategic rationale for deeper EU-Korea cooperation. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the mutual defence treaty. Subsequently, North Korea deployed an estimated 14,000-15,000 troops and thousands of additional workers to Russia to support its war in Ukraine, marking a watershed moment in the partnership and directly linking European security with the situation on the Korean peninsula. This underscores why South Korea must move beyond transactional arms sales toward deeper strategic integration with Europe. Besides North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea is subject to CRINK’s hybrid warfare threats that range from disinformation campaigns to cyberattacks. Shared intelligence through remote sensing and human intelligence (HUMINT) offers both sides force-multiplier benefits. Europe is also aligned with South Korea on North Korean denuclearisation and participates in international sanctions monitoring and enforcement. From a defence industrial standpoint, Europe offers South Korea advanced materials, cutting-edge technology and its own sophisticated weaponry. For both partners, the implication is clear: security cannot be compartmentalised regionally. Defence cooperation between like-minded democracies becomes not merely desirable but essential.

Building trust through commitment and complementarity

Shared values and norms have traditionally been emphasised in EU-Korea relations, as they lay the foundation for long-term trust. For South Korea to secure its position in the European defence market, it must demonstrate commitment to European defence over the long term. This does not mean deploying troops to the European theatre. South Korea’s defence industry can leverage unique competitive advantages to provide Europe with a secure and resilient supply chain of critical components and materials for its defence industrial base.

South Korea’s world-leading semiconductor and electronics industry will be essential for a successful European rearmament. Europe’s supply chain vulnerabilities extend beyond heavy dependence on China for rare earth materials to include industrial components such as ammunition precursors, semiconductors and electric vehicle (EV) batteries, areas where Korea’s industrial strength lies. Two South Korean semiconductor manufacturers, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, accounted for approximately 50% of the global market share in NAND flash memory chips and nearly 70% in DRAM in 2022. Korea is also a large exporter of EV batteries and cathode materials, the latter of which China dominates with 80-90% of global production. South Korea can greatly lessen European dependencies on Chinese-made critical industrial components.

Europe should further leverage Korea’s strength for its defence supply chain resilience. The 2024 EU-South Korea Security and Defence Partnership provides a foundation, but deeper integration requires active participation in specific capability development projects. Poland’s military co-production agreement with South Korea already exemplifies this approach. Most Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries have indicated greater openness to collaboration with South Korean arms manufacturing firms, all in the framework of ReArm Europe. South Korea should seek alignment with EU defence initiatives, while politically and economically guaranteeing to sustain critical defence supply chains for Europe.

There are downsides to closer cooperation for South Korea. A robust strategic partnership with Europe will inevitably impact South Korea’s strategic positioning vis-à-vis certain actors, particularly Russia. But as the US – as the key ally of both South Korea and Europe – reassesses its strategic posture and global alliances, a strong security partnership founded on robust defence cooperation and supply chain resilience will pay strategic, security and economic dividends. This would trump any downsides felt by South Korea. What is required is trust, the commitment that partnership obligations take precedence over short-term benefits.

Conclusion

The EU-South Korea strategic partnership stands at an inflexion point. The need to strengthen it has become increasingly urgent as both partners witness the growing alignment between North Korea, Russia and China, while the US is engaged in reassessing its strategic posture around the world. To transform defence cooperation into a lasting strategic partnership, both the EU and South Korea should pursue joint defence industrial initiatives that take advantage of existing EU defence industrial mechanisms, while South Korea should contribute through its industrial and technological competencies.

Converging threat perceptions have created unprecedented opportunities for cooperation, but realising these opportunities requires more than arms sales and diplomatic declarations. What will make the partnership durable is the dialectic interaction of trust and commitment, reinforcing the other in a virtuous cycle. To institutionalise this cooperation, future Korea-EU high-level dialogues should address not only defence cooperation but also coordination on North Korea policy, sanctions implementation and responses to the Russia-China-North Korea axis.

South Korea has proven it can be an arsenal of democracy for Europe’s eastern flank. The question now is whether both partners can build the institutional and industrial infrastructure to sustain this role over decades, through political transitions and strategic shocks. That requires moving beyond transactional defence sales toward genuine strategic integration – with commitment, investment and, above all, mutual trust.

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