CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 10/2024
By Ramon Pacheco Pardo
15.4.2024
Key issues
- The South Korea-NATO relationship is moving from dialogue to practical cooperation, which reflects a shared interest in countering common threats and benefiting from bilateral relations.
- In an era of “polycrisis”, cooperation between South Korea and NATO is driven by several external factors that have led both sides to consider that Asia and the Indo-Pacific, on the one hand, and the transatlantic region, on the other, have become a single strategic theatre.
- Cybersecurity, the deterrence and countering of cyber threats, nuclear non-proliferation, NATO’s nuclear sharing experience and the development of new weapons systems are top priorities for practical cooperation.
Introduction
South Korea has fallen in love with NATO. In recent years, the transatlantic organisation has become one of the main darlings in South Korea’s corridors of power, becoming central to security, defence and strategic discussions. Both the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol today, and the liberal Moon Jae-in previously, have pushed for stronger ties with NATO. The ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense have significantly stepped up ties with the organisation. South Korean think tanks and research institutions are boosting their expertise and analysis of the benefits of partnering with NATO for their country. South Korea’s growing fascination with NATO was already evident in private discussions that this author had the chance to hold in Seoul in the summer of 2020. Four years later, the strong interest in NATO is unashamedly public.
NATO, for its part, has certainly reciprocated Seoul’s interest. Yoon has been invited to the Madrid and Vilnius summits, held over the past two years. An invitation to attend this year’s summit in Washington now beckons. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a much-publicised visit to Seoul in January 2023. South Korea is regularly feted as one of the members of the “AP4” partners with which NATO wants to boost ties in the Indo-Pacific region, along with Australia, Japan and New Zealand. NATO even offered South Korea an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), signed in July 2023. The ITPP is the most comprehensive agreement in the history of their bilateral relationship.
However, the South Korea-NATO relationship is not new. The two sides launched their dialogue in 2005, in the wake of their participation in the United States (US)-led invasion of Afghanistan. Seoul and the transatlantic organisation then signed their first bilateral cooperation programme in 2012. In December 2020, South Korea was invited to participate in a NATO ministerial meeting for the first time. In November 2022, South Korea established its mission to NATO, providing Seoul with a permanent official representation to the organisation. In the meantime, South Korean military and civilian personnel have engaged in multiple exchanges and exercises with NATO forces via the Partnership Interoperability Initiative signed in 2014.
Yet, South Korea and NATO have never been as close as they are as of 2024. A strategic environment defined by multiple tensions and crises, coupled with a shared wish to deepen practical cooperation explains the burgeoning ties between the two sides. Thanks to South Korea’s support for NATO cutting across the political spectrum and NATO’s expanding interest in China and the Indo-Pacific region, relations between the two sides are poised to continue to strengthen. However, as this CSDS Policy Brief argues, the South Korea-NATO relationship needs to accelerate its move from words to deeds. To this end, this Policy Brief explores some of the areas in which burgeoning ties can be further developed.
A shared strategic environment?
The term “polycrisis” has gained a strong foothold in South Korea. China’s (alleged) assertiveness, the tense relationship between the US and China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the implications of the conflict between Israel and Hamas are among the many crises that create a sense of permanent crisis. Further still, South Korea still needs to confront North Korea’s long-standing nuclear, missile and conventional threat, which is not going away any time soon.
South Korean government officials and security and foreign policy thinkers ascribe to the idea that Asia and the Indo-Pacific, on the one hand, and the transatlantic region, on the other, have become a single strategic theatre. This means that what happens in one of the regions has deep implications for the other, and vice versa. This is a key reason that explains South Korea’s robust response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and strong support for Kyiv hitherto. From a South Korean perspective, this invasion is not only contrary to international law but could lead to instability in Northeast Asia, where China and North Korea seek to replicate Moscow’s actions. Since NATO and its members have been the main supporters of Ukraine’s efforts to expel Russia from its territory, the invasion has deepened Seoul’s ties with the organisation. As for NATO, South Korea being one of the few countries in the world supporting Ukraine – including indirect artillery shells and arms transfers via countries such as the US and Poland – has been a main driver behind its interest in stronger relations. Seoul has also announced that it will provide a US$ 2.3 billion aid package to Ukraine starting from this year.
Closely related, both South Korea and NATO agree that China, Russia and North Korea are deepening their ties in a way that threatens their interests. With Iran or Hamas added to the mix, there is a perception that there is an axis of authoritarian regimes and terrorist groups working with each other to undermine the liberal international order that they cherish – as well as posing a direct security threat, for example, via missile and arms transfers or cyberattacks. In this respect, North Korea’s suspected supply of, among others, missiles and artillery shells to Russia in support of its invasion of Ukraine is a vivid illustration of how the ties among these countries are a real threat, and not merely theoretical. Thus, in a recent meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cho Tae-yul, called for the organisation’s cooperation in developing a new North Korea sanctions monitoring mechanism, after Russia vetoed the extension of the UN mechanism.
US policy is another reason driving South Korea and NATO to work together with each other, in particular Washington’s push for the transatlantic organisation to focus on China. It was the Trump administration that first pushed NATO to publicly identify China as a threat, a move then accelerated under the current Biden administration. Understandably more worried by North Korea but also increasingly wary of China, South Korea quickly grasped this shift in NATO thinking to seek cooperation for its own security purposes. From a South Korean perspective, dealing with Pyongyang and Beijing requires working together with as many reliable partners as possible. NATO certainly fits the bill, being name checked in Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was released in December 2022.
Paradoxically, the Trump presidency also helped to draw South Korea and NATO closer to each other due to the US president’s open disdain for allies and partners. After all, Trump even floated the idea of removing American troops from South Korean soil. The perceived unreliability of the South Korea-US alliance during the Trump years led Seoul to seek new partners, and NATO emerged as a preferred one. The spectre of a second Trump administration helps to continue to drive Seoul’s interest in NATO, regardless of whether the Republican is voted in for a second term in the forthcoming US presidential election.
From talking to doing
Strategic convergence has served to lay out the conditions for stronger South Korea-NATO cooperation. Yet, the two partners are now focusing on how to engage in practical cooperation that serves their own material interests. In other words, officials in Seoul and in the Brussels-based organisation know that both sides have an interest in working together. Their focus has now shifted towards realising this interest in practice.
The ITPP signed last year already hints at the areas in which both sides want to focus. The partnership document includes eleven areas for stronger cooperation. They are as follows: 1) dialogue and consultation; 2) arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; 3) counterterrorism; 4) cybersecurity; 5) emerging and disruptive technologies; 6) capability development and interoperability; 7) practical cooperation for interoperability; 8) science and technology; 9) women, peace and security; 10) climate change and security; and 11) public diplomacy. This is a fairly ambitious agenda, very similar to, for example, the agreement that NATO and Japan also signed in 2023. Yet, both sides agree that there are certain areas in which cooperation should be prioritised and can proceed more smoothly.
In this authors’ discussions with South Korean, NATO and NATO member officials over the years, it has become clear that cybersecurity is a key and fundamental area for cooperation. There is a reason why South Korea became the first Asian country to become a full member of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in May 2022. If there is one security area in which South Korea lags behind NATO and many of its members, it is cybersecurity. South Korea wants to get access to NATO’s intelligence, expertise and capabilities in the area of cyber, in order to better protect itself against attacks coming from North Korea, especially China and Russia. For its part, NATO values South Korea’s deep understanding of the ways in which North Korea operates in cyber space.
Closely related, the deterrence and countering of cyber threats is another key area for cooperation between the two sides. Spanning several of the areas included in the ITPP, South Korea and NATO are seeking to learn from each other and boost joint activities in areas. This includes the malicious use of new technologies such as, for example, Artificial Intelligence (AI), foreign interference and manipulation of information to which democracies can be more vulnerable or human-made environmental threats. While these areas are not classified as traditional security threats, NATO has long been focusing on non-traditional security risks. South Korean policymakers and military officials are ever more aware about these types of risks as well, and see cooperation with NATO as a means to address them more adequately.
Certainly, cooperation in the nuclear field is a priority for both South Korea and NATO. The two partners have a shared interest in working together in the area of non-proliferation, considering North Korea’s proliferation of nuclear technology and knowledge sharing over the decades, as well as Russia’s – and China’s – support for Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. Relatedly, nuclear deterrence is an area which South Korea has a strong interest in, and it can learn from NATO’s experience. In addition, South Korea is also interested in learning in more detail how NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group works. Last year, the Biden administration agreed to launch a similar mechanism with South Korea, labelled the Nuclear Consultative Group. In fact, the Nuclear Consultative Group is going to be key if Washington wants to prevent Seoul from continuing to harbour a strong interest in developing its own nuclear weapons. Since this is a policy objective that the Biden administration shares with several NATO allies, it is in the interests of the transatlantic organisation to share the experience of its Nuclear Planning Group with Seoul.
Another promising area for potential cooperation is the defence industry. South Korea’s weapons systems such as howitzers are compatible with NATO standards. The country’s armed forces are investing heavily in unmanned systems, including aircraft, AI-enhanced autonomous weapons or space warfare. Furthermore, South Korea’s defence spending is high, standing at 2.7% of GDP in 2022. Even though NATO’s European countries have pledged to spend 2% of their GDP in defence, budgetary constraints will make this difficult to achieve for many of them. And in any case, South Korea can quickly scale-up production in a way that European countries are not able to due to decades of underspending in defence. The case of the announcement that Poland will start building South Korea-designed K2 tanks from 2026 shows that there are synergies with the defence industries of NATO members. It is expected that defence industry cooperation will also result in joint research and, potentially, the development of new weapons systems. In this respect, South Korea’s strong interest in working with AUKUS on its second pillar – which focuses on the development of advanced military capabilities – as well as the development of a new jet fighter with the support of Indonesia shows the country sees the value in defence industry cooperation.
Conclusion
To summarise, the time has come for South Korea and NATO to move from talking about potential cooperation to taking practical steps to realise the potential of their relationship. There is evidence that both sides understand this and are now working together, in areas ranging from cybersecurity to the defence industry. Considering that the international environment is marked by multiple crises and that Seoul and the transatlantic organisation understand the value of working together, we should expect greater cooperation between the two of them moving forward. Both South Korea and NATO are certainly willing to move down this road.
In the case of South Korea, there is broad agreement among conservative and liberal policymakers that cooperation with NATO is both beneficial and desirable. This helps to explain why Moon kick-started a process of rapprochement with the organisation that Yoon has taken to a new level. Unless the strategic environment changes dramatically, the drivers behind stronger South Korea-NATO relations will compel future South Korean leaders to continue to seek deeper ties. In particular, the move from dialogue to practical cooperation will serve to make it easier for South Korean leaders to pursue and justify deeper cooperation with the transatlantic organisation.
With the US election less than six months away, it is interesting to consider what may happen depending on who wins. Biden will certainly continue to press for NATO to cooperate with South Korea, among other Asia-Pacific partners. If Trump wins the election, however, he is likely to resume his attacks on NATO and the South Korea-US alliance, as he did during his previous term in office. Rather than weakening South Korea-NATO ties, however, this type of approach towards allies from Trump would probably serve to boost links between Seoul and the transatlantic organisation. After all, South Korea sees deeper ties with NATO and other partners as a way to address, among others, the uncertainties of US domestic politics. Indeed, the drivers serving to boost South Korea-NATO ties run deep and should be able to withstand the possible return of Trump to the US presidency.
