CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 17/2024
By Bjørn Olav Knutsen and Elisabeth Pettersen
10.6.2024
Key issues
- Norway’s approach to security in the High North has centred on a mix of deterrence and reassurance, and this continues since Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
- Norway’s approach is based on people-centred cooperation, confidence- and security-building and not using the Arctic Council to coordinate security and defence policies.
- Using security dilemma theory, this CSDS Policy Brief analyses how Norway’s security challenges in the High North are evolving in light of Russian aggression.
Introduction
On 7 May 2024, Vladimir Putin was reinstated as President of the Russian Federation for the fifth time. No one in the West, including Norway, accepts the notion that the Russian elections were free and fair. Nevertheless, and to the surprise of many, the Norwegian Ambassador to Russia was present at the grandiose presidential inauguration ceremony at the Kremlin, fully aware that most European Union (EU) and NATO ambassadors boycotted the event. When explaining why it was important for Norway that its ambassador was present, a State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) explained: ‘Russia is on the wrong side of history. Nevertheless, it’s in Norway’s interest to maintain diplomatic channels with our neighbour, no less so in challenging times, to be able to deal with important issues of safety at sea, fisheries cooperation, and border management’.
This rationale, we argue, says a lot about the Norwegian approach to deterrence, defence and reassurance in its security politics. Furthermore, we argue that the Norwegian approach stands on firm footing in the scholarly debate on the character of security dilemmas in international politics. In this CSDS Policy Brief, we explain how Norway’s deterrence policies influence how it formulates its reassurance measures towards Russia. From a Norwegian perspective, there is no contradiction in defending Norway and deterring Russia while keeping the doors open to cooperation on important issue areas where there are common interests. Rather than analysing deterrence and reassurance measures as a continuum from deterrence to reassurance, it is more appropriate to regard them as complementary.
This perspective towards Russia should not give one the impression that Norway is failing to take its defence or the war on Ukraine seriously. Over the next 12 years, Norway will significantly strengthen its defence capabilities. In April 2024, the Norwegian government presented its defence pledge on reaching the NATO commitment of 2% of GDP on defence spending in 2024. According to this plan, Norway will continue to increase its defence spending over the years 2024–2036 and will reach an estimated defence spending of 2.8% of GDP in 2036. Of course, this dramatic increase is due to the deteriorating Euro-Atlantic security situation that requires ‘the ability and willingness to adapt to a time of increased unpredictability and an increasing risk of military conflict’ in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Continued support to Ukraine is therefore of vital importance to both Norwegian and Euro-Atlantic security. Norwegian support to Ukraine takes the form of the so-called Nansen programme, with a total budget of 75 billion Norwegian kroner (approximately €6.35 billion) over the timespan 2023–2027. Continued support for Ukraine and a dramatic increase in Norwegian defence spending of 600 billion Norwegian kroner (approximately €50.8 billion) between 2025 and 2036 must therefore be considered a Norwegian contribution to uphold and defend the Euro-Atlantic security order. Accordingly, the defence pledge emphasises that Norway in the coming years will expand its defence capabilities ‘to strengthen Norwegian and allied security, NATO’s deterrence and defence, our defence capabilities, and our ability to receive and support allied forces’. The aim is to ‘increase the volume and flexibility of the Norwegian military to enhance our military posture and the defence of the Alliance’.
In this regard, Norway’s approach to deterrence, defence and reassurance in its security politics offers an interesting case. This CSDS Policy Brief is structured in the following way. First, we describe how Norway understands and approaches security dilemmas in the High North and how insights from security dilemma theory can provide some understanding of the policy impacts of the Norwegian approach. Second, we ask whether it is possible to mitigate such security dilemmas and discuss three forms of mitigation strategies. These forms are people-to-people cooperation, confidence- and security-building measures, and the Norwegian view that the Arctic Council should not handle security and defence issues. Finally, we discuss the security situation in the High North considering today’s security environment and discuss whether low tension is still feasible in a changing geopolitical context.
How Norway understands security dilemmas in the High North
Security dilemma theory is a useful framework when seeking to explain the Norwegian approach towards deterrence, defence and reassurance in the country’s security policies. Norway’s current challenge is how to pursue policies based on maintaining low tension in the High North when there is an ongoing war in Europe. According to traditional understandings of security dilemmas, they occur when one state tries to increase its own security in such a way that it reduces the security of others, leading them to initiate their own security-enhancing measures. This then creates a spiralling effect, and in the end, decreased security for all states involved. Hence, in an international system short of a functioning collective security arrangement, one state’s gain in security is perceived as a threat to the security of another state, making security dilemmas also a security paradox.
Robert Jervis, the most prominent scholar on the theorising of such dilemmas, provides a highly fruitful analytical framework in which he makes two distinctions. First, whether offensive postures are distinguishable from defensive postures or not, and second, whether the offensive or the defensive posture has the advantage. The most dangerous situation is an outcome where the offensive posture is not distinguishable from the defensive posture and where the offensive posture has the advantage. Jervis names this outcome “doubly dangerous”, and this is the exact situation Norway aims to avoid in the High North. Should such a situation occur, we will see increased military tension and a breakdown in the political and administrative cooperation regimes that exist in the north. Such a situation might therefore harm treaties and regimes like the Law of the Sea, the Svalbard Treaty, the Norwegian-Russian fisheries cooperation, the Arctic Council and the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA).
The Norwegian government states in its 2024 defence pledge that: ‘Norway’s freedom to act in terms of security policy is under pressure. A main challenge for Norwegian security is an increased risk of being marginalised, i.e., that our interests or security are not considered’. This marks a clear statement on aiming to avoid such a “doubly dangerous” situation. This Norwegian fear of ending up in a such a situation is underpinned in the next sentence: ‘When the potential for conflict in our areas has increased, our ability to understand, shape, coordinate and participate in activities in our areas becomes more important. In this way, the Norwegian authorities can prevent escalation to levels where our national freedom of action and influence is markedly reduced’.
Norway’s security policy aims in the High North are therefore three-fold: 1) keep the tensions in the High North low; 2) curb security dilemmas; and 3) cooperate with Russia on issues of common interest. The challenge today is how Norway can pursue policies based on maintaining low tension in the High North when there is an ongoing situation of war in Europe. In such a situation, Norway’s approach to security dilemmas and how to avoid or mitigate them is to design a deterrence policy that is compatible with its policies of reassurance towards Russia. In essence, Norway has not changed its position on achieving low tension with Russia, which illustrates that Norway presupposes that Russia in the High North still seeks to maintain a status quo situation. Otherwise, all measures taken by Norway to keep tensions low would be meaningless since security dilemmas can only appear between states that are not committed to malign intentions.
Hence, rather than analysing deterrence and reassurance measures as a continuum from deterrence to reassurance, it is more appropriate to regard them as complementary. If Norway succeeds with such a policy, Norway would, however, still face a security dilemma, but the security requirements would be more compatible. That is, the states pursue a policy of keeping the status quo, and in such a situation the defensive posture has the advantage. It would then be possible for Norway to continue to pursue an orderly and professional relationship with Russia focusing on the specific issues and interests shared with Russia in the north. The purpose would be to build a minimum level of trust without becoming vulnerable.
According to security dilemma theory, predictability in behaviour is key in achieving such a situation. As another scholar, Stephen M. Walt, states in this regard: ‘[S]tates interested in stability are usually wise to respect the status quo and adhere to prior agreement. Blatant violations erode trust, and trust once lost is hard to regain’. Predictability is therefore a vital part of Norwegian foreign policy in the High North, and this is especially important during times when Russia acts in a far more unpredictable way, as the Norwegian intelligence service states in its latest annual threat assessment, Fokus 2024.
Is it possible to mitigate security dilemmas in the High North?
Since it became a NATO member in 1949, Norway has pursued a policy of low tension in the High North, including prohibiting permanent foreign bases on Norwegian soil during times of peace. Furthermore, it has also prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons in Norway during peacetime. Over the years, these policies have been adapted and changed, but the substance remains the same. In other words, successive Norwegian governments have combined measures for deterrence with measures intended to reassure Russia (and the then Soviet Union in the past) to reduce risks and thereby stabilise Norway’s immediate geographical areas. The aim, then, has been to mitigate security dilemmas to secure cooperation between potential hostile states in areas where there are common interests.
People-to-people cooperation
People-to-people cooperation in the High North is an example of regional cooperation at the sub-state level, even though the cooperation depends on the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financing the Barents Secretariat (The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, 2021). Issues discussed includes cooperation on business, cultural exchanges and indigenous peoples. These issue areas played a role in promoting even more cooperation and integration over the old Cold War border. For example, in the years 1993 to 2021, the Barents Secretariat supported between 200 to 300 projects yearly within such fields as exchange programmes between universities, sports events and programmes on climate change.
Norway’s aim was to create a more constructive neighbourhood in the High North. Crucially, the strategy was not initiated to promote system change in Russia. If that had been the aim, then ‘it would have been politically impossible for the Russians to participate in this project,’, as one highly ranked Norwegian diplomat stated in an interview in High North News in January 2023. Far from establishing a collective security system, the aim was instead to mitigate security dilemmas through the establishment of closer people-to-people contacts.
Was it successful? Based on interviews with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2023, the diplomat we spoke with informed us that ‘the Russians tolerated this form of cooperation, but there was no eagerness for it.’ This diplomat also noted that Barents Sea cooperation became even more difficult after 2012, when the Russians introduced their “Foreign Agent” legislation. He further stated that ‘the whole idea behind people-to-people cooperation from a Norwegian perspective was that of a maturation process. Even more so, ever since its inception in 1993, the Barents Sea cooperation has consistently been heavy going’.
Open borders in the High North have not transformed Russian security thinking, however. Nevertheless, Norway still aims to keep diplomatic channels open, and Norway continues to pursue an orderly and professional relationship focusing on specific issues and interests shared with Russia in the High North. Insights from security dilemma theory should inform us about the limitations of such a mitigation strategy, especially since this form of low-key cooperation has not transformed Russia’s approach to security. One question along these lines is whether it was naïve and fruitless to embark upon such an approach. Yet, in such a highly militarised region, every effort should be made to avoid entering a situation Jervis terms “doubly dangerous”.
Confidence- and security-building measures
Formally, the Vienna Document of 2011 lays the foundation for how the 57 participating states within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall relate to each other in the military sphere. However, these arrangements became almost irrelevant in 2014, when Russia first attacked Ukraine. The Russian attack in February 2022 and onwards further ended the low tension that has characterised the Arctic region after the end of the Cold War, meaning that all prior measures initiated with Russia and involving Norway appear to have become insignificant. Therefore, it is more relevant to ensure stability in the north given that low tension has become almost impossible to maintain.
An additional factor is NATO’s northern enlargement to include Finland and Sweden. With these two countries now inside NATO, it is imperative to adapt the military presence in the area so that this can lead to both trustworthy deterrence and necessary stability. Considering this, Norway must begin to regard the security situation in the Baltic Sea area and in the Barents Sea within the same context. The aim is to integrate these two new Nordic member states as quickly as possible into the NATO infrastructure and thereby enhance the Alliance’s deterrence posture.
Simultaneously, Norway strives to maintain constructive, bilateral relations with Russia within a range of areas, such as fisheries, natural protection, border control and Search and Rescue (SAR). This also includes cooperation with Russia on Svalbard. Prior to the Russian invasion in February 2022, one concrete measure to achieve this was the 2019 decision on establishing a communication channel between the defence leaders in Oslo and Moscow. The channel was meant to foster dialogue and prevent misunderstandings in the military sphere. After February 2022, Norway implemented European Union (EU) sanctions against Russia but intended to employ a ‘flexible interpretation’ of them. The Norwegian authorities therefore keep three northern ports open to Russian ships. A closure of these ports might have severe consequences for the Norwegian-Russian cooperation on incidents at sea, as well as for the fishing regime in the Barents and Norwegian Sea.
Norway’s aim in today’s security environment is to maintain stability in the High North. How Norway acts, how the country approaches legitimate Russian security interests and how it implements a practical approach to avoid unnecessary incidents are of vital importance to Norway’s reassurance policies.
The Arctic Council
Norway is one of the countries that has demonstrated scepticism towards bringing security and defence into the eight-member Arctic Council, since such a move could disrupt the established trust and aggravate – not mitigate – already existing security dilemmas. To Norway, the Council’s work is important from both an environmental and a climate change perspective, as well as its role as a forum for cooperation with indigenous representatives. Consequently, the official Norwegian position is that any confidence- and security-building measure should take place within the framework of the Vienna Document.
To open forums for consultations is nevertheless important, and even more so in the current security political situation. The former Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy, Lars Saunes, has investigated measures to improve security dialogues in the High North. In an interview in High North News, he stated that ‘deterrence and military posturing are more or less the only signalling that take place in the Arctic that may lead to an accelerating security policy challenge in the future’. He therefore suggests including Russian militaries in security and defence arrangements or forums. Berbrick and Saunes therefore suggest restarting the meetings with Russia through the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Forum, where they argue that this forum ‘offers an opportunity for dialogue to help prevent misunderstandings and unintended security escalation’. According to their report, a reconvening of this forum would be a mechanism that Arctic states could use to re-open dialogue on the strategic-military level. The challenge here, however, is that Russian participation was suspended after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
Both the Arctic Council and the Vienna Document can contribute to curbing security dilemmas. However, insights from security dilemma theory also teach us that setting up new institutional frameworks is one way of mitigating security dilemmas, and to reconvene the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Forum could be a step in the right direction, which also illustrate the need for more regional arrangements in ensuring security in the High North.
Conclusion
The Norwegian Defence Pledge – the long-term defence plan for 2025–2036 – proposes that Norway must significantly strengthen its defence capabilities and contribute more to enhancing NATO’s deterrence posture in the High North. Furthermore, as Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO reshapes Nordic security, the landmass between the Baltic Sea and the Norwegian and Barents Sea must be considered a common strategic area, which dramatically increases NATO’s deterrence capabilities.
In this situation, insights from security dilemma theory can assist us in understanding the current character of High North security, including insights into how misperceptions among state-actors can destabilise an already tense security situation – for a more theoretical understanding, see Jervis. To avoid a “doubly dangerous” situation is still an overarching Norwegian aim, but in today’s security condition “low tension” is something that belongs to the past. But what is still relevant is to consider deterrence and reassurance as complementary factors in Norwegian defence policies. As the Norwegian Defence Commission underlines in its report from 2023: ‘It may a time will come when it will be desirable and possible to cooperate more closely with Russia, both within the framework by NATO and bilaterally’. It is then important to maintain a minimum of channels for dialogue and joint work in place.
Hence, the best strategy for Norway is to combine the strengthening of its own deterrence and defence postures with predictability in its behaviour and cooperation with Russia on issues where there are common interests.
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