By Ramon Pacheco Pardo
5.9.2025
Introduction
On 3 September 2025, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended the 2025 China Victory Day Parade in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, as well as the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Kim’s trip to China to attend the parade marked his debut in a multilateral gathering. It also marked the first time that the leaders of North Korea, China and Russia have met together, at least publicly, since the late 1950s. Furthermore, Kim travelled to China together with his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, marking her first known trip to a foreign country. This was also Kim Jong-un’s first trip to China since January 2019, when the United States (US)-North Korea and inter-Korean diplomacy were at their height, as well as since the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, this was Kim’s second foreign trip since the pandemic, following his visit to Russia for a leaders’ summit in September 2023.
What are the main reasons behind Kim’s attendance at China’s Victory Day parade?
A key reason behind Kim’s decision to attend the China Victory Day parade appears to be his need to improve relations with China’s President, Xi Jinping. North Korea-Russia relations have warmed in recent years, mainly thanks to Kim’s decision to support Moscow’s war on Ukraine by sending North Korean soldiers to the battlefield and providing ammunition and missiles to the Russian army. However, North Korea-China relations had weakened following the COVID-19 pandemic. The leaders of the two countries only met this week after a noticeable dip in the number of high-level visits between Pyongyang and Beijing, and a strained trade relationship throughout most of 2024. Amid these and other signs that Xi was unhappy with the warming ties between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kim seems to have assessed that attending this week’s parade in Beijing should help improve his relations with the Chinese leader. Furthermore, Kim held a separate summit with Xi on 4 September 2025. This was the first meeting between them in six years, and yet further proof that Kim is seeking to strengthen relations with his Chinese counterpart.
Another key reason behind Kim’s decision to attend China’s commemoration of the end of the Second World War is his wish to boost his domestic and international legitimacy, as well as Kim Ju-ae’s credentials as his would-be successor. North Korean media has prominently covered Kim’s visit to China and, crucially, his positioning right next to Xi during the parade. The symbolism of Kim standing next to one of the world’s most powerful leaders will not go unnoticed among both elites and ordinary people in North Korea. Furthermore, the image of Kim standing next to Xi, with Putin, the other leader flanking the Chinese premier, serves to legitimise his position as an international leader. This matters for Kim, given that his country is often portrayed as isolated from the international community. Finally, bringing Kim Ju-ae to China and her being treated as the second most important person in the North Korean delegation will serve to cast Kim’s daughter as North Korea’s potential heir apparent – in the same way that Kim Il-sung, the founding father of North Korea, brought his son Kim Jong-il to China in the 1980s to introduce him as the country’s future leader.
What are the main international implications of Kim’s visit?
Arguably, the main international implication of Kim’s attendance at the parade in Beijing is the strategic realignment of North Korea as a strong partner and ally of both China and Russia. Traditionally, these have been the two countries North Korea has worked most closely with. They are also the two countries that most often have provided an economic and diplomatic lifeline to Pyongyang over the decades. However, Kim’s ties with Xi and Putin have been strained at times – most notably, when China and Russia supported the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Pyongyang in 2016-2017. Kim has now repaired his relationship with Putin and is also working on doing the same with Xi once more. However, there are limits to this realignment. There was no formal trilateral summit between the leaders of the three countries, and even though they share the goal of undermining the US-led international system, their ultimate objectives and ability to do so are different. Plus, it should be remembered that Pyongyang was able to play Beijing and Moscow against each other during the Cold War and, to an extent, in recent decades as well. It seems that Kim is trying to do the same by leveraging his closer ties with Putin in his relationship with Xi.
Another important implication of Kim’s trip to China is that the North Korean leader can approach relations with the US and South Korea from a stronger position than he did in 2018-2019. Both US President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung have indicated their wish to pursue diplomacy with North Korea, with Trump mentioning that he would be willing to meet with Kim once again. Pyongyang has been lukewarm towards proposals to resume diplomacy but has not closed the door entirely – particularly in the case of the US. However, North Korea can now count on Chinese and Russian economic and diplomatic support during any potential negotiations with the US and/or South Korea. This support was not guaranteed at the start of the 2018-2019 bout of diplomacy, when Kim’s relations with Xi and Putin were weaker. This means that Pyongyang would be in a stronger position to press ahead with its goals if diplomacy resumes, including de facto recognition as a nuclear state, the removal or at least freezing of economic sanctions on the country, receiving economic aid or the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Washington.
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The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) or the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB).
