Lee Jae-myung’s Middle Power Diplomacy

By Ramón Pacheco Pardo

4.4.2026

Introduction

In recent days, Lee Jae-myung has received Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and French President Emmanuel Macron in Seoul. These two meetings are part of a flurry of summits with fellow middle-power leaders since Lee took office in June 2025. Leaving aside meetings on the sidelines of multilateral summits such as APEC, G7, G20 or the UN General Assembly, Lee has received his counterparts from Italy, Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia and France in South Korea – plus a special envoy from Qatar – and visited Japan, Singapore and the Philippines for summit encounters. Lee’s top-level middle power diplomacy builds on a similar emphasis on building bridges with South Korean counterparts dating back to at least the Lee Myung-bak presidency. This focus on middle power ties accelerated during the Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol presidencies. It is mainly the result of South Korea’s growing military, economic, technological and diplomatic capabilities; the disruption to global stability resultant from China’s aggressive behaviour under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy; the disruptions brought by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and the push by a growing number of middle powers across the world to find new, reliable partners. We can thus expect Lee’s middle power diplomacy to continue to be a cornerstone of his foreign and security policy.

What has been the main focus of Lee Jae-myung’s middle power diplomacy so far?

Over the years, South Korea has sought to link its middle power diplomacy to concrete outcomes – moving beyond vague joint declarations and focusing on specific deliverables. Top-level meetings between South Korean leaders and their foreign counterparts have been central to this strategy. Lee’s approach has been no different. In particular, his focus has been on economic security, including technology cooperation, supply chain resilience and energy security, as well as on traditional security, with an emphasis on partnerships, defence industry cooperation and weapons sales. Lee’s recent meetings with Prabowo and Macron illustrate this.

In the case of Indonesia, Seoul and Jakarta have elevated their bilateral relationship to a “special comprehensive strategic partnership”. For South Korea, this is the highest level of bilateral ties with another country. In concrete terms, the two sides agreed to continue the joint development of the KF-21 jet fighter – in which Jakarta holds a minority stake – and for Indonesia to purchase up to 16 units as the cornerstone of deeper defence industry cooperation. Seoul and Jakarta also agreed, among others, to South Korea increasing imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and critical minerals from Indonesia, South Korean firms boosting investment in the electric vehicle and battery manufacturing ecosystem in Indonesia, and for Indonesia to increase its participation in the South Korean maritime industry and AI industries.

As for France, Seoul and Paris have also elevated their partnership, in this case, to a “comprehensive partnership”. The visit marked Macron’s first trip to South Korea since taking office in 2017, which serves to underscore that Seoul has become a central partner for European powers. The agreements signed between South Korea and France during Macron’s visit highlight that their relationship – and by extension, relations between Seoul and Europe – continue to be driven by technology, economic security and trade primarily. Indeed, South Korea and France signed agreements to expand research and other cooperation in sectors including semiconductors, AI and quantum computing, as well as the joint development of value-added space services such as satellite transportation, deployment, life extension and refuelling. Macron also invited Lee to attend this year’s G7 summit, to be held in Evian–les-Bains in June. South Korea has become a regular attendee of G7 summits dating back to the final years of the Moon government.

How does Lee Jae-myung’s middle power diplomacy fit with his overall foreign policy strategy?

Lee came to office with a promise to pursue a “pragmatic” foreign and security strategy, in juxtaposition to Yoon’s (alleged) prioritisation of values over South Korea’s core interests. In practice, Lee’s approach has followed Seoul’s well-trodden path of prioritising South Korean interests when necessary and values when possible. In this respect, reinforcing ties with middle powers irrespective of their political regime, human rights record or economic policy is similar to the policy of fellow middle powers across Asia and other parts of the world. Thus, Lee’s pragmatism means that top-level summits and meetings with leaders from other middle powers will continue to be central to his foreign policy. It also means that Lee will emphasise values when possible, as he did before Macron’s visit in an op-ed published in a French newspaper.

At the same time, Lee will prioritise South Korea’s ties with today’s two superpowers: the United States and China. The Lee government has made clear that the ROK-US alliance continues to be the most important foreign relationship for Seoul, certainly in the areas of security and diplomacy, but increasingly in the areas of technology and economic security as well. Concurrently, Lee has sought to stabilise diplomatic and economic relations with China. Seoul-Beijing ties continued to deteriorate under Yoon following the heights reached in 2015 under Park Geun-hye. This serves to explain Yoon’s summits and meetings with Trump and Xi. Yet, South Korea is seeking to diversify economic, diplomatic and security ties as a means to help avoid security overdependence on South Korea’s alliance with the United States, withstand China’s recurrent security and economic aggressions, and hedge against the Trump administration’s trade policies. Lee’s recent meetings with his Indonesian and French counterparts are further proof of this push.

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