Litigating Rivalry: Great Powers and the Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement

By Laia Comerma

CSDS In-Depth Paper

25/2025

The paralysis of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Appellate Body has transformed what was once considered the most successful interstate adjudication system in international law into a central site of contestation in the evolving international political economy. Existing scholarship has examined the causes of this crisis, but we know considerably less about how states continue to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) under conditions of great power rivalry, geopolitical competition and the weakening of multilateral trade governance. This CSDS In-Depth Paper addresses this gap through an original dataset comprising all WTO disputes initiated against four major powers – the European Union (the EU), the United States (US), China and Russia – between 1995 and 2025. The dataset includes information on complainants, third-party participation, coalition patterns, dispute timing, issue areas and case outcomes.

The In-Depth Paper combines insights from the literature on WTO dispute initiation, strategic autonomy and the geopoliticisation of trade to analyse how great powers and secondary powers use litigation in an increasingly fragmented trade regime. The findings show that WTO disputes are increasingly embedded in broader geopolitical dynamics. China is disproportionately targeted by the US and the EU, reflecting both systemic rivalry and the centrality of disputes concerning subsidies, industrial policy, market access and state intervention. The analysis also reveals distinct coalition structures surrounding the major powers, with the EU frequently partnering with countries that support legalised multilateralism, while the US forms coalitions centred on concerns about Chinese competition and trade distortions. Despite the crisis of the Appellate Body, dispute initiation and settlement continue, suggesting that WTO litigation remains a valuable instrument for managing economic interdependence and strategic competition.

The In-Depth Paper’s main contribution is primarily empirical: it provides one of the first comprehensive datasets of WTO disputes directed against major powers over the entire lifespan of the WTO. Conceptually, it shows that the DSM should no longer be understood solely as a legal enforcement mechanism but increasingly as a strategic instrument through which states navigate great power rivalry, defend economic interests and pursue strategic autonomy in a progressively geopolitical trading system.

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WTO DSM cases database

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