By Elene Dzneladze
27.6.2024
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted swift reactions from the international community. South Korea joined the efforts of the European Union (EU) member states and the United States(US), who to this day have coordinated and adopted multiple comprehensive sanctions packages. The South Korean parliament has been largely unified in supporting Ukraine, as the war has implications far beyond Russia and Ukraine. The outcome of the Russian war will affect the status quo in the current liberal international order, as well as challenge the security of the Indo-Pacific.
Concerns over the heightened risk of escalations on the Korean Peninsula are further highlighted by the strengthening of the Russia-North Korean friendship. The North Korean leader, Kim Jung Un, has showed support to Vladimir Putin’s plans since the beginning of the invasion, sending various arms, including shells and rockets to the Russian military. Concerns from the US and its allies over Russia and North Korea moving to the next level of their partnership were proven right after Putin’s visit to Pyongyang on 19 June 2024, the first time in 24 years, during which the two leaders stated their joint readiness to confront the Western ambitions together and create alternative trade and mutual settlements mechanisms. Even more alarming was the signed arms agreement which requires Moscow and Pyongyang to provide each other with defence and other types of assistance in case of war. While the North will benefit from Russian economic assistance and technology transfers and move forward in its nuclear strategy, the munitions sourced from Pyongyang will in turn allow Russia to prolong and sustain the war in Ukraine.
Considering Kim Jung Un’s more aggressive language towards the West, and the scrapping of the peaceful reunification policy with the South, as well as the sending of over 600 trash-filled balloons and multiple incidents of North Korean soldiers crossing the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), tensions on the Korean Peninsula are at their highest in years. With Putin and Kim motivated to partner in deciding the security architecture of Eurasia, South Korea is more inclined to also deepen its partnership with the US, NATO and European states. As the security situation in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific are intertwined, the South will play an important role in providing aid to Ukraine, as Seoul clearly has a lot depending on the outcome of the war.
What role has South Korea played so far in the provision of aid to Ukraine?
As South Korea is forbidden by its Foreign Trade Act to export weapons outside of a “peaceful purpose”, it has instead channelled its aid to Ukraine through the provision of financial, humanitarian, technical and non-lethal military supplies, including bulletproof vests, helmets, medical supplies, etc. Additionally, Ukraine received a donation of two K600 combat engineering vehicles (CEVs) for de-mining, 100 units of SsangYong Musso pickup trucks and 5 units of DOOSAN DX17Z mini excavators – these are strictly to be used in humanitarian missions. The Parliament has also approved an eightfold increase of the previous Ukraine aid package to 520 billion Won ($394 million) for the year 2024, covering reconstruction, humanitarian aid, as well as aid dispersed through other international organisations. The South Korean president has also pledged to Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy to cooperate on post-war reconstruction efforts, launch a scholarship fund named after him and to offer more support to Ukrainian students residing in South Korea.
While Ukraine has requested direct weapons provision on numerous occasions, South Korea has so far refused to deviate from its long standing policy of not sending arms to countries for use in active conflict. Instead, as South Korea is a key US ally and a global partner of NATO, it has joined the economic sanctions against Moscow and coordinated aid provision with the US, directly transferring 550,000 units of 155mm artillery rounds to the US over two years to replace the ammunition the US has sent to Ukraine. Through this transfer of shells, South Korea’s contribution to supplying artillery ammunition to Ukraine became larger than all European nations combined.
South Korea is fulfilling its role as a major arms exporter with the EU as well, finalising an arms sale worth billions of dollars with Poland. This deal resulted from the agreement made by Western countries in 2023 to send tanks, including Leopard 2 and Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine in the hopes of breaching Russian defensive lines. Korean tanks and armoured vehicles acquired by Poland through the mega deal, which also is the second largest deal made by a NATO ally to a partner outside the bloc, as well as the biggest ever weapons export pact for the South, will partly replace the military vehicles transferred by Poland to Ukraine. Additionally, South Korea permitted the export of its weapons components to Ukraine and Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) approved export licences for Poland to provide Ukraine with Krab howitzers made from South Korean components. These decisions not only act in favour of NATO and the US’ expectations for increased South Korean assistance to Ukraine, but it also positions South Korea as an important player in military procurement and a defender of international order.
What are the future areas of trilateral cooperation among the US, EU and South Korea for the provision of aid to Ukraine?
During the time of heightened security concerns, delays in defence procurement cause uneasiness among the European nations, especially among those who share their eastern border with Ukraine. An inability to timely acquire military equipment from Germany, the fourth largest donor to Ukraine, or the weaknesses and capacity shortages in both the European and American supply chains, create an opportunity for South Korea to come in as a trustworthy and adept partner that can fill production gaps with weapons that comply with NATO standards. As ten European countries, including Estonia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Czechia, the Netherlands and Slovakia signed the “Tallinn Pledge” on 19 January 2023, committing to collectively donate military equipment such as main battle tanks, heavy artillery, air defence and ammunition as aid to Ukraine, they will also be seeking for ways to replenish and modernise their domestic stockpiles.
South Korea’s aim is to make the country the fourth-largest defence exporter by 2027, combined with strong capacities for mass industrial production and support of technology transfers and production localisation, positions South Korea as a prime candidate for enhanced military and commercial cooperation beneficial for all parties involved. Through the upscaling of South Korean military production, the European countries will benefit by diversifying their weapons supplier portfolios, receiving new technologies and reviving domestic production. The US can also alleviate the effects of their own production shortfalls, and South Korea can obtain a larger share of European markets while also being better equipped with modern munitions necessary to combat the rising security concerns and risks of aggression from the North Korean side. One of the main obstacles to South Korea – EU direct cooperation is that the EU’s two incentives, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), contributing to building defence capabilities, consolidating demand and encouraging joint acquisition of defence industry products, are only accessible to EU member states, thus forcing South Korea to only pursue bilateral agreements.
Additionally, South Korea has expressed interest in strengthening its position in the renewable batteries market. As the EU and the US seek to decrease dependence on Chinese battery producers for their growing electric vehicle market, South Korea can have an opportunity to present itself once again as an alternative partner. However, South Korea’s success depends on the ability to procure large amounts of lithium, which Ukraine has in abundance. South Korea–Ukraine cooperation in the field of lithium extraction could not only help progress the economic partnership between the two countries, but also be the determinant factor in whether South Korea can have a larger share of the European battery market too.
While there are promising areas for enhanced trilateral cooperation, South Korea’s involvement in aid provision to Ukraine, as well as increased weapons production, have not gone unnoticed by either Russia or North Korea. Previously, South Korea suggested that they could consider directly providing lethal arms aid to Ukraine in case of large-scale Russian attack on Ukrainian civilians. The potential change in the existing weapons export policy has become relevant again in light of the newly signed Moscow and Pyongyang treaty and mutual defence support commitments. As this agreement could allow North Korea to openly arm Russia and help sustain the Ukraine invasion, it could also create grounds for Russia to intervene on the Korean peninsula against South Korea. After the official condemnation by the US and South Korea of the treaty, it was stated again that South Korea could support Ukraine directly with lethal aid to better combat Russian aggression and thus reconsider its policy stance based on how Russia will proceed going forward. Subsequently, this statement was followed up by Putin’s threats, warning South Korea against a “big mistake”, making it clear that the extent of South Korean involvement in Ukrainian aid provision can have large-scale implications not only through the strengthening of trilateral partnership with the US and the EU, but also through its impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula.
