South Korea-Europe Relations: Reflections from the 2026 Brussels Korea Forum

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 19/2026

By Ramón Pacheco Pardo

8.10.2026

Key issues

• The 2026 Brussels Korea Forum focused on existing and potential (traditional) security and economic security cooperation between South Korea and Europe, as well as potential barriers to deeper relations between both sides.
• South Korea and Europe are poised to strengthen their cooperation because of the strong foundations they have built, international uncertainty and a need to work with trusted partners.
• South Korea and Europe should continue to promote multilateralism despite its current weak position, while also acknowledging the need to work with selected partners through minilateral initiatives.

Introduction

South Korea-Europe relations have deepened substantially in recent years, both in terms of the number of issue areas covered and the depth in which they are covered. This was the key message coming out of the fifth edition of the Brussels Korea Forum that the KF-VUB Chair at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy convened on 8 September 2026. Speakers in the two panels focusing, respectively, on cooperation in the areas of global security and economic security and technology agreed that South Korea-Europe relations have never been as strong as they are today. There is a question, however, about whether cooperation between the two sides is about to touch a structural ceiling or whether it can break through it to reach new heights.

Certainly, the drivers behind closer South Korea-Europe relations are likely to remain in place. They include the similarities and complementarities between the two sides in terms of economic, diplomatic and defence capabilities as well as their worldviews and values; the pressure coming from United States (US)-China strategic competition; threat perceptions coming from the behaviour of the likes of China, Russia and North Korea; the need to manage historical ties with a less reliable US; and a realisation of the benefits of expanding the number and scope of partnerships. It is unlikely that any of these drivers will change any time soon, hence why Seoul and Brussels will continue to press ahead with new and existing cooperation initiatives.

Yet, the capabilities of both sides are constrained. Limited budgets need to be allocated efficiently, particularly as certain costs such as social welfare continue to climb. Some issues inevitably need to be prioritised over others, since no country can afford to deal with every single international matter. Unexpected domestic and international crises can demand the attention of leaders and their governments at any moment, from protests related to migration to the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. And while South Korea and Europe have many reasons to cooperate with each other, there are also areas of disagreement and even competition between both – including defence exports, the regulation of Artificial Intelligence or how to manage relations with the Trump administration.

It is in this context that the Brussels Korea Forum centred on ways to boost South Korea-Europe cooperation, building on the existing blocs while projecting into the future. In this CSDS Policy Brief, we look at the main issues discussed at the Forum while also sharing some of the recommendations to deepen South Korea-Europe cooperation.

Global security: working together in an uncertain world

The security environment in 2026 is radically different to the context in which the first Brussels Korea Forum was held (in 2021). Back then, there was a strong focus on North Korea’s nuclear programme as the main hard security issue for South Korea and Europe to work together on. Today, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, years-long conflicts in the Middle East and cyber and hybrid warfare from China, North Korea and Russia are arguably even more important shared threats. At the same time, the US has made clear that both South Korea and Europe need to increase spending on their own security. In other words, Seoul, Brussels and other European capitals are facing a more threatening environment while simultaneously being asked by their main ally to take a more central role in defending their own countries.

This issue was extensively discussed at the 2026 Brussels Korea Forum. And it is fair to say that there is a recognition that South Korea and Europe need to step up and become more self-reliant. In fact, successive US administrations have spent decades asking Europe – in particular – as well as South Korea to upgrade their military capabilities. This includes everything from hardware such as jet fighters and missile systems, to battle-ready command and control structures, to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. In the case of South Korea, the latent North Korean threat has driven a decades-long investment in homemade and imported capabilities. As for Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven home the need to increase defence spending. The confluence of all these factors has already resulted in a number of bilateral dialogues, joint projects and research and development initiatives between South Korea, NATO, the EU and several European countries.

In particular, the Brussels Korea Forum served to assess the burgeoning defence industry ties between South Korea and Europe. According to SIPRI, South Korea has become the second-largest arms supplier to NATO members since Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. Plus, South Korean defence companies are being asked to open production facilities in their export countries with European partners. This type of defence industry cooperation should endure in time and survive the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It should be reinforced with joint bilateral defence industry development, technology transfer and training programmes – particularly between South Korea and Poland but also between South Korea and others such as Romania or Spain. At the same time, frictions remain in this area due to the “buy Europe” requirement of EU flagship initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and the European Defence Industry Programme. These frictions underscore that Europe wants to use these initiatives to develop its own defence industry to limit reliance on the US, with one of the consequences being the exclusion of other potential partners such as South Korea.

At the same time, an important message coming out of this year’s Brussels Korea Forum is that neither South Korea nor Europe are ready to give up on their respective security relationships with the US. There is a shared understanding that the military, bureaucratic, diplomatic and intelligence ties forged in the decades since the end of the Second World War run deep and can – and will – survive the Trump administration. It is also inescapable that the US continues to be the strongest military power in the world, home to the largest active armed forces in the Western world and the most advanced weapons systems globally. After all, the South Korea-US alliance and NATO benefit South Korea and Europe, respectively, but also serve the interests of the US. Therefore, the US will continue to be South Korea’s and Europe’s main security partner for years, if not decades. So, the security ties between South Korea and Europe will inevitably be secondary and niche-focused compared to their respective security relationships with Washington.

Economic security: navigating US-China competition

Economic security has become the central paradigm driving economic strategic thinking and policymaking across the world. This has very important implications for South Korea and the EU, since both of them benefited hugely from the US-underpinned liberal economic order that followed the end of the Second World War. This order was already being challenged when the first edition of the Brussels Korea Forum was held. But it is in life support as of 2026, with the US decisively pushing an “America First” economic agenda based on tariffs and industry onshoring; China paying lip service to trade openness while continuing to impose huge barriers to trade and investment; and industrial policy and protectionist policies becoming widespread across developed and developing economies alike. Seoul has long pursued an industrial policy of its own, coupled with openness to trade and investment. The EU is now also openly pursuing an industrial strategy too, which is designed to strengthen its strategic autonomy and internal resilience. Yet, the Brussels Korea Forum served as a reminder that South Korea and the EU can and should boost their economic partnership.

Above all, Brussels Korea Forum discussions centred on the many ways in which South Korea, the EU and other advanced economies are seeking to navigate Washington’s protectionism, mitigate the effects of Beijing’s years-long protectionist practices and the effective collapse of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and multilateral economic governance in general. And it is clear that Seoul and Brussels see each other as important economic partners with which to increase trade and investment flows. This explains why South Korea and the EU signed a landmark digital trade agreement in June 2026, on the occasion of their eleventh bilateral summit. In recent years, Seoul and Brussels have also launched green and digital partnerships. All of these agreements serve to create a more stable and predictable environment for South Korea-EU trade and investment relations. In particular, the 2026 digital trade agreement fills a void in the free trade agreement between the two sides.

Moreover, another important point raised at the Brussels Korea Forum is that the industrial strategies of both South Korea and the EU open the door to deepening economic ties. It usually goes unnoticed that EU firms are the largest cumulative investors in South Korea, and their investment has continued in recent years as South Korea has attracted record annual investment inflows. In the opposite direction, South Korea is the largest or second largest Asian investor across many European countries – particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where South Korean firms have a strong foothold. The investment in both directions centres on high-value-added activities such as factories, research and development facilities and services. All of this showcases not only the extent to which South Korea and Europe are already important economic partners to each other, but also that further trade and investment ties would build on very solid foundations with a stable environment thanks to the many bilateral agreements between the two sides. Plus, there is a security benefit to South Korea-Europe economic cooperation as both sides seek to build secure supply chains with trusted partners. In particular, there is scope for South Korea and Europe to strengthen economic relations in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors, humanoid robotics, electric batteries, AI or space.

Having said that, discussions at the Brussels Korea Forum also pointed out some challenges to the South Korea-Europe economic relationship. To begin with, South Korean and European firms are diverting investment to the US as a result of the tariffs and other protectionist measures imposed by the Trump administration – which, it should be noted, built on onshoring initiatives already launched under the Biden administration and also President Trump’s first time in office. This is diverting investment to the US for a mixture of political and economic reasons, since the US is the most important security partner for both South Korea and Europe, while also remaining a key trade partner. In addition, South Korean and European firms have complementarities that can lead to joint projects, but they also compete with each other in key sectors. Cases in point include electric vehicles or nuclear reactors. While today’s still-globalised economy means that most international firms rely on global supply chains, recent layoffs in certain key European industries and Europe’s weak position in many high-tech sectors sit in contrast with South Korea’s strengths. While it is unlikely to be singled out for unfair economic practices in the way that China is, these differences between South Korea and Europe need to be managed.

South Korea, Europe and multilateralism

A point of contention during the 2026 Brussels Korea Forum concerned the role of multilateralism in South Korea-Europe relations. Both South Korea and the EU, along with most if not all European countries, support multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the WTO. However, it is undeniable that multilateralism is under severe stress. The UN has lost its voice and position as an arbiter of disputes among states. China and Russia give voice to the many authoritarian countries seeking an alternative international order. The Trump administration has little time for international organisations that, it believes, constrain and unfairly target the US. Led by India, developing countries have long expressed their dissatisfaction with the rules and regulations imposed by the WTO. South Korea and European countries should work together with partners such as Australia, Canada or Japan to defend the position of multilateral institutions as the only venues that give a voice to all members. And they should also work together to protect the roles that they can still play, whether putting together peacekeeping missions in the case of the UN, brokering nuclear non-proliferation discussions in the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency or convening sectoral and technical discussions in the case of the WTO. In short, South Korea and Europe should uphold the remnants of multilateralism.

Concurrently, it seems more realistic for South Korea and Europe to work together with other partners via minilateral initiatives. This includes the G7 Plus, NATO-Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) and the proposed EU-Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) collaboration – were South Korea to take the step to become a member of the latter. An obvious drawback of these initiatives is that they are not inclusive. Not all European countries are part of NATO or the EU – never mind the G7. However, they do serve as venues for cooperation in a way that multilateral institutions or even other minilateral initiatives with members that do not see eye-to-eye, such as the G20. The G7 Plus, for example, served to informally coordinate sanctions on Russia related to its invasion of Ukraine and is used as a forum to discuss security and economic matters. The NATO-IP4 has boosted exchanges in areas such as cybersecurity and countering disinformation. Additionally, EU-CPTPP collaboration could serve to promote trade and manufacturing rules and regulations. In other words, these initiatives have the potential to partly fill the void left by multilateral institutions.

All in all, South Korea and Europe need a relationship that accounts for the reality of a fragmented international system defined by Sino-American competition and the end of liberal frameworks that promote cooperation. This explains why bilateral cooperation in the areas of (traditional) security and economic security is likely to continue to increase, even if there are constraints mainly driven by South Korea’s and Europe’s respective relationships with the US. Meanwhile, the two sides should continue to promote the merits of multilateralism while acknowledging that minilateralism is more likely to work in the current international environment. All of this makes for a difficult balancing act. However, it is a balancing act that South Korea and Europe can strive to work together on.

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