By Ramon Pacheco Pardo
12.04.2024
South Korea held its quadrennial National Assembly election on 10 April. The opposition, centre-left Democratic Party (DP) led by Lee Jae-myung, who ran for president in the 2022 presidential election, and its satellite party obtained an absolute majority of the seats, winning 175 out 300 seats. This result was similar to the previous National Assembly election, held in 2020 and in which the DP and its satellite party clinched 180 seats. Thus, the DP retains its majority in the South Korean unicameral parliament. The centre-right People Power Party (PPP) of President Yoon Suk-yeol obtained 108 seats, also a similar result to 2020 when the party won 103 seats. The smaller left-leaning party Rebuilding Korea Party, led by former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk, and the New Reform Party, led by former PPP leader Lee Jun-seok, won 12 and three seats, respectively. At total of 67% of eligible voters went to the polls. This marks the highest turnout for a National Assembly election in 32 years, continuing the upward trend of the 2020 election. The results of the election mean that the left-leaning opposition bloc controls a large majority of seats, albeit short of the 200 seats—or two thirds of the total—that would have allowed it to launch an impeachment process of the president, override presidential vetoes over new laws passed by the National Assembly or revise the country’s constitution. Nonetheless, the opposition’s control of the National Assembly will make Yoon the first president to rule with his party holding a parliamentary minority during his full five-year non-renewable mandate.
What are the main reasons behind the results of the election?
Domestic affairs dominated the National Assembly campaign, in common with most past South Korean National Assembly and presidential elections. Issues such as house prices especially in big cities such as Seoul, relatively high inflation including for food products or the country’s declining birth rate and how to adapt to it and reverse it were among the most discussed. Having said that, the DP and the PPP offered a mix of policy options to voters that did not differ widely, and there was no fundamental disagreement regarding the strategy that South Korea should pursue to continue to maintain its current rates of economic growth—or even raise them—or how to deal with a changing society with a larger share of women active in the workforce, older people or migrants, among others, than in the past. In this respect, the (perceived) polarization of South Korean politics continues to be more about personalities, party competition and intra-party politics rather than substance.
Indeed, the National Assembly campaign ended up being presented as a referendum on Yoon’s presidency. Critics argue that the South Korean president, who served as a prosecutor for over 25 years, has followed a ‘prosecutorial’ style, criticizing when not persecuting opponents and refusing or at least failing to engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition. Yoon’s critics also argue that the president has not sought to forge a national consensus on issues that matter to most South Koreans, such as whether there is a need for economic reform, how to continue to create high-quality jobs or how to adapt to a changing society as described above. Furthermore, Yoon’s critics accuse the president of shielding his wife, Kim Keon-hee, from alleged corrupt practices, and have also critiqued some of his nominations to key government posts. In fact, Yoon himself called on voters to provide with a majority in the National Assembly to pursue his preferred policies, which he and his supporters argue have been blocked by the DP. In contrast, Lee and Cho asked voters to pass indictment on what they have labelled as two years of economic and political mishandling under Yoon.
What are the implications of the results of the election?
Focusing on domestic affairs, the main implication of the result of election is that Yoon will find it very hard to move forward with his preferred policy agenda, including economic reform, deregulation of the housing market and pro-business measures. This means that Yoon will probably have to continue to rule by decree rather than passing laws. Decrees tend to be less ambitious, less enduring and easier to reverse. Yoon has also made use of his veto power to block initiatives by the DP-dominated National Assembly on issues such as special investigations into his wife’s alleged corrupt behaviour, pro-labour measures or intervention in and the governance of broadcasters. In all likelihood, the DP will continue to present similar initiatives that are considered to erode Yoon and the PPP, and the president will continue to exercise his veto power. It should be noted, however, that the DP and the PPP have largely worked together to approve South Korea’s annual budget, approve crucial plans and strategies in areas including the support for the country’s innovation-driven economy. This underscores the point that South Korea’s two main parties agree on the broad strategy that they feel is in the country’s best interests. We should expect agreement on fundamental policies crucial to South Korea’s future to continue during the remainder of the Yoon administration, regardless of the heated debate that will also endure.
When it comes to foreign policy, we should not expect much change compared to the first two years of the Yoon government. The National Assembly has limited influence over foreign policy matters, and thus Yoon has latitude to pursue his preferred policies. Therefore, we should expect Yoon to continue to focus on deterrence rather than engagement with North Korea and to raise the issue of Kim Jong-un regime’s human rights abuses, while leaving the door for dialogue open under certain conditions. We should also expect Yoon to continue to press ahead with his Global Pivotal State strategy focused on a more active international role for South Korea, including with partners in minilateral groups such as the G7, NATO and, if possible, AUKUS. Yoon is also very likely to continue to be critical of China while also seeking a degree of engagement and dialogue, and without calling for economic decoupling or economic isolation. In addition, in all likelihood Yoon will continue to focus on a strong ROK-US alliance regardless of who wins the November US presidential election, as well as burgeoning trilateral South Korea-US-Japan cooperation. Rapprochement with Japan is also very likely to continue to be a priority for Yoon, given the strategic environment in Northeast Asia. In fact, Yoon will now feel unconstrained by future elections, since he cannot run for re-election in 2027, and will probably double down on his foreign policy priorities considering the difficulties that he will face in pursuing his domestic agenda.
