Special Delivery? The European Council and the March 2025 Defence Summit

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 5/2025

By Daniel Fiott

7.3.2025

Key issues

• The 6 March 2025 European Council special meeting focused on European defence and support to Ukraine.
• European leaders have put-off answering fundamental questions related to European security guarantees.
• The special European Council meeting set the parameters for a substantial increase in European defence spending.

Introduction

Europe. A continent that is experiencing the biggest shake up to its security since the Cold War. The continued menace posed by Russia and shifts in American strategy raise existential questions for Europe. Will European efforts on defence investment and capability acquisition be enough to placate President Trump and his continued questioning of the American security guarantee to the old continent? In the absence of this security guarantee by the United States (US), can Europeans provide for their own defence? Without American power, can Europeans remain united? So far, European leaders are putting off any bold answers to the delicate question of US security guarantees – they seem to assume a guarantee will exist in the future, in some form or another. Working through the European Union (EU), European leaders have instead decided to focus on boosting defence investments and conventional military capabilities, although France and its close partners appear willing to at least discuss nuclear deterrence in Europe. In any case, defence spending and conventional defence capabilities are President Trump’s two “big asks” of Europe.

Hence, when European leaders met on 6 March 2025 at a so-called “Special Summit” they outlined the measures they would pursue to ensure that Europe is investing appropriate amounts in defence, as well as their ongoing support for Ukraine. Following on from the Versailles Declaration of 2022 and the EU’s Strategic Compass, the European Council stressed that ‘Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously with immediate and future challenges and threats’. Remarkably, these special summit conclusions were agreed at the level of all 27 member states: neutrals and recalcitrants included. Although only 26 out of 27 member states could agree on the Council press release pertaining to Ukraine, the overwhelming result of the 6 March summit was the display of European unity. Beyond unity, however, it is worth exploring the concrete measures that were agreed at the special European Council meeting.

Ukraine

Although Hungary did not approve a formal set of European Council conclusions on Ukraine, European leaders were keen to make a more formal statement of solidarity with Kyiv. This was deemed important following the scenes in the Oval Office in early March, and President Zelensky in fact travelled to Brussels for the 6 March special meeting for an exchange of views. The language in the press statement did not depart from the EU’s long-standing approach to Ukraine, with a message of solidarity and a commitment to the EU’s ‘unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its international recognised borders’. European leaders also continued to reflect on how any “peace deal” could be brokered, and they again insisted that no negotiations on Ukraine can occur without Ukraine or Europeans. Getting to the heart of the matter, European leaders acknowledged that a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine can only occur as part of a more comprehensive peace agreement backed by ‘robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine that contribute to deterring future Russian aggression’.

More importantly perhaps, was the EU’s messaging on putting Ukraine in a position of strength. Borrowing President Trump’s own mantra of “peace through strength”, European leaders made a commitment to provide Ukraine with €30.6 billion in 2025 under the Ukraine Facility to assist the country with its military efforts and defence. What was noteworthy was how the European Council linked these additional financial resources with frozen Russian assets, which is an issue that is likely to gain even more traction in the coming weeks. That is, whether the EU will use the some €300 billion in frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s defence efforts. As was seen at the London Leaders Meeting on 2 March 2025, the United Kingdom announced that a £2.2 billion loan for military aid to Ukraine would be backed by these Russian assets. A similar move at the EU level could be expected soon.

Beyond the financial assistance to Ukraine, however, the European Council press statement also waded into the discussion about security guarantees. Interestingly, the European Council stated that ‘for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, the European Union and Member States are ready to further contribute to security guarantees’ to Ukraine. This may sound bolder than it is in reality, and is hardly a step that prefigures the retraction of any US security guarantee. In fact, the European Council framed its contribution to security guarantees to Ukraine in a specific manner centred on continuing the military training of Ukrainian forces and looking at ways to support Ukraine through the ‘possible use of the common security and defence policy instruments’. Quite what this statement means in practice remains to be seen, although it should be recalled that Kyiv has a specific definition of security guarantees in mind that goes beyond military training.

Financing defence

A large part of the discussions on 6 March 2025 centred on financing European defence – again, one of President Trump’s “big asks”. The European Council acknowledged the importance of increasing defence investment in order to lower strategic dependencies, boost European defence and fill critical capability gaps. The leaders framed this as both a step towards enhancing Europe’s defence and its competitiveness. It welcomed the European Commission’s intention to relax the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules on defence spending ‘as an immediate measure’, but it also called on the Commission to offer further steps to help with significantly boosting national defence spending. Under the Commission’s recently proposed “ReArm Europe Plan”, the idea is to allow member states more fiscal space to increase defence spending without falling foul of the SGP’s excessive deficit procedure. It is noteworthy, however, that the European Council did not specifically endorse or even refer to the Commission’s own estimate that €650 billion in additional spending could be secured through a relaxation of SGP rules.

Beyond the SGP, however, the European Council yet again called on the Commission to propose new funding sources for defence at the EU level, especially by finding additional funding sources in current EU funding programmes. In essence, the European Council are calling on the Commission to identify and re-appropriate funds that may be buried (and unused) in existing EU financing programmes for defence. What is more, the European Council “took note” (rather than “welcomed” or “endorsed”) the loan pillar within the Commission’s “ReArm Europe Plan”, which could see €150 billion in loans – backed by the EU budget – generated for defence. Obviously, European leaders appear to still have questions about how this loan facility should work in practice, and they will no doubt return to the issue at future European Council meetings. Beyond loans, however, the European Council underlined its continued support for a greater role for the European Investment Bank (EIB) in defence. The Council specifically called on the EIB to revise its lending rules for defence and to increase its investment in security and defence levels, as well as underlining the importance of mobilising private financing.

Defence industry

The European Council also dedicated a lot of its time and energy on 6 March to the question of the defence industry and military capabilities. European leaders underlined the importance of the forthcoming White Paper on the Future of European Defence, which they see as a way to ‘substantially boost financing for European defence and to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base’. The European Council stopped short of announcing any “Buy European” approach, but it did sound the familiar notes of wanting to aggregate demand, harmonise requirements and to boost standardisation and interoperability. In this respect, the European Council underlined their continued support for the European Defence Fund and called for a swift conclusion to the negotiations for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Leaders also called for simplified rules and procedures for defence procurement, industry cooperation and supply chains.

Military capabilities

The European Council meeting of 6 March 2025 also reiterated the military capability needs of the EU and NATO including: air and missile defence, artillery systems, deep strike precision strike capabilities, missiles and ammunition, drones and anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space, military mobility, critical infrastructure protection, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Although all of these capability needs have already been identified through European Defence Agency and European Commission processes, it will be worth monitoring how these capability needs and gaps evolve over time. Indeed, with more defence investment at the EU level there will be a need to agree on the capability priorities that are identified by the EU and NATO – and these calculations will be greatly affected by potentially abrupt shifts in US policy towards Europe. Still, the European Council did underline that ‘the defence of all EU land, air and maritime borders contribute to the security of Europe as a whole’, which will also serve to frame future capability development discussions.

Conclusion

The 6 March 2025 Special European Council will not go down in history as an epoch changing moment in European defence. However, European leaders have started (but only started) to adjust to the “Trump 2.0” world by taking a more expansive view of European defence funding, military capabilities and industrial needs. On Ukraine, they have taken a consistent and cautious line that combines continued financial and military support to Ukraine, without any bold measures to provide Kyiv with meaningful security guarantees. In this respect, the fundamental question of who will provide Ukraine with a meaningful security guarantee in the absence of Washington remains unanswered. The 6 March summit conclusions ended with a familiar European Council refrain: “The European Council will revert to this issue at its March and June meetings”. There will only be so long the European Council can keep on “reverting” the issue of European defence to future summits and meetings. And, between now and June, we may be looking at a very different Europe.

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