Strategy by Design: Six Tips for Europe’s Security Strategy

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 9/2026

By Giovanni Grevi

30.3.2026

Key issues

• The EU needs a comprehensive grand strategy that turns latent power into actionable security guidelines for member states;
• The EU must offer a rules-based alternative to power politics by leveraging international partnerships in a multi-polar world;
• Europe must build a defence capacity separable from the US by simultaneously establishing autonomous defence readiness and a robust European NATO pillar.

“Then we follow the four-stage strategy.

What’s that?

The standard Foreign Office response in a time of crisis.

In stage one, we say ‘nothing is going to happen’.

In stage two, we say ‘something may be going to happen, but we should do nothing about it’. In stage three, we say ‘maybe we should do something about it, but there’s nothing we can do’.

In stage four, we say ‘maybe there was something we could have done, but it’s too late now’.”

Yes, Prime Minister

Series 1, Episode 1

Introduction

Forty years on, the outstanding ‘Yes, Prime Minister’ satirical TV series continues to offer insights into the backstage of politics and policy-making. In this case, two senior officials deliver a grotesque masterclass in muddling through: ignoring a crisis out of convenience, complacency or weakness. Away from parody, this approach can be very harmful in the real world, when systemic challenges emerge and threats pile up. Europe has acquired some experience. Most in (Western) Europe had been in denial about Russia’s preparations for war in Ukraine, and failed to deter the attack. Europeans have essentially forfeited influence in the war-ravaged Middle East, where they once played meaningful roles as supporters of the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and as negotiators of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Lured by the economic opportunities presented by China’s huge market, for too long Europeans neglected China’s growing geoeconomic clout and its impact on Europe’s economic security. And, throughout 2025, most European leaders have pretended that the structural challenge posed by the Trump administration to Europe could be managed through diplomatic flattery and some defence spending.

Muddling through has led to the marginalisation of Europe on the geopolitical stage, to its relative economic decline, to its subordination to “America First” (at least until the Greenland crisis) and to the withering of Europe’s credibility as a supporter of international law. Some useful steps have been taken to attempt a course correction, from backing Ukraine to rising defence investments, expanding the EU geoeconomic toolbox and striking new trade deals. But the story of the last few years has been one of Europe placed at the receiving end of decisions made and trends largely shaped elsewhere. The far-reaching implications for Europe and the world of the deliberate US-Israeli attack on Iran are the latest case in point. Given this track record, it might be time to change both course and gear. The envisaged elaboration of a new European Security Strategy may contribute to Europe turning from muddling through to strategic purpose, but several obstacles lie ahead.

Strategy time?

Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, European Commission President von der Leyen mentioned for the first time that the EU would prepare a new security strategy ‘to adjust to the new security architecture and realities that we are now facing’. A few weeks later, at the Munich Security Conference, she outlined an ambitious approach to this exercise, making clear that the strategy would encompass the entire EU policy toolbox and be driven by an overarching goal: ‘to ensure that Europe can defend its own territory, economy, democracy and way of life at all times. Because this is the true meaning of independence’.

These statements open a new chapter in the long pattern of efforts at defining a strategy for Europe in an increasingly volatile world. The first time that the EU engaged in this exercise was with the 2003 European Security Strategy, which was followed by the EU Global Strategy of 2016. Other important documents, such as the 2022 Strategic Compass, the 2023 Economic Security Strategy (updated last year) and the 2025 White Paper on European Defence, have since delivered additional components of the EU’s emerging strategic agenda. The latter centres today on advancing European independence, taking more responsibility for Europe’s defence and supporting rules-based cooperation. Four main organising principles underpin these goals: competitiveness (encompassing economic security), defence readiness, preparedness and partnership on the international stage.

Given the plethora of recent and forthcoming EU policy blueprints covering most aspects of these priorities, the question of the added value of the envisaged European Security Strategy should be addressed upfront. Tackling it requires a consideration of the obstacles to integrated strategy-making in the EU’s intricate political-institutional architecture. Both intra- and inter-institutional turf wars have historically affected policy-making at the EU level, and they continue to do so. More consequential are the reluctance of EU member states to empower Europe through decisive joint action, the latent tensions among them and the readiness of Hungary and others to sabotage EU decision-making. Underlying heterogeneous national agendas is a protracted wave of anti-EU, illiberal nationalism across Europe, which narrows the margin of manoeuvre of many national leaders. Furthermore, as external powers such as President Trump’s America and China seek to divide Europe by exploiting its vulnerabilities, EU cohesion is under strain. The combined impact of these factors is that EU foreign policy has been adrift on most international crises, except for the support for Ukraine. The lamentable European cacophony that followed the US-Israeli attack on Iran, which, despite the heinous regime in Tehran, is both illegal and reckless, underscores this point.

Concluding from this overview that some industrial, defence or energy policy bricolage might set the “pragmatic” level of ambition for Europe would lead to, at best, softening its decline.  Political and institutional constraints cannot be whisked away in a fit of ambition, but neither can they stifle required action when the EU needs to gear up for systemic competition. The potential added value of the ongoing strategic exercise consists, therefore, in helping offset or mitigate the blockages that hamper EU priority-setting and strategic projection, and in outlining concrete guidelines for action. Conversely, should the exercise largely reflect the arcane logics of Brussels institutions and fail to deliver deeper cooperation among (at least coalitions of) member states, the strategy would be of negligible effect.

This CSDS Policy Brief aims to contribute to EU strategy-making with six non-exhaustive tips concerning the framing of the future strategy, related narratives, transatlantic affairs and two core strategic priorities: strengthening Europe’s defence and deploying a proactive partnership agenda.

Tip 1: Deliver grand strategy

Great power rivalry, the weaponisation of interdependence and the exacerbation of global challenges are mutually reinforcing trends. As Russia’s war in Ukraine sent shockwaves across the international system, so the US-Israeli attack on Iran carries disruptive ramifications, affecting not only the entire Middle East but also global energy security, food security, technology supply chains and economic stability. Managing systemic volatility and preventing, or coping with, acute crises requires an integrated approach, cutting across policy silos and driven by clear goals. The EU needs the equivalent of a grand strategy, which outlines what it stands for, what it wants to achieve on the international stage and how.

Europe needs the tools and determination to deter any form of coercion and strengthen its resilience across the board. Europe’s protection, however, does not rest on security policies only. It relies on the robustness of its constitutional order (at both the national and EU levels), on Europe’s economic power base and on a relatively stable and rules-based international order. The current EU strategic exercise cannot address the entirety of this agenda, but it should articulate a comprehensive concept of Europe’s security. Such an understanding includes the strengthening of the constitutional, socio-economic, technological and security foundations of the European order. Once this frame is set, the strategy could focus on a more limited scope of priority areas under an overarching approach.

For the EU, articulating a grand strategy is both a foreign policy undertaking, as it frames Europe’s strategic projection, and a Union-building effort, as it fosters coherence between EU policies and between the EU and its member states. The best laid plans must be supported by collective political ownership and institutional jointness. The litmus test of Europe’s grand strategy will consist, therefore, in providing actionable guidelines to steer the mobilisation of national and EU resources to achieve shared goals through joint action. Where unanimity will prove elusive in implementing these guidelines, the EU and its member states shall embrace flexible forms of cooperation (see tip 3).

Tip 2: Write Europe’s own script

We live in a multi-script world. Scripts reflect different worldviews and encompass related narratives and priorities. As it crafts its security strategy, the EU should further outline its own script – one fitting the world as it is, but not solely dictated by it. A script must be rooted in sound analysis, but should include an aspirational dimension too – a statement of intent for European citizens and for the world. The “arsenal of democracy” and “America first”, China’s “rejuvenation” and its recent Global Development, Security and Civilisation initiatives, Russia’s “Eurasian” destiny, “normative power” Europe and the “non-alignment” of the “Global South” are important elements of competing scripts. Of course, some scripts are little more than rhetorical devices. However, if rooted in respective strategic cultures and when matched by broadly consistent action, they can be significant vectors of influence. In this contested landscape, the extractive unilateralism of the Trump administration has shattered the script of the liberal West, contributing to a normalisation of the “might makes right” worldview that runs against Europe’s fundamental interests and identity as a rules-based actor.

In drafting its script, Europe’s distinct experience of rules-based cooperation informed by liberal values, sometimes considered a relic of the past, is a core element of its comparative advantage. While toughening the EU’s discourse to reflect mounting global disorder, departing too much from its normative tenets to mimic power- or security-driven narratives would be self-defeating, and rather implausible. For the EU, taking a casual approach to international law, depending on who breaches it, amounts to cutting the branch where it sits on the global stage. As mentioned above, in the last two years, a strategic agenda has been emerging centred on the EU’s reliability as a rules-based actor, on Europe’s growing responsibility for its security and on Europe’s independence. This is a good starting point, since it recognises the need to empower Europe to stand its ground and set its own priorities and rules. That said, this agenda entails two risks. For one, as the level of ambition rises, Europeans would lose credibility if they failed to “walk the talk” (see tip 3). For another, a mainly defensive and increasingly Eurocentric posture will not deliver global influence.

The EU must strengthen its power base and grow a political spine, but power is defined by purpose. Europe’s defining purpose on the global stage cannot be confined to securing itself, but ought to intercept the great demand for stability and cooperation, as opposed to spheres of influence and disruption. The EU should outline a comprehensive proposition for collaborative security, prosperity and stability in the world, through partnerships and shared rules (see tip 6). In short, Europe should articulate a script of opportunity and progress, working with partners to deliver public goods. Europe’s problems are surely not its norms, but its divisions at home and weakness abroad. A pragmatic approach is required to tailor cooperation formats to different priorities, but that does not amount to relinquishing Europe’s own message. The EU should position itself as a clear alternative to a world of power politics, and it should act accordingly, starting with consistent support for international law.

Tip 3: Tap into Europe’s vast latent power and embrace “anchored” flexibility

There will be no European independence, sovereignty or autonomy without leveraging the largely untapped potential of European integration. In policy areas that are central to national sovereignty, from defence to economic security, the EU must strengthen its role as a hub and multiplier of cooperation. In the fields falling under its remit, such as the single market, the EU shall sustain its push to pull down barriers. Many of Europe’s vulnerabilities are self-inflicted, such as by failing to establish a capital markets union and underinvesting in defence or in the digital and energy transitions. Member states still frame their (industrial, defence, innovation, energy) policies mainly in national terms, with EU-level cooperation playing an ancillary role. That means, however, that Europe holds an unparalleled scope for speeding up reform and growing critical mass, relative to other powers. The security strategy should help unlock this potential.

The priorities ahead are very well known, as outlined in the 2024 Letta, Draghi and Niinistö reports, in the 2025 Competitiveness Compass and defence readiness agenda (see tip 5), and in reiterated statements by European leaders. The strategy-making process should help better connect internal policies not only with the demands of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition but also with the opportunities to create new markets for European technologies and deliver global public goods (see tip 6). At the interface between internal and external policies, expanding the international role of the Euro should be a cornerstone of Europe’s grand strategy. Boosting the Euro as a global reserve and payment currency would lower the cost of capital, attract investment and streamline trade relations, while strengthening Europe’s resilience against financial crises or coercion. Issuing joint debt via Eurobonds, where needed, would deliver multiple benefits at once, raising funds for investments into European public goods such as defence and energy security, and meeting growing global demand for safe assets.

In the current strategic environment, harnessing Europe’s untapped potential cannot depend on all EU member states aligning their priorities and resources, not least because some of them are deliberately undercutting joint action. While always engaging in consensus-building, binding the future security strategy to action at 27 is no longer sustainable. Differentiated cooperation should become an operating principle for the European Security Strategy and apply to both internal and external policies, except for areas of EU exclusive competence. The strategy should create the conditions for flexible cooperation formats to thrive while remaining anchored to the EU. That entails establishing institutional linkages between modular initiatives and EU bodies, providing incentives for joint action where necessary and ensuring that flexible cooperation initiatives are consistent with EU goals. EU defence policy (PESCO, European Defence Projects of Common Interest), the EU partnership agenda (“Team Europe”) and EU foreign policy at large (contact or lead groups) already entail a degree of flexibility, which the strategy can build on. To this end, use could also be made of Articles 42.5 and 44 TEU concerning the EU’s security and defence policy to entrust groups of member states with particular tasks.

Tip 4: Build a post-American Europe to rescue the transatlantic partnership

Europe has an obvious interest in a strong transatlantic partnership, but it is dealing with the most un-Atlantic administration since World War Two – one that features a mix of contempt and neglect for Europe, and hostility for the EU. The normative disconnect across the Atlantic not only reverberates across most policy fields, from trade to Ukraine, but also poses a structural challenge to European integration. The 2025 US National Security Strategy has outlined an agenda of political interference directed to promote “MAGA” nationalism in Europe and to divide the continent. The 2026-2030 Strategic Plan of the US State Department has called for a ‘Civilisational Alliance with European States’ while denouncing the ‘unaccountable supranational regulatory bureaucracy of the European Union’. The Greenland crisis has seen the Trump administration attempting to blackmail Europeans into seizing the Danish island. President Trump’s deliberate unpredictability precludes the anticipation of further developments, and any post-2028 scenario would be speculative. It is obvious, however, that neither deference nor hope can be grounds for Europe’s strategy, or for a viable partnership.

Transatlantic relations are lopsided, in that Europe depends on the US for its defence, for some critical technologies and for energy security. But this is far from the whole story: Europe’s strategic approach to transatlantic affairs should take a larger perspective. First, the economic and technology partnership is of unique importance for both sides, and deep dependencies travel both ways across the pond. Second, in the unlikely scenario of the US abandoning NATO or deserting Europe in the face of aggression, they would trade an unparalleled alliance for a bitterly alienated continent, and their residual global reputation would crater. Third, the Trump administration is walking on thin political ice, with low approval ratings and an increasingly K-shaped economy that penalises ordinary Americans. Europe should be confident that, if forced to, it has considerable leverage to counter coercion. Quiet resolve should be the basis for discussing with the US matters of common interest, dealing with disputes and managing the predatory instincts of the current administration. However, diplomatic crisis management cannot be the only response to a structural political challenge.

The forthcoming security strategy should reaffirm Europe’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership, but set out Europe’s own terms for the future relationship. The underlying rationale should be that rescuing the transatlantic partnership requires building a post-American order in Europe. A post-American order is one where Europe autonomously sets its goals and rules, in ways that involve dialogue with the US and other partners but are determined by none of them. A post-American Europe frames the transatlantic partnership as a central dimension of its grand strategy, as opposed to framing the latter as a by-product of volatile transatlantic relations. Building a post-American Europe crucially means upholding the liberal foundations of both the EU and the transatlantic partnership. Enhancing Europe’s technological sovereignty and resilience is central to this goal. Europe must manage, in line with its own choices and in cooperation with trusted partners, the digital revolution that is transforming politics, the economy and security affairs. Ultimately, a post-American European order is a necessary condition for resetting a genuine transatlantic partnership, when the political conditions in Washington permit, and to strengthen Europe’s independence, whichever scenario will emerge.

Tip 5: Take responsibility for European defence: towards a “dual-mode” capacity

Europe’s goal in defence matters should consist of achieving a “dual-mode” defence capacity. That involves a firm commitment to building a robust European pillar of NATO, while also leveraging this effort to strengthen Europe’s autonomous defence readiness. Europe’s commitment to NATO is not in question, but the reliability of US engagement in Europe’s defence depends on factors that are beyond Europe’s control. First, the US is prioritising the Indo-Pacific theatre and, should a conflict break out with China, it would not be in a position to play a leading role in the defence of Europe. Second, beyond Indo-Pacific contingencies, the US may decide to divert resources from the defence of Ukraine and Europe to cope with crises elsewhere, as reportedly considered to sustain the ongoing war in Iran. Third, Ukraine is not covered by NATO’s Article 5. As a prospective EU member state, Ukraine’s defence will be chiefly a European responsibility, even in the presence of possible bilateral US guarantees to Kyiv. Fourth, the US might grow even more politically alienated from Europe. Leaving aside the risk of a return of the Greenland crisis, Washington might seek to leverage security guarantees to advance unilateral demands that challenge Europe’s economic interests and normative choices – a prospect raised by various US officials over the past year, and the key driver in forcing the EU to accept the Turnberry trade deal in 2025.

The recent US National Defence Strategy confirms the commitment of the US to Europe’s defence. According to Undersecretary for War Colby’s recent outline of a “NATO 3.0”, the US would maintain extended nuclear deterrence and continue to deliver critical enablers, while shifting primary responsibility for conventional defence to European allies. Taken on its own, this is a workable, if demanding, proposition, but the past year has severely damaged trust across the Atlantic. Europe’s defence policy, and NATO, cannot be insulated from larger strategic trends and political risks. President Trump’s latest threat, whereby NATO would face a “very bad future” if Europeans did not help secure the Strait of Hormuz, followed by disparaging allies as “cowards” because they did not join a heedless war they did not choose, confirms this analysis.

Europe should therefore aim to achieve over the medium-term a dual-mode integrated defence capacity, to be mobilised in “NATO-mode” or in “non-NATO mode”, as need be. The best way to achieve this capacity is to work consistently towards strengthening NATO, while reducing Europe’s dependence on the US in the process. To establish the European pillar of NATO, European allies must acquire the necessary military capabilities, develop the operational capacity to field large integrated force packages and take on more responsibility within NATO’s command structure. Meanwhile, willing and able European allies should envisage a roadmap to develop specific areas of redundancy, where needed, to enable them to switch to a “non-NATO mode” if necessary, such as adequate command and control infrastructures.

The envisaged European Security Strategy cannot drive this process, since member states maintain control over their respective defence policies. However, the strategic process can make an important contribution at three levels. First, it should restate the centrality of supporting Ukraine during and after the current war, directing resources accordingly and deepening cooperation with Ukraine’s military and defence industry. Second, the strategy should help member states to fulfil their growing defence responsibilities by intensifying the current efforts to foster their cooperation and targeting them to fill critical shortfalls. Integrating the European defence market, launching flagship European capability projects, delivering financial incentives at scale and boosting investment in disruptive technologies to establish the digital backbone of European defence are among the priorities that the strategy ought to advance. Third, the security strategy could invite willing and able EU member states to explore the articulation of a European pillar of NATO that can also operate autonomously from NATO, if needed, by engaging the UK and other relevant non-EU European partners too.

Tip 6: Develop Europe’s network power through partnerships

The principle and practice of partnership should be central to the European Security Strategy. Advancing international partnerships is a key dimension of European sovereignty, since the latter entails the strategic management of interdependence to reduce vulnerabilities and foster Europe’s influence. The EU has expanded and deepened a wide range of partnerships across the digital, climate, energy and defence domains, alongside a determined push to conclude new trade deals. These initiatives fall within the emerging EU economic foreign policy agenda, which in turn reinforces Europe’s economic security. Building on this experience, the European Security Strategy should provide an integrated framework that connects and gives stronger direction to this vast array of partnerships. This also means framing multiple vectors of cooperation as serving Europe’s overarching script: a power for opportunity and progress (see tip 2).

Within this script, the strategy should establish a multi-purpose and multi-level approach to partnerships. First, it should aim to make the multiple objectives pursued by EU partnerships mutually reinforcing. For one, EU partnerships structure win-win cooperation and help deliver public goods, such as trustworthy digital connectivity, just energy transition pathways or maritime security. For another, partnerships are tools for the EU to hedge against the risks of weaponised interdependence by diversifying supply chains, expanding markets for EU exports and shaping common rules and standards. Finally, partnerships can offer leverage against coercive practices, since like-minded actors can decide to join forces and deter, or raise the costs for, the perpetrators. Through partnerships, cooperation can become a strength multiplier, and strength can, in turn, attract more partners.

Second, partnership diplomacy should better connect dialogue and cooperation at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. The EU needs a multi-level partnership strategy, whereby separate initiatives feed into Europe’s network power. This applies, for example, to digital partnerships (to develop product standards and market rules) and to climate partnerships (through initiatives on energy efficiency or climate finance). In these and other sectors, the EU should convene like-minded partners on a more regular basis when shared objectives are defined. This concerns free trade agreements too, which can provide stepping stones for plurilateral regimes. The recently launched EU-Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) dialogueis a case in point, considering that the EU has Free Trade Agreements with nine of the 12 CPTPP members. The EU should also seek to convert coalitional agendas into multilateral influence, to gain clout in an increasingly contested order, as opposed to opting out of such an order, thereby compounding global fragmentation. The plans by EU and CPTPP members to table joint proposals for reform of the World Trade Organisation, while advancing inclusive agendas in sectors like digital commerce, point to a suitable, multi-level approach.

Conclusions

After years of muddling through, the EU has slipped downwards not only in power rankings but in others’ perception. President Trump’s America and China see it mainly as a playground for their respective agendas, and many countries worldwide have not missed Europe’s double standards, which undermine its normative claims. While it is in Europe’s interest to preserve and, where possible, renew the economic and defence roots of the transatlantic partnership, the Trump administration’s instincts, and stated policy, are to undermine European integration by supporting far-right nationalist forces across the EU. The illegal US-Israeli attack on Iran, carrying potentially dire economic and security implications for Europe and Ukraine, with no clear objective in sight, has once again completely blindsided Europe. This is the realistic background of the envisaged European Security Strategy.

Given this context, a realistic question for EU member states ought to frame the process leading to a new European security strategy. The question is whether any of them stands a chance of preserving their prosperity, security, values and way of life without the EU, in a “might makes right” world where the US has taken an un-Atlantic path, at least for the coming years, Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine, and China is doubling-down on its geoeconomic power strategy, gaining positions of strength. If national leaders believe so, then no EU process will rescue EU countries from further irrelevance. If the answer is that the EU is the principal level of action for gaining sovereignty together and anchoring more agile forms of cooperation, then this finding offers a good basis for a productive strategic exercise.

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