The Strategy Trap? European Threat Assessments and the Problem of Common Action

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 17/2026

By Daniel Fiott

22.7.2026

Key issues

• The EU’s 2026 threat assessment demonstrates that while Europe has developed a clearer understanding of its strategic environment, it remains less certain about the political choices required to respond to it.
• Russia’s war has brought European threat perceptions closer together, but convergence around the existence of a threat has yet to produce a genuinely common European strategic outlook.
• While Europeans increasingly agree on the threats they will face by 2030, they remain far less confident in their collective ability to respond to them.

Introduction

Some years ago, American think tanks put their hand to drafting several strategic foresight studies on the United States’ (US) future relations with Iran. Some were extremely accurate. In 2016, Cordesman pointed to the centrality of the Strait in any US-Iran conflict and rightly assumed that Tehran would utilise it for geopolitical ends. Again, in 2019, Cordesman also rightly pointed to Iran’s inferior missile military balance, and highlighted how it would use its existing arsenals to strike infrastructure and military bases in the region. With, perhaps, the exception of Iran’s effective use of drone warfare in the current US-Iran conflict, Cordesman’s predictions over a decade ago proved prescient. However, as a perceptive analysis of past predictions about US-Iran relations by Ewers and Tabatabai shows, although the predictions were largely accurate, none altered US policy. Thus, we are left with a US that, owing to its early and overwhelming military success in assassinating leaders of the Iranian regime and striking Iran’s nuclear programme, believed that it could swiftly deal with Iran more broadly: to date, it has failed in this task.

The case of predicting or analysing the US-Iran war, and then translating it into policy outcomes, is instructive for Europe, especially as the European Union (EU) heads towards the publication of a new European Security Strategy. Threat assessments are needed, but they do not always lead to action. Drawing on three recent policy, academic, and think tank documents on threat assessments in Europe, this CSDS Policy Brief highlights the “strategy trap” facing Europe. European states increasingly converge on several critical threats and challenges, but they still find it difficult to take decisive, coherent and effective action. This is a counter-intuitive observation, as the conventional wisdom is that greater convergence on threats and priorities in the EU should make it easier for the Union to act. To be sure, we do see action by Europeans in the area of defence production, support to Ukraine and even nuclear deterrence, but today Europe is far from being the actor required to compete in an era of great power rivalry. As the three documents analysed in this policy brief show, while there is growing convergence over threats in Europe, it is not clear how this can translate into more unified EU strategic action.

The European Union: assessing the EU’s strategic environment in 2026

On 9 July 2026, the European Union (EU) released its updated “Common Understanding – The Threats and Challenges We Face: Assessment of the EU’s Strategic Environment”. The document delivers on the promise, following the publication of the 2022 Strategic Compass, to draft more frequent threat assessments. Unlike the 2021 threat assessment that accompanied the Strategic Compass, which was released as a short four-page memo, the 20-page 2026 version is available for public scrutiny, as it has been published online (obviously, this version is still somewhat sanitised given the risks facing the EU). The 2021 EU threat assessment was published before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, so there was a clear need to update the assessment, although early assessments of the risk posed by Russia were not taken seriously by many in the EU, who believed that Russia would never think of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The 2026 threat assessment at least has the benefit of hindsight on Russia, but, again, foresight assessments – made in private by intelligence agencies, and in public by think tanks – were overlooked by public bodies (to be honest, many analysts also underplayed the risk posed by Russia).

The 2026 threat assessment has only hastened the EU’s understanding that the world is now braced for long-term confrontation and great power rivalry. This is a far cry from the world of crisis management and the rules-based order that was still cherished before Russia’s invasion. In combination with important shifts in US strategy towards Europe, Putin has effectively killed much of Europe’s past liberal worldview. Now the EU’s emphasis is on territorial defence, “total defence” strategies and enhanced defence production. Here, the biggest difference between the 2021 and 2026 EU threat assessments is that Russia is no longer just a principal threat, to be managed in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Russia has become an enduring military threat for the EU that will remain hostile for many years to come. Moscow has increased the pace and severity of its hybrid campaigns in Europe; it continues to bombard Ukraine; and it is permanently restructuring itself into a war economy. The question posed in the 2026 threat assessment, then, is not how Europe responds to the invasion, but how it also lives with a permanently hostile Russia.

Additionally, the 2026 EU threat assessment expands the range of security challenges facing the Union. Whereas the 2021 edition emphasised risks in the cyber and space domains, and stressed the challenge posed by hybrid threats and climate change, the 2026 version goes further by underlining the growing risks that emerge in supply chains, critical raw materials, technologies and finance. The 2026 EU threat assessment also prefigures many of the excellent points that are likely to make it into the forthcoming 2026 European Security Strategy, including how external industrial policy and economic coercion pose a direct security risk to the EU’s competitiveness and critical infrastructure. This is a broader perspective than the one taken in the 2021 assessment, although they do not supplant the need for the EU to continue to boost its defence sector. In fact, the 2026 assessment recognises the need for constant defence production and stockpiling as a basis for Europe’s ability to deter Russia and be ready for war, should the need arise. In this regard, Europe’s defence industry is far more central to the 2026 threat assessment than its 2021 predecessor.

The 2026 assessment is no different to its 2021 counterpart in calling for a continued “360-degree” perspective, even though Europe remains the core focus and frame of the document. In the EU, we have become accustomed to hearing about the importance of the 360-degree approach, as this not only has the benefit of acknowledging the plethora of challenges facing the EU (both in terms of geography and theme), but it also denotes an “inclusive” approach so that all EU member states can see their own national threat perceptions reflected in the document. So, it is certainly no surprise to read in the 2026 edition the usual references to the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Middle East, maritime security, space, cyber, etc, etc. Yet, even here, one can see some of the punches one would expect to be thrown effectively pulled. For example, read this perplexing sentence from the 2026 assessment: ‘Geopolitical tensions and geoeconomic competition in the Arctic require that [the] (sic) EU, together with our partners, respond’. There may, of course, be political reasons why the EU does not want to classify the US as a threat to the Union over its interest in annexing Greenland, but not to mention the word “Greenland” even once in the threat assessment damages the document’s credibility.

Given the significant challenges and risks the Union faces in relation to China, it is no surprise to see how much of the 2026 EU threat assessment is dedicated to the challenge from China. Here, we must keep in mind the prevailing geopolitical context, especially the EU-China trade conflict that sits on the near horizon and Beijing’s seeming disinterest in doing anything to help the European economy. Again, we can perhaps expect the 2026 European Security Strategy to devote a great deal of energy to China, and the 2026 threat assessment is a good foretaste of what may come. If the 2021 threat assessment reinforced the EU’s understanding of China as a “partner, competitor and systemic rival”, it is noteworthy that the 2026 edition does not mention this well-trodden triptych once. It is worth quoting the most important passage on China in the 2026 threat assessment:

“China positions itself to win systemic competition, combining industrial scale, technological ambition, and global reach while exploiting instability. China’s asymmetric advantages with the EU, from trade imbalances to critical raw materials to technological advances in some areas, along with its willingness to use this as leverage against the EU and others in pursuit of its ambition of becoming the world’s leading power makes China a critical long-term strategic challenge. China’s support to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a crucial enabler for Moscow. China will continue to seek to increase its influence in Europe”.

As we can see, the language hardens considerably and is more precise, as the 2026 document sees China as an enabler of Russia’s war, seeking global technological dominance, exploiting dependencies, using economic coercion and reshaping global governance. The document stops short of calling China an outright threat, but it nevertheless is clearly more direct on the challenge posed by China. A similar level of candidness cannot be found in the language on the US, which has also contributed to trade distortions and raised serious questions for the European security order. While the US and China cannot be compared, clearly the EU is making a call (at least in its public document) that the challenge posed by the US is more of an evolutionary nature: that changes in US strategy have implications for how Europeans organise their own defence. Just as the EU’s triptych for China never really worked, the Union is also struggling to find a way to describe its relationship with the US. This is why the 2026 threat assessment calls into question the centrality of the transatlantic relationship for European security, while simultaneously calling the US Europe’s ‘most important strategic partner’.

However, the puzzling aspect of this document is that the threat assessment contains certain policy prescriptions. Even though the 2026 threat assessment can be criticised for being somewhat vague and contradictory in places, the purpose of the document should not be to advance policy prescriptions based on the analysis of threats identified. Ideally, the threat assessment should be just that: an assessment of threats. The task of translating the analysis into policymaking is the task for other processes and documents, such as the forthcoming European Security Strategy. This is important, as the threat assessment, when it does make policy prescriptions, can only ever hope to do so in a rudimentary and shallow manner. For example, page 7 in the assessment emphasises the need for partners and a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence. These lines are so often repeated in EU policy discourse that they are close to being meaningless. One cannot spend the previous five pages outlining the serious threats facing Europe, to then call for partnerships and a more capable EU as a response. It would have been better not to include page 7 at all. The place for more detailed solutions should be found in the forthcoming European Security Strategy.

The “Ghent Four”: what has Russia’s war done to European threat perceptions?

Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised several existential questions for European security, and the majority of think tank and academic analysis has focused on Europe’s rearmament strategies and military support for Ukraine. In this regard, an associated discussion concerns the idea of a more “Europeanised NATO” or a “European Way of War”. These analyses invite us to consider how Europe should address the Russia challenge, especially in a geopolitical context where the United States is playing a different role. Within the recent intellectual framing of “NATO 3.0”, developed by the US administration itself, the bulk of studies and analysis focus on how Europeans should take up the role of “primary responsibility” for conventional defence that the US has requested from its European allies.

Aside from this intellectual focus, however, a more basic yet crucial question requires attention: are a Europeanised NATO or a European Way of War being built on a common strategic vision and threat perceptions among European allies? Fortunately, this question was recently addressed by Michelle Haas, Tim Haesenrouck, Servaas Taghon and Berk Vindevogel (all with Universiteit Ghent) in a recent journal article for Contemporary Security Policy. Their article looks specifically at threat perceptions in Europe, and they ask if there has been an end to the long-standing “strategic cacophony” of Europeans towards strategic threats. They conclude, overall, that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made Europe more united in perceiving Russia as a threat, but the war has not produced a common European threat perception per se.

The article concludes that almost every European country now views Russia as a greater security threat than before February 2022. This represents, the authors argue, the single biggest change in European threat perceptions since the end of the Cold War. However, the authors caution that this development should not be mistaken for strategic convergence. Indeed, every country studied in the article by the Ghent researchers moves in roughly the same direction vis-à-vis Russia, but they stop at different points. With a couple of outliers, European countries agree that Russia is a threat, but they do not agree on the degree of the threat posed by Moscow. The article distinguishes between five categories of threat perception:

1) Countries that perceive Russia as an acute territorial threat: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Sweden and Romania.

2) Countries that perceive Russia as the primary national security threat: Germany, France, UK, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway.

3) Countries that perceive Russia as an important, but non-dominant, threat: Belgium, Austria and Bulgaria.

4) Countries that perceive Russia as a threat to European order rather than as a national security threat: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg, Croatia, Slovenia and Cyprus.

5) Countries that have not or do not consider Russia as a threat: Hungary (under the Orban government) and Slovakia.

The article goes on to comment on the reasons for the divergences between European countries, even if they generally agree that Russia represents a threat of some degree. Obviously, the main reason pertains to geography, which the authors rightly argue still matters enormously. Geography remains, understandably, the best predictor of threat intensity in Europe. As expected, countries bordering Russia or Belarus increasingly perceive Russia as an immediate territorial threat, but those countries located further away generally regard Russia as a major strategic challenge and destabiliser. Such understandings have a profound effect on the military policies and defence capabilities of each European country, as well as on the pace and scale of defence investment in each country. However, the authors of the article are clear that a realist interpretation of threat perceptions towards Russia has limitations. In other words, the geographical variable only takes us so far. Interestingly, the article considers interpretative insights too, and the authors claim that Russia’s war affected how individual European countries understood key terms such as “security”, “strategy” and “defence”. For example, countries like Germany, France and the Netherlands did not simply respond mechanically to Russian capabilities by building their own defences. Instead, the longstanding beliefs about Russia in these countries changed dramatically. “Strategic culture”, therefore, can help explain why many countries revised their threat assessments far more than material geography alone would predict. For example, Germany’s Zeitenwende encapsulates more than a need to develop military capabilities to deter Russia, as it implies a complete overhaul and reformulation of Germany’s overall strategic culture.

The article also indicates that the threat perceptions of individual European countries are still heavily influenced by domestic politics. The authors argue that external threats are filtered through domestic politics, and that such domestic considerations politically mediate how countries understand and act on external threats. The article points to the case of Slovakia, as while Slovakia’s geography has not changed, given its proximity to Russia, the return of Robert Fico to power altered the country’s official threat perception. Under the previous government, Hungary similarly continued to refuse to define Russia as a threat despite belonging to NATO and the EU. Yet, it is important to distinguish between different instances of where domestic politics intervene. In the case of Hungary and Slovakia over the past years, there has also been a strong ideological element in their approach to Russia and the EU, as Moscow’s war served as a way for these governments to poke “Brussels” and accuse the EU of being overly “liberal”. Yet even Hungary – much like Greece in the present day – blocked successive rounds of sanctions on Russia because Budapest feared it would damage the country’s access to energy.

The main implication of this article is that the long-standing “strategic cacophony” in Europe has not disappeared because of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Clearly, the invasion has not created a unified European strategic culture, even if Europeans now share greater concern and awareness of each other’s approach and concerns. By extension, the Ghent researchers argue that the increased concern about Russia certainly creates more favourable conditions for defence cooperation in Europe. However, persistent differences in threat perception continue to constrain deeper integration. On this basis, we are left with the striking observation that, if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – the largest war in Europe since 1945 – was insufficient to create a common European threat perception, it is difficult to imagine what shock would do so. Naturally, one can think of a greater shock to the system: a Russian invasion of a NATO/EU state, but it is questionable whether even this would lead to a common threat perception, as geography and domestic interests would still colour the overall European response.

Indeed, it is worth reflecting on whether a common strategic culture is ever possible in Europe, especially given the European states system. Naturally, the term “common” strategic culture is not the same as a “single” strategic culture, and the very idea of a “common” culture denotes an ability for a majority of European states to share a certain level of strategic solidarity over a threat regardless of geography or domestic interests. The article by the Ghent researchers demonstrates that there is a greater sense of common purpose among European states; otherwise, how else would they have agreed to successive rounds of sanctions on Russia or support packages for Ukraine? In any case, a “single” strategic culture would assume a single, centralised state structure in Europe, which is unattainable for the foreseeable future. Even the US has multiple strategic cultures (i.e. doves vs hawks, restrainers vs neo-conservatives), but Washington’s centralised power structure in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief means that the president defines the US strategic culture at any given point in time. In this respect, Europe will always struggle to generate a convincing strategic sense of itself, as it will need to please the individual interests of member states in either the EU or NATO, as the 2026 EU threat assessment demonstrates.

The “French School”: where will Europe be in 2030?

In addition to the illuminating article by the “Ghent Four”, comes a study of the future strategic horizon to 2030 by the Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM Europe), written by Marie Hiliquin and Philippe Perchoc. This is an extremely timely study, not least because senior EU decision-makers have set the year 2030 as the time by which Europe needs to be defence-ready. The underlying data in the study is impressive, with 269 individuals from across France and partner countries having responded to the survey ( by comparison, a survey conducted by this author before the EU Strategic Compass only managed 120 respondents). The core message from the survey is that most surveyed individuals expect Europe to become more dangerous, more fragmented and more competitive by 2030, while the EU will only make incremental progress in security and defence. The survey results are interesting in that they reinforce many of the threats and challenges picked up in the 2026 EU threat assessment, but, given that the respondents to the survey have some intellectual distance from the EU, there are some surprising outcomes.

One of the major conclusions from the survey is that instability in and around Europe is no longer viewed as temporary but as the defining feature of the international system. Respondents to IRSEM expect Europe to operate in a world characterised by persistent geopolitical rivalry, military conflict, technological competition and hybrid threats. Rather than anticipating a return to the relatively stable post-Cold War order, those surveyed expect an era of permanent strategic competition. This is an interesting conclusion. At first glance, one may say it is an obvious claim to make, but it implies a need for Europe to completely shift its understanding of international politics. Principally, it implies that Europe should not try to recover the world gone by in terms of strategic priorities (i.e. crisis management to territorial defence) and partnerships (i.e. trusted allies to competitive allies). And here, the results from the survey are very interesting: 47% of respondents believe NATO will remain the cornerstone of defence in Europe, but only in strong coordination with the EU and its defence initiatives; yet 25% of respondents believe some countries will leave NATO, and only 17% unequivocally believe that NATO will retain its central role by 2030.

Clearly, Russia was identified as Europe’s principal military challenge. Respondents overwhelmingly expect the war in Ukraine to remain unresolved by 2030, with 49% believing Ukraine will still face a repeatedly violated ceasefire rather than a durable peace settlement in 2030. This, in itself, is an interesting conclusion as it presupposes that some form of ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine will be achieved by 2030. Still, Russia is not viewed by respondents as a temporary crisis but as a long-term structural challenge to European security. The only other security challenge that matched Russia in terms of severity is Europe’s Southern Flank. Indeed, 85% of respondents expect the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa to remain persistent sources of instability for Europe. Rather than seeing these regions primarily as opportunities for partnership, respondents overwhelmingly associate them with migration, conflict, terrorism and instability, with significant spillover effects for Europe. The report therefore suggests that Europe’s southern neighbourhood will continue to compete with Russia for policymakers’ attention.

While Russia dominates European security, the Indo-Pacific region is viewed as the second most unstable region by 2030. Here, respondents associated China with its strategic competition with the US and Taiwan, but they also referred to China’s growing technological rivalry with Europe and the risks of economic dependence. However, respondents do not expect the Indo-Pacific to displace Eastern Europe as Europe’s primary strategic concern. Interestingly, when responding to survey questions on the Indo-Pacific, many respondents discussed the role of India, and they suggested that it is the most important emerging geopolitical actor. Despite not having a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, India is viewed as the state that will have a crucial diplomatic role by 2030. This could be because of India’s strategy of multi-alignment, which allows it to maintain productive relations with competing centres of power rather than aligning exclusively with any one bloc. The UAE and Brazil are also identified as increasingly influential middle powers, albeit at some distance behind India.

The IRSEM Europe report is, however, notably cautious about what Europe can do to manage the risks and threats it faces. While respondents expect the EU to become more active in defence, most foresee only marginal or partial European defence integration rather than a decisive leap towards a genuine European defence. 42% of respondents anticipate only limited progress, while almost one-third still expect persistent fragmentation. Here, the central paradox identified by the authors is that Europeans expect the EU to assume greater security responsibilities for defence, but many remain doubtful that EU member states will overcome political divisions sufficiently to create a genuinely integrated defence system. Accordingly, one of the report’s more interesting conclusions is that Europe’s principal vulnerabilities are not conventional military capabilities alone, but include: energy and supply-chain security; economic and technological resilience; civil preparedness; the protection of democratic institutions; and cyber resilience. Yet, even with this plethora of threats, the IRSEM Europe report makes clear that the biggest obstacle to a genuine European defence is not money but politics. Most respondents believe that the absence of a shared strategic culture, divergent threat perceptions, fragmented political authority and limited willingness to pool sovereignty are major hindrances to European defence integration.

The IRSEM Europe survey report ends with an alarming but necessary observation, which we will quote in full: ‘Territory is therefore no longer perceived as the space of conflict, but as the very stake in a struggle over representations and control, which makes every flow a potential threat to the stability of geographical entities’. It is important to note that the survey was conducted by IRSEM Europe before the events in Venezuela, Greenland and Iran, yet even so the question of territory emerges strongly in the findings. Any future based on territorial expansion and spheres of influence will put Europe at a huge disadvantage and create even greater international turbulence. Yet, as we saw with the EU 2026 threat assessment, without a willingness to even acknowledge the direct risks Europe faces for its own territorial integrity, it will be impossible to craft a strategy to combat territorial encroachments, regardless of whether they take place on the Eastern Flank, Eastern Mediterranean or Greenland and the Arctic. Europe may not be interested or able to handle “spheres of influence”, but it should be able to ensure its territorial integrity.

Conclusions

The 2026 EU threat assessment is an important reminder that strategic communication is itself a part of the EU’s strategic credibility. Threat assessments are not merely analytical exercises, as they help establish the shared understanding of the strategic environment facing Europe. From here, such assessments can shape political expectations and provide the foundation upon which governments, armed forces and industry make longer-term decisions. In this sense, unambiguous language is inseparable from effective strategic making, because even the most accurate assessment will fail if it does not generate the political clarity needed to act upon it. Such clarity is needed more than ever, not least, as the prominent researchers from Universiteit Ghent remind us, because Europe remains plagued by a cacophony of strategic cultures and threat perceptions. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly narrowed the gap between European threat perceptions of Russia, but this has not translated into agreement on the intensity or urgency of the threat posed by Russia. Geography, strategic culture and domestic politics continue to mediate how European states interpret and respond to external risks.

As the IRSEM Europe survey demonstrates, Europe has become increasingly realistic about the strategic environment it is likely to face by 2030: one marked by geopolitical rivalry, territorial competition and systemic instability. But herein lies the paradox or “strategy trap”. Although Europeans increasingly accept the need for greater responsibility in security and defence, they remain doubtful that national governments will generate the political cohesion necessary to deliver it. This suggests that Europe’s principal challenge over the remainder of the decade will not be identifying the threats it faces, but overcoming the political fragmentation and strategic hesitation that continue to constrain an effective collective response. In this respect, the greatest risk to Europe’s defence readiness by 2030 may not lie in money and capabilities, but in an inability to translate threat assessments into coherent political action. As odd as it may sound, the forthcoming European Security Strategy should not be designed principally on the sophistication of content or fine words, but rather in creating ways in which European governments will collectively deliver coherent and effective solutions to all of the threats identified by Europe’s nascent strategic community.

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