Two Elections, One Challenge: How the European and Taiwanese Elections Mean a New EU Taiwan Playbook is Needed

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 19/2024

By Giulia Tercovich and Laia Comerma

27.6.2024

Key issues

• Elections in Taiwan and Europe in 2024 provided Europe with important moments to reflect on its position on cross-strait issues and its relations with Taiwan.
• Even if the European Union (EU)’s views of cross-strait issues are unlikely to change after the European elections, Europe needs to create a clear playbook to be ready to face potential escalations vis-à-vis Taiwan.
• An “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook” that considers all possible scenarios could help the EU build consensus ahead of any possible crisis, and it might send a signal to China about the consequences of its possible actions in the region.

Introduction

In June 2023, the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) published a Policy Brief that examined the evolving perception and discourse of the EU regarding Taiwan, particularly in light of the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Even though the EU has traditionally maintained a cautious approach to China, recent developments in EU-China economic relations and China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, particularly in its support for Russia amid the Ukraine conflict, are perceived as posing an increasingly significant threat to European stability and security. Furthermore, since the recent Taiwan election, Beijing has intensified its aggressive stance in the Indo-Pacific region, conducting military drills and asserting territorial claims that challenge international norms. This escalation threatens regional stability and signals China’s broader ambitions to reshape global power dynamics, making it imperative for Europe to address these concerns proactively.

This CSDS Policy Brief reflects on the implications of the recent presidential elections in Taiwan in January 2024 and the European parliamentary elections of June 2024 for the EU’s position on and relations with Taiwan going forward, especially in the face of Europe’s own relationship with China. We suggest that the EU should develop a “Taiwan Strait Playbook” as a means to accelerate the consensus-building exercise among member states on any possible crisis, as well as to send China a signal about the potential consequences of any harmful action towards Taiwan or the region.

The implications of Taiwan’s 2024 elections for EU-Taiwan relations and regional stability 

The current political situation in Taiwan is significant for Europe, especially due to its implications for cross-strait relations and security. Indeed, it might impact the future of the EU’s bilateral relations with Taipei, while illustrating the internal dynamics of China’s assertiveness in Taiwan. Taiwan held its eighth democratic election in January 2024. Former President Tsai Ing-wen concluded her mandate and her Vice-President, (William) Lai Ching-te, was elected as the new President of Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election also thanks to a split in the opposition vote between the mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-yi, who was the official candidate of the Kuomintang (KMT), and the former surgeon Ko Wen-je, who stood for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new political party established in 2019.

This election remained centred on Taiwan-China relations, identity and autonomy. However, it featured a more expansive debate that incorporated crucial domestic issues too. The emergence of the TPP as the third major political party injected a new dimension into the election landscape, as it presented itself as an alternative third party advocating for broader issues beyond security-related concerns to encompass domestic affairs. One of the pivotal domestic debates revolved around Taiwan’s slowing economy, which is attributed to declining exports not only to China but also to the United States (US), Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Europe. Candidates from both KMT and TPP proposed swift economic recovery through increased engagement with China. While this might appeal to some voters, it overlooks the derisking strategies undertaken by significant global economies like the US, Europe and Japan, which are distancing themselves from China. Increased economic reliance on China exposes Taiwan to potential vulnerabilities including coercive economic policies, such as the past ban on food imports following Nancy Pelosi’s – the former Speaker of the US House of Representatives – visit in 2022. Diversification, as proposed by President Lai, offers a more challenging yet sustainable solution that necessitates engagement from like-minded partners to aid Taiwan in expanding and diversifying its economy, making Europe an interesting trade partner.

Ultimately, the elections gave the DPP its third consecutive presidential term. President Lai, who in the past asserted that Taiwan – already a de facto sovereign nation – does not require a formal declaration of independence, toned down his emphasis on Taiwanese independence during the campaign and in his inaugural speech. Nevertheless, China has labelled him a ‘dangerous separatist’ and its Taiwan Affairs Office stated that ‘Taiwan’s independence is incompatible with peace in the Taiwan Strait’. China has also put pressure on Taiwan with regular air force and navy activities near the island since Lai’s victory in January, including a ‘blockade simulation’ through military drills in May 2024. His Vice-President, Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s former de facto ambassador to Washington, faces Chinese sanctions for ‘colluding with the US’ and ‘provoking confrontation’. In addition, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun has recently stated that ‘[China] will take resolute actions to curb Taiwan independence and make sure such a plot never succeeds. […] Anyone who dares to separate Taiwan from China will only end up in self-destruction’.

However, while former President Tsai enjoyed a majority in the Legislative Yuan during her presidency, the DPP lost this parliamentary majority, which means that opposition parties will have the leverage to limit the decisions of the new president. For example, they could limit or control military expenditure or oppose any further decoupling from the Chinese economy. The first legislative amendments approved at the end of May 2024, and voted upon in June, already seek to expand the Legislative Yuan’s power to oversee and investigate the government by forming specialist panels to question, investigate or demand documents from any official, private organisation or individual deemed relevant. As a result, thousands of citizens gathered outside the Yuan building to protest, recalling the Sunflower Movement of 2014.

While all three parties supported the maintenance of Taiwan’s current status quo during the campaign, how they plan to implement this in relation to China remains a contentious topic, particularly considering the current status of the Legislative Yuan. The opposition parties leading the Legislative Yuan might seek to slow-down legislative processes, creating instability and further steering the popular discontent and apprehension that the May protests against the government oversight bill seem to indicate. Internal instability makes Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese influence. This will bring another set of challenges. If Taiwan faces increased Chinese pressure for “closer ties”, while its population opposes forms of unification or any loss of freedoms, this turmoil could destabilise the status quo in unexpected ways.

Enhancing the EU’s internal coherence: the Taiwan Strait debate in post-electoral Europe

The EU’s own elections were significant in terms of cross-strait relations and the debate around Taiwan and its bilateral relationship with Europe. Before the parliamentary elections, each European political group defined its perspective and intentions regarding the EU’s relationship with China and, in some cases, the issue of Taiwan, in their party manifestos. The European People’s Party (EPP) mentioned China the most in its manifesto (i.e. up to 11 times), while it referred to Taiwan twice. It called the ‘growing tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait’ a ‘wake-up call for Europe’, noting a change in the EU’s security environment and it called for a ‘long-term strategy towards other key, strategic areas including China and Taiwan’, built around Europe’s geopolitical interests. Here, China was discussed in the context of economic and systemic competition, and derisking, especially in the fields of energy and technology.

The other European party that dealt with the topic of China and Taiwan quite extensively in its manifesto is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), which mentions China eight times, and Taiwan three. They are the only party grouping that specifically call for a ‘bilateral investment agreement between the EU and Taiwan to enhance our open strategic autonomy for our high tech and sustainable industries’. They also stand for Taiwan’s self-determination, opposing ‘any attempts by China to challenge Taiwan’s right to determine its own future, or to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan straits, especially through the use of force.’ On China, the Liberals have called for the EU to revisit the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), but only when Chinese sanctions have been removed and it has made specific commitments on human rights, democracy, labour, environment, market access and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). More generally, they stand for reducing Europe’s dependency on non-democratic countries, implementing Magnitsky-style targeted sanctions on Chinese officials who violate human rights in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet, and against China’s disruptive efforts in EU enlargement countries.

Meanwhile, the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) stood in contrast as they only mention China once, when calling for a rebalancing of ‘relations with China, promoting our values and protecting our interests, and further cooperating to address pressing global issues’. Taiwan is not mentioned at all, and the political group instead takes a more value-based stance, even if a succinct one. Similarly, the Greens mention China and Taiwan only once each, recognising ‘the threat posed by China towards Taiwan that puts international peace and security in jeopardy’ and advocating ‘for an active, clear-eyed, and common EU policy on China’. They also refer to China’s use of surveillance technology for state control to advocate for the need of a rights-based, decentralised approach to digitalisation in Europe. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) mention China twice and Taiwan once, advocating for a ‘nuanced stance’ towards China, ‘recognising both the need for engagement and imperative to address human rights violations, while advocating for stronger ties with Taiwan and other like-minded partners in the Pacific region’. In the context of trade, they call for derisking and adopting a firm approach towards China. Finally, The Left does not mention China or Taiwan at all in their manifesto, while Identity & Democracy (ID) does not have a manifesto.

The results of the European elections already provide some hints into how the Parliament’s stance towards China and Taiwan might potentially change in the next mandate. While the greatest China critic, Reinhard Bütikofer (Germany, Greens), did not run again for the European elections, some of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) that had taken a hard stance on China did get re-elected, such as Hilde Vautmans (Belgium, Renew Europe) or Moritz Körner (Germany, Renew Europe). It will be especially relevant to see who joins the Parliament’s China Delegation, and if some new critical voices emerge. The last elections also showed an increase in extremist groups, both on the left and the right. For instance, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was rocked by scandals ahead of the elections. Its head of list, MEP Maximilian Krah, was investigated for ties to China and his parliamentary assistant was suspected of being a Chinese spy. Furthermore, the AfD’s number two, Petr Bystron, was accused of receiving money from a pro-Russian network. Yet, the party obtained 15 seats, up from its nine seats in the previous mandate. The other winner from the European elections was Jordan Bardella’s Rassemblement National (RN) from France, who so far has reportedly taken a more transactional stance on China, less concerned about human rights and more focused on the security effects of critical infrastructure.

Nonetheless, the elections saw the centrist coalition of the EPP, S&D and Renew/ALDE keep its majority, possibly opening the path towards a second Von der Leyen Commission and, ultimately, a “more of the same” approach. Overall, the results do not immediately indicate an imminent shift in the Parliament’s policy towards China, although its discourse on China might become more diverse, with stronger voices with a pro-China rhetoric advocating for a more transactional approach that might even revive the debate on the ratification of the CAI. Beyond the composition of the European Parliament, and the impact of European elections on national political debates, the election results will have an impact on the definition of the new Commission, including critical positions for the future of EU-Taiwan relations, such as the President of the Commission, the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) and the Trade Commissioner.

Furthermore, European elections will have an impact on the politics of key EU member states, specifically France, Italy and Germany, where the far-right emerged as a re-invigorated political force. First, Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, will play an increased role in the horse-trading for the EU’s top jobs. Second, the fear of a Marine Le Pen victory in the forthcoming French legislative elections adds more pressure to conclude the negotiations for the Commission and European Council Presidents before France votes from 30 June to 7 July 2024. Lastly, the two main advocates for a more transactional approach towards China, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz, were weakened by their parties’ results in the European elections. This implies that the main variable potentially shifting the EU’s relationship towards China and its support for Taiwan includes, beyond the Parliament and the Commission, also the European Council, as member states’ leader’s preferences in the EU’s approach to Taiwan Strait issues matter. A more right-wing leaning European Council might further increase the polarisation among EU leaders vis-à-vis China.

This is especially significant as, while the EU adopted its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021, including its position on cross-strait dynamics, the process towards enhanced coherence in the EU’s approach to the region is still in motion. While some European states have adopted national strategies for the Indo-Pacific, including Czechia, Lithuania and Ireland, others, like Italy, are still discussing their national priorities in the region. This is likely to impact how the European Council will define the EU’s political direction and priorities towards the region in the coming years. Thus, the next wave of national elections will define how and to what extent the EU really shifts towards the strategic autonomy, economic security and derisking that has characterised the EU’s policy towards China in the previous cycle.

What remains unclear is what direction Europe might take in case of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which remains an EU priority. In the European Council Conclusions on China of 30 June 2023, the EU reiterated its position. It recognises the strategic importance of the East and South China Seas for regional and global prosperity and security, and expresses its concern about growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, while reaffirming its “One China policy”. Even if the issue was not included in the public agenda, during their trilateral meeting with Xi in May 2024, which focused primarily on China-Russia relations and trade-related concerns, Presidents Macron and Ursula von der Leyen discussed the situation in Taiwan. This shows that for the EU the Taiwan Strait is increasingly important, as also demonstrated by the passage of the Dutch frigate Tromp in June 2024 and the possibility of a similar action by a German frigate, which, as German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock stated in May 2024, would exercise the ‘right of peaceful passage’.

The EU’s strategic priorities: towards an “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook”?

There are limits to the new European Commission and Parliament’s role in the Taiwan issue, as member states still dictate the EU’s ability to support Taiwan and respond to China’s assertiveness. Indeed, inconsistencies remain in how European states read the existing state of affairs in the Taiwan Strait; this results in an unclear understanding of what the different 27 member states understand as the status quo, making it difficult to reflect on the EU’s possible responses to the different scenarios that might develop in the Taiwan Strait. Even if in Europe it seems little expectation exists that these scenarios will unfold soon, a series of recent statements suggest they are not unrealistic.

Developing an “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook” that considers all possible scenarios (e.g. increasing assertiveness, accidents, full-scale invasions, partial island invasions and blockades) and outlines the possible effects on European and EU responses (i.e. statements, high-level visits, Council Conclusions and sanctions), could help the EU build consensus ahead of any possible crisis. Such a Playbook could also help discourage China from aggressive actions. To achieve this, it does not need to be fully public. However, clearly outlining the scenarios the EU is considering, without disclosing all the details of potential responses and actions, could still achieve its purpose. This approach would signal that the EU is proactively looking at any potential deteriorations in the situation and would not remain passive.

An “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook” will need to start by highlighting the economic magnitude that tensions in the Taiwan Strait might have on Europe and its member states. In April 2023, the EU and Taiwan held their second Trade and Investment Dialogue; they discussed horizontal strategic trade issues and concerns that prevent bilateral investment flows in relevant fields like agri-food exports or semiconductors. While a bilateral investment agreement seems not on the table for the moment, the trade and investment relationship between the EU and Taiwan is broad. Europe is Taiwan’s third-largest trading partner and remains Taiwan’s largest source of foreign investment. Taiwan has a key place in global supply chains of key technologies, producing over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones, and maritime trade in the Taiwan Strait is among the busiest shipping routes in the world, with approximately 1,200 ships crossing the Strait every week. A disruption of trade with Taiwan would have deep consequences for European supply chains, which is why some have advocated for an EU-Taiwan Supply Chain Agreement to improve supply chain resilience.

Additionally, an “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook” must take stock of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). Indeed, countering FIMI remains a challenge for both Europe and Taiwan, and it is likely to exacerbate further in case of cross-strait tensions. Taiwan stands as the primary target of Chinese disinformation globally due to its geopolitical relevance to Beijing, as well as various other factors like language affinity, shared historical and cultural legacy and strong economic and people-to-people ties with the mainland. Acting as a test bed, Taiwan already experienced aggressive disinformation campaigns during the last 2020 presidential election against then-President Tsai Ing-wen. Since Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, these tactics have evolved in tone, method and the platforms used to disseminate false information. Disinformation campaigns intensified during the 2024 elections. Confronted with these challenges, Taiwan has developed stronger counter-measures. As coercive measures fall short when dealing with disinformation from external states or when attributing the source becomes intricate due to the involvement of multiple foreign actors, the government has trained its civil servants extensively with innovative approaches such as “humour over rumour” or the “2-2-2” approach. Local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have increased Taiwan’s capacity to de-bunk disinformation narratives and have also invested in training citizens to identify disinformation campaigns. Organisations such as Doublethink Lab, Cofacts and Taiwan FactCheck Foundation (TFC) offer a series of innovative approaches to fight disinformation that might be also interesting for Europe to explore.

In recent years, Europe has grown more aware of the risks posed by FIMI. The European External Action Service’s (EEAS) first FIMI report in February 2023 highlighted China’s growing involvement in disinformation campaigns in Europe, sometimes in conjunction with Russian actors. In the weeks before the European elections, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions on ‘democratic resilience and the safeguarding electoral processes from foreign interference’, and on 24 April, the Belgian presidency activated the Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in information-sharing mode to provide regular updates on foreign interference attempts during European elections. Initiatives such as supporting European CSOs, and establishing contacts with Taiwanese CSOs that counter FIMI, could be a starting point for Europe’s ability to recognise and counter Chinese FIMI actions in Europe. In addition, in light of the growing cooperation between China and Russia, including on FIMI initiatives, Europe and Taiwan can share notes on joint attempts to influence debates in Europe and Taiwan and reinforce the respective initiatives.

An “EU Taiwan Strait Playbook” will also need to reflect on the main venues for Europe to coordinate its position and actions with its like-minded partners from the region. The EU’s response to the Ukraine conflict has shown the EU’s challenges in responding to military situations, including the need for an accelerated production of armaments, enhanced military training programmes and increased defence spending. On this, the EU’s coordination with key partners, including the US and allies in the Indo-Pacific region, has been pivotal. This coordination has so far happened at the bilateral level and it has featured in some of the G7 gatherings or at the NATO Summit level, thanks to the continuous participation since the Madrid Summit of the Indo-Pacific (IP4) partners. However, it remains to be seen what the best venue to coordinate the European response to any potential escalation in the Taiwan Strait is. Furthermore, the effectiveness of collaboration on joint military exercises, intelligence sharing and strategic planning will be enhanced if organised around a clear role that each partner is capable and willing to play in the different scenarios.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s security concerns will continue to affect Europe. An even more assertive Chinese stance toward the Taiwan Strait, further straining US-China relations and creating expectations about European and like-minded support for international norms and regional stability, is not a remote possibility that Europe can ignore. The EU’s approach to Taiwan must be strategic and forward-looking, particularly given the evolving geopolitical landscape influenced by Beijing’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive stance on Taiwan. The EU should enhance its internal coherence and find venues to regularly coordinate externally with regional partners to solidify its position on cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s security. Developing a comprehensive “Taiwan Strait Playbook” could help clarify the EU’s possible responses to an escalation of crises, which includes a clear plan for all involved sectors, from trade to the fight against disinformation. While military deterrence will largely fall upon the EU’s partners like the US and other regional partners, strengthening bilateral relations with Taiwan on areas such as trade, while also countering FIMI, will contribute to discouraging China from aggressive actions, and signal the EU’s position towards the Taiwan issue. The recent elections in Taiwan and Europe highlight the need for a nuanced EU strategy that addresses both security and economic dimensions.