By Ramon Pacheco Pardo
28.04.2023
Yoon Suk-yeol is wrapping up a six-day state visit to the United States. This is the first state visit by an Asian leader to the United States during the Joe Biden presidency, and the first state visit by a South Korean president since Lee Myung-bak in 2011. The honour afforded to Yoon underscores the strength of the ROK-US alliance, as well as the extent to which the Biden administration is seeking to woo South Korea as its competition with China intensifies. At the same time, Yoon’s state visit is also the result of South Korea increasingly siding with the United States on a range of issues, from competition with China as just mentioned, to opposition to China’s assertiveness over Taiwan, the deterrence of North Korea or South Korea-United States-Japan trilateralism. During the state visit, Yoon and Biden issued a joint statement, South Korea and the United States agreed to the Washington Declaration on nuclear cooperation, and Yoon delivered an address to a joint session of US Congress.
What are the key takeaways of Yoon’s visit for South Korea-US bilateral relations?
Arguably, the main diplomatic victory from Yoon’s state visit to the United States could be the Washington Declaration. The agreement sets up a Nuclear Consultative Group (NGC) in which Seoul and Washington will discuss plans involving the use of US strategic assets and extended deterrence to counter the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In addition, the agreement sets that the United States will deploy strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines, more frequently. In return, Seoul has reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and not to develop its own nuclear weapons. The Washington Declaration falls short of the wishes by many South Koreans of a NATO-style Nuclear Planning Group with forward-deployed nuclear weapons. And the declaration has already been criticised by South Koreans, including many conservatives, who want to keep open the option of Seoul developing nuclear weapons of its own as a way to confront the threat of Pyongyang’s own weapons. But South Korea will have more input into US discussions about the potential use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against, or even try to prevent, a North Korean nuclear strike. This has been a key demand across the political spectrum in South Korea for long now.
With regards to the key geopolitical question today, namely US-China global competition, Yoon’s visit to the United States has served to underscore South Korea’s years-long tilt towards Washington. The Yoon-Biden joint statement makes several indirect references to China’s (alleged) assertiveness. Most notably, the statement includes a reference to ‘peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’ and opposition to ‘any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Indio-Pacific’. With regards to tensions between China and Taiwan, this is the third South Korea-US joint statement in three years, the first under Moon Jae-in and the last two under Yoon. This underscores South Korea’s opposition to China’s threats to Taiwan. As a result, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already expressed its ‘strong dissatisfaction’ to South Korea, as it has done in the past when South Korea has made its position clear. As for the Indo-Pacific, China has been critical of South Korea’s strategy towards the region, issued in December, which positions Seoul with Washington and other partners in calling for a ‘free an open’ region—and implicit criticism of Beijing. Even though South Korea has indicated its willingness to work with China in the region, this is conditional on the Xi Jinping government taking a different, less confrontational direction in its foreign policy. Ultimately, Seoul’s position reflects the growing belief among many South Korean policy-makers that South Korea should be more assertive in its foreign policy, and also that China cannot afford cutting its economic links with South Korean firms.
Perhaps economic relations and cooperation is the area in which Yoon’s visit to the United States has yielded less results. On the one hand, Washington has pledged to continue to discuss with Seoul how to address the negative effects of its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), especially, on South Korean firms such as Hyundai Motor or Kia. Furthermore, Yoon will return home to Seoul with investment pledges in the US$ billions by US tech firms in sectors such as hydrogen fuel, semiconductors, or environment-friendly facilities, as well as by Netflix on South Korean dramas and movies. On the other hand, however, the effects of IRA on South Korean firms that will not have access to US subsidies remains unsolved. And on the same day that that Yoon delivered his speech to US Congress, US National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan delivered a speech in which he essentially reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to an ‘America First’ economic policy. While Sullivan stressed the need for cooperation with partners, citing South Korean by name among others, this economic policy has created uneasiness in South Korea—in common with others such as the EU or Japan. In particular, there are divisions in South Korea regarding how much can the country’s firms follow US policy to restrict high-tech exports to China, especially semiconductors in which Samsung, in particular, and SK Hynix play an important role. This issue remains unsolved as well.
What are the key takeaways of Yoon’s visit for South Korea-US cooperation globally?
The ROK-US alliance has long been global in nature, with its scope extending well beyond the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, two issues stood out during Yoon’s visit to the United States. To begin with, Yoon reaffirmed his government’s commitment to South Korea-United States-Japan trilateral cooperation. This was included in the Biden-Yoon joint statement, and Yoon also mentioned it during his address to US Congress. The improvement in relations between Seoul and Tokyo has been a priority for Yoon since taking office last May, and has led to an agreement to solve the issue of the use by Japanese firms of slave labour during Japan’s colonisation of Korea, steps towards normalising South Korea-Japan trade relations, and a substantial increase in the number of bilateral security and diplomatic exchanges between the two countries—as well as in a trilateral format together with the United States. Yoon’s visit to the United States suggests that Seoul will continue with its policy, regardless of the way domestic opinion in South Korea may feel about it.
Furthermore, South Korea’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was also referred to in the Yoon-Biden joint statement and Yoon’s address to US Congress. South Korea reiterated its condemnation of the invasion, as well as its support for Ukraine. So far, this has included South Korea joining in UN votes condemning Russia and in the imposition of sanctions on the country, as well as non-lethal military transfers and economic aid to Ukraine. South Korea has also reached or is in negotiation of agreements with countries including Poland, the United States, Estonia, Norway, or Romania to sell or transfer tanks, howitzers, and artillery. This has indirectly supported Ukraine’s war efforts, allowing these countries to transfer their own weapons to Ukraine. There are also credible reports in South Korean and foreign media that South Korean offensive weapons or components have made their way to Ukraine already. The big questions now are whether South Korea will ship military equipment to Ukraine directly and which country will receive South Korean artillery shells, which could then make their way to Ukraine or allow other countries to transfer their own shells there. As usual with South Korea, the country prefers to act quietly on this type of matters—in this case, including due to deteriorating relations between Seoul on the one hand and Moscow and Beijing on the other. So it remains to be seen what the extent of these agreements will be and whether they will be made public.
