The Unfinished Military Revolution: Why Europe Risks Getting Left Behind on the Battlefield

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 22/2026

By Gerrit Wissler

10.11.2026

Key issues

• Europe’s rearmament in response to the war in Ukraine is reactive, prioritising legacy platforms over structural adaptation to the accelerating Revolution in Military Affairs.
• Unlike the United States and China, which align procurement with sovereign operational concepts, doctrine and military learning, Europe lacks a common strategic framework to harness fully autonomous, networked warfare.
• Europe should move beyond its current modes of military procurement by institutionalising indigenous wargaming and cultivating its own intellectual capacity to think about conflict and war.

Introduction

What happened in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marks the return of high-intensity, industrial-scale warfare to the European continent. It has put an end to the post-Cold War security architecture and forced the European Union (EU) and its respective member states on a path of rearmament. The conflict in Ukraine can be understood as an accelerator for contemporary combat, demonstrating in real time how emerging technologies are reshaping the modes of warfare. However, as European capitals and defence establishments observe the developments on the ground and the innovations emerging from the frontlines in Ukraine, there is a profound risk that the continent is internalising the wrong lessons.

Europe possesses, by many economic and structural indicators, the latent power to accumulate very serious military capabilities, but it has a tendency to outsource its strategic thinking at the highest level to its most major ally. The importance of indigenous and common strategic and intellectual considerations regarding the changing character of warfare, and the implications this has for one’s own force structure and posture, has gained importance. In fact, it is growing in importance due to the increasing relevance of the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and how AI can impact military command and control cycles. If Europe seeks to translate its latent power potential into relevant military might in an era of rapid technological transformation, a fundamental reconsideration may be in order.

The accelerating but incomplete RMA

To understand the inadequacy of Europe’s defence adaptation, one must first fathom the nature and logic of the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that is presently unfolding in Ukraine. This RMA gained traction rapidly, is still evolving and yet remains fundamentally incomplete. Strategic thinkers define an RMA not merely as the introduction of new technologies and weapon systems. Technological breakthroughs alone do not transform warfare as an overarching pattern. A definitive RMA occurs only when new technologies are synergistically combined with innovative operational concepts and profound organisational adjustments, leaving the adopting party with a stark advantage over their adversaries. In Ukraine, innovation cycles have gathered traction. Procurement timelines have shifted from multi-year processes to software-driven adaptations measured in weeks or days. The battlefield has brought forth the terrible first fruits of these technological shifts: omnipresent sensor networks, algorithm-assisted targeting, proliferated loitering munitions and the democratised use of commercial drones integrated with heavy artillery, to name a few.

When attempting to map the full magnitude of this RMA, it becomes evident that it is far from over. The ultimate, mature version demands at least the seamless networking and centralised command and control of fully autonomous systems. These systems must operate synergistically (or “swarmed”) across multiple domains, with human operators strictly “on the loop” or entirely “out of the loop”. In the Ukrainian theatre, this overarching synthesis of autonomous capabilities has not yet been achieved. The tactical environment is more so characterised by a fragmented integration. Human operators remain heavily involved, and the architectures of systems are regularly disrupted by intense electronic warfare, bandwidth limitations and the immense friction of legacy forces who cannot keep up with the speed of autonomous systems. Therefore, the densely scrutinised drone warfare and accelerated sensor-shooter loops visible today are merely transitional phenomena. They could also be portrayed as the precursor to a more profound transformation. This possible future phase will likely be defined by an AI-driven swarm logic, multi-domain automated strikes and deeply resilient data infrastructures as a prerequisite.

Layers of conflict

Acknowledging this accelerating RMA does not mean war now is an entirely different mode of competition, and its character remains relatively unchanged. Still, it is a contest now burdened with additional tactical, operational and strategic layers that lead to enhanced complexity. Traditional warfare is not replaced but superimposed with new domains, such as cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum or space, layered onto conventional combat. The defining challenge for modern armed forces is not simply buying new technology from domestic or foreign markets, but coping with the intellectual and structural complexity required to conceptualise and apply this multitude of new and old layers of combat into strategy.

European armed forces are structurally fragmented and operationally inefficient due to persistent national reliance on the US for military enablers. In high-intensity combat scenarios, European militaries cannot operate autonomously over sustained periods. Crucial capabilities are largely missing or underdeveloped at the national level: European air forces lack sufficient aerial refuelling tankers to sustain extended flight operations, have severe gaps in strategic airlift to transport troops and heavy equipment quickly and rely almost entirely on American satellite constellations and high-end reconnaissance systems for battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Furthermore, European forces continue to lack dedicated capabilities to suppress modern enemy air defences, meaning that independent joint air campaigns remain impossible without US support.

This vulnerability is reinforced by national procurement habits. Following Russia’s invasion, European capitals responded with urgent remilitarisation, yet this spending surge has largely funded legacy industrial replenishment. Flagship efforts such as expanding the Boxer wheeled vehicle family (notably the German-Dutch Boxer Schakal infantry fighting vehicle) and executing contracts for 155 mm artillery shells focus on restocking twentieth-century mechanical mass and conventional attrition capacity. While all layers of conflict are important, absorbing financial resources that could otherwise support structural modernisation through these purchases seems one-sided.

To encourage member states to develop next-generation capabilities collaboratively, the EU established collective instruments, most prominently the European Defence Fund (EDF). However, the EDF’s seven-year budget of roughly €8 billion (2021–2027) remains critically underfunded compared to global peers. Because European initiatives remain sub-scale, current collective tools are too modest to overcome existing capability deficits while simultaneously matching the pace of contemporary technological transformation.

Consequently, Europe’s defence posture possibly suffers from a structural contradiction: an incomplete and premature adaptation to the ongoing RMA. Rather than building a coherent, continental warfighting system, European defence policy remains stuck in a reactive cycle. It oscillates between high-profile joint platform projects that disintegrate under political self-interest, ad hoc tactical restructuring and procurement and an almost total neglect of the shared digital infrastructure required to connect modern forces into a system fit for future warfare.

The unravelling of the Future Combat Air System illustrates the failure at the strategic, platform-centric level. In theory, the Future Combat Air System pointed European air power in the right operational direction by seeking to pair a next-generation crewed fighter with autonomous remote carriers, swarm capabilities and a unified combat cloud. In practice, the project stalled and unravelled due to industrial disputes over intellectual property and flight-control software, compounded by divergent national requirements between Paris and Berlin.

Simultaneously, at the tactical ground level, national armed forces are attempting to absorb modern battlefield lessons in isolation. A clear example is the German Bundeswehr’s planned restructuring of its combat battalions. In a direct response to the war in Ukraine, the German Army has discussed reducing traditional combat battalions from three active combat companies to just one, repurposing the remaining capacity into a dedicated company for unmanned systems, a recruit training unit and reserve elements. While this reform reflects the urgent need for manpower in sustained conflicts of attrition, it calls to mind the shooter “in the loop” comparison of the transitory phase of the ongoing RMA in Ukraine.

Additionally, neither the Future Combat Air System nor dedicated drone companies can generate decisive combat power without the component Europe continues to underfund: a sovereign and resilient digital infrastructure. Modern multi-domain warfare does not function as a collection of isolated smart weapons; it requires a robust digital nervous system comprising cloud computing, tactical edge processing and high-bandwidth satellite networks.

As long as Europe treats next-generation programmes as industrial workshare disputes, its adaptation to modern warfare will remain unfinished. This is especially problematic since, while Europe struggles to be on par with its deficits of the past, it seems to lose track of what is coming next. Adapting solely to the transitional phase of this RMA without a coherent intellectual framework to anticipate its ultimate trajectory would leave Europe strategically vulnerable. To avoid being perpetually outpaced by both allies and adversaries, European defence institutions must transcend their current fragmentation. In a hypothetical scenario where all member states are in complete political agreement on procurement, there is still a lack of a European authority capable of devising a unified Kriegsbild that is subsequently harmonised across Europe. Without this, determining what is strategically decisive for the future of European warfare is missing. The swiftness and depth of the ongoing RMA point to a realisation: decision-makers must recognise that European security cannot be bought off the shelf. It must be cultivated intellectually first.

Primary military power epistemologies vs. superficial European adaptation

This conceptual shortfall becomes more visible when Europe’s fragmented approaches are juxtaposed against the more coherent and purpose-driven strategic frameworks of the world’s two primary military powers. Both the US and China possess sound institutionalised epistemologies embedded in an intellectual cycle of strategic military learning to contend with the RMA and draw its logical conclusions for their respective national goals.

These institutionalised defence intellectual ecosystems are dedicated to long-term strategic anticipation and thought. Both actors possess world-class capacities in military strategic theory, operational research and professional wargaming. In the US, federally funded research institutions such as war colleges and specialised bodies like the Office of Net Assessment continuously stress-test future scenarios to steer procurement priorities decades in advance. Similarly, China’s Academy of Military Science and National Defence University serve as conceptual engines, systematically translating technological breakthroughs into actionable doctrine through large-scale simulations. By continuously funding, cultivating and listening to this “strategic brain”, both superpowers ensure that hardware acquisition is never merely an end in itself, but the deliberate execution of an intellectually reasoned approach.

The US operates on a strategy of maintaining uncompromised global power projection. The American “theory of victory” relies on establishing air, sea and information dominance through precise and rapid strikes. To sustain this expeditionary posture in the age of accelerating RMA, the US is pioneering “Joint All Domain Operations” (JADO), an overarching doctrine designed to link every sensor to every shooter across all military branches. By integrating AI directly into the command loop, the US aims to transition from a human-led linear kill chain to an algorithm-driven network. This facilitates large, coordinated multi-domain operations capable of striking thousands of targets globally at an unprecedented speed, leveraging a robust private sector innovation ecosystem with pragmatism and a very large budget.

Conversely, China operates under a fundamentally different doctrine rooted in a geographically grounded strategy: enforcing an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) theatre to dominate the Western Pacific. The Chinese theory of victory does not prioritise the physical annihilation of enemy troops but the paralysis of the adversary’s entire operational network in a vertical approach. Through the concepts “Multi Domain Precision Warfare” and “Intelligentised Warfare”`, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views AI and swarm intelligence as mechanisms to leapfrog subsequent technological generations and offset US military superiority. The goal is to bypass US conventional strength by targeting the Achilles heel of US operations: command and control nodes, logistics, maritime choke points and political alliances. The PLA actively pairs AI-driven simulations of conflict with iterative learning from real-world conflicts.

The ongoing conflict in the Strait of Hormuz is being closely monitored by both the US and China since it could be portrayed as a proxy proving ground where these strategies and respective epistemologies collide. Iran’s execution of an A2/AD strategy, mixing asymmetric tactics, drone warfare and ballistic missiles, demands that US forces test their AI-enabled expeditionary capabilities against a saturated air defence. For the functioning systems of military learning in Beijing and Washington, Hormuz is an active proving ground for their individual epistemologies to test and learn for future conflict. The PLA continuously analyses operational lessons, assessing the fragility of maritime chokepoints, the endurance of missile stockpiles against US counter-targeting and how the mixing of cheap drones with fast ballistic missiles can exhaust expensive US air defence, to name a few.

While the US and China try to align their military and technological procurement with operational concepts designed to achieve specific grand strategic ends, Europe risks remaining a passive spectator. Recent EU and national defence efforts provide evidence for structural inefficiency and a critical lack (or unwillingness) of an indigenous strategic epistemology. The European rearmament responses were largely devolved into uncoordinated national stockpiling and ad hoc purchases, primarily from non-European suppliers, without a unifying doctrinal vision or epistemology.

European strategic capacity and sovereign epistemologies

To move beyond reactivity, Europe must make an intellectual shift in the security and defence realm. It must forge a sovereign capacity to understand and shape the future of the European battlefield.

First, Europe needs to cultivate a shared strategic culture, moving beyond simply ensuring that national armies can operate together through NATO procedures. A sober look at today’s politics shows clearly that a single European strategic culture remains an illusion for now. National defence priorities, differing threat perceptions and a desire to protect sovereignty present structural barriers. However, this should not excuse European nations from doing the intellectual work required to commonly grasp the ongoing RMA. Member states should independently, yet collaboratively, link their technological procurement to a common defence epistemology. Without this alignment, European military spending will continue to fund a collection of disjointed armies rather than a credible force for deterrence or a robust European pillar in the NATO structure. The EU and its member states must recognise that strategic autonomy is not just about establishing defence funds or buying munitions; it is about the intellectual sovereignty needed to define how future wars will be fought in and for Europe.

Second, to prepare for the unknowns of modern warfare, Europe must urgently expand its capacity for analytical wargaming. Wargames are a crucial tool for military learning without the cost of actual combat. Currently, European defence planners often rely on wargaming metrics and methods imported from external powers. For example, when assessing threats in Europe, European nations have relied on external analysis like the highly influential Rand Corporation Wargame on defending the Baltics. While valuable, such exercises use an inherently American strategic mindset, even though the exercises drive real policy consequences across Europe. This reliance forces Europe’s strategic thinking into paradigms that ignore the continent’s own specific frictions, its geographic realities and its unique vulnerabilities. By institutionalising native analytical wargaming, European defence planners can create environments to test experimental defence concepts and expose specific European vulnerabilities and potential strengths.

Finally, Europe must build these wargaming scenarios upon its own strategic foundation. A Chinese military maxim accurately observes that ‘first-class militaries design warfare, second-rate militaries are trailing warfare and third-rate militaries have to contend with warfare’. Europe’s goal should be to design the dynamics of future conflict in Europe rather than passively adapt to them.

By importing foreign operational frameworks and buying transitional defence technologies without a unifying doctrine or common epistemology, Europe risks remaining a second- or third-rate military power. Europe must develop native intellectual tools tailored to its geography, demographic constraints and political structures. By fostering its own strategic mindset, Europe can stop reacting to the doctrinal developments of Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Instead, it can proactively design its defence future, ensuring that, as the RMA reaches its fully networked phase, European armed forces possess both the technology and the defence intellectual mastery required to deploy it successfully.

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