Four In, Two Out and One in Between: European Political Parties and EU Defence

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 14/2024

By Łukasz Maślanka

10.5.2024

Key issues

• Following the increased interest in defence and security because of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and due to greater European Union (EU) support for the arms industry, there is an incentive for parties to take a position on EU defence.
• Some European parties present far-reaching visions of how EU defence should develop (EPP, Greens, Renew Europe), even if delivering on these visions can be very difficult.
• All parties supporting the development of EU defence agree that it should be compatible with NATO, although interpretations of this means may differ.

 

Introduction

The increased interest in developing EU defence is part of the “geopolitical Commission” agenda announced by the current head of the European Commission, President Ursula von der Leyen. An important factor that conditioned the Commission’s and Parliament’s outlook on this issue during the current term was the presidency of Donald Trump. This provided the necessary impetus for the development of several initiatives in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is overseen directly by the EU member states. The most important results in this area have been: the Strategic Compass and its commitments: for example, the establishment of a new form of Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC)), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Peace Facility (EPF). However, the European Commission has also sought ways to expand its competencies into defence policy. The latter path required the adoption of legislative acts to support the rebuilding of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), after years of under-investment caused by the so-called “peace dividend”.

Although Joseph R. Biden’s victory in the 2020 United States (US) presidential election was expected to end the momentum for European defence, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided new impetus for its acceleration, as reflected in the Versailles Declaration of March 2022. The need for the development of CSDP and EU aid for the European arms industry was supported by all of the significant mainstream political forces in the European Parliament, as well as by some deputies of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR). The three main people responsible for pushing forward the EU defence agenda in the Union’s executive structures came from three different political groups: 1) Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (European People’s Party (EPP)); 2) Internal Market Commissioner, also responsible for the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), Thierry Breton (Renew Europe); and 3) High Representative for the Union’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice-President (HR/VP), Josep Borrell (formerly a Socialists & Democrats (S&D) Member of the European Parliament (MEP)).

However, they were not entirely alone in this endeavour. For example, the legislative work on regulations to support the EDTIB involved MEPs from various political families who were part of the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) or the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). These included MEPs such as Arnaud Danjean (EPP-France), Christian Ehler (EPP-Germany), Michael Gahler (EPP-Germany), Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D-France), Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR-Poland), Nathalie Loiseau (Renew-France) and Hannah Neumann (Greens-Germany), to mention only a few. It is only the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) group and the European Left that take an unequivocally negative stance towards the development of the CSDP and EU defence.

So, several MEPs have taken an increasing interest in EU defence matters, and we should expect the issue of EU defence to appear in the election campaigns during the European elections. However, the proposals for defence and security presented in the pre-election manifestos are often overly general and focused on the issues that arouse the most emotion among voters – e.g. the EU’s attitude to ongoing armed conflicts and the prospect of Trump’s re-election as US president. For the Eurosceptic far-right and far-left, CSDP and EU defence appears exclusively in a negative context, that is, as a potential threat to be defended against. Nevertheless, several of the mainstream parties are interested in EU defence matters. To probe each manifesto and better understand each party group’s attitude to EU defence, this CSDS Policy Brief looks at each party in terms of their approach to and ideas for EU defence.

The European People’s Party 

The EPP’s programme documents outline an ambitious plan for developing EU defence. The transformation of the CSDP into a “European Defence Union” is a significant political proposal and it dates back to the previous election campaign. Passed in March 2024 in Bucharest, the EPP’s pre-election manifesto ties the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war to EU security and supports continued comprehensive assistance to Kyiv. The group stresses that EU defence policy should be consistent with NATO, based on cooperation with the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway. The EU’s greater responsibility for the continent’s defence is to be understood as following through on the demand for more equitable burden-sharing with the US. The three steps for EU defence, according to the EPP, involve: 1) deepening industrial cooperation and linking it to the latest technologies (“Defence Tech 2.0”), standardisation, common export rules and a more “Buy European” logic for armaments; 2) the appointment of a “Defence Commissioner” and a security council of defence ministers; and 3) a gradual transition from the CSDP to a “European Defence Union” with integrated land, sea, cyber and air forces to complement national armies. The EPP also call for a specially established “European Fund for External Military Intervention”, which would raise funds for EU missions abroad, including from those member states that do not wish to participate in them.

While not contesting the common programme, the national parties that make up the EPP subscribe to its provisions with varying degrees of commitment. Italy’s People of Freedom (PdL) leader, Antonio Tajani, recently called for a European army. Although EPP leader Manfred Weber, who hails from the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), has made similarstatements, the practice of Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/CSU governments has been very cautious on this issue. The leaders of the new Polish government, including Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, are calling for a European rapid reaction brigade. Unofficial conversations with EPP representatives indicate that the party wants to present a far-reaching vision that is justified by the current international situation. Similarly, the EPP demanded, even before 24 February 2022, a halt to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and stricter sanctions against Russia, although some center-right member state governments opposed this. The real priority of the majority of the EPP is to organise sustained EU support for the defence industry – particularly the industries of the most prominent member states. However, expanding joint capabilities is equally important for some politicians and governments. Discrepancies between enthusiastic announcements and political practice also appear at the level of EU defence funding: among EPP politicians, many are committed to reducing spending in the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF).

The Socialists and Democrats

The pre-election manifesto of the Party of European Socialists (PES) announces, without going into detail, the implementation of ‘a strong European Common Security and Defence Policy that complements NATO’. The document emphasises the importance of the historic turnaround following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and advocates comprehensive assistance, including military aid, to the invaded state. The manifesto also supports the development of the European arms industry, including joint procurement. Rather than increasing arms expenditures by member states, it mentions “targeted” and “smart spending”. Defence issues were placed far down the list of PES priorities, and the aforementioned laconic declarations share a paragraph with foreign and enlargement policy. The S&D group also emphasises important points for left-wing voters, such as arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament and democratic control over defence issues. The manifesto echoes and highlights the S&D Group theses of the February 2023 paper The Future of EU Strategic Autonomy, which mentions, among other things, the need to “operationalise” Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (the “mutual defence clause”) and to increase funding for the EPF to support peacekeeping missions and conflict prevention. The document also mentions that there is no contradiction between the expansion of CSDP and cooperation with NATO; to this end, duplication of structures should be avoided.

There is a tension between pacifist ideals and the need to respond to the challenges caused by the international situation, and this is present in the discourse of the various national parties that make up the PES and S&D. This has become particularly visible in the case of the German Social Democrat Party (SPD) and the Italian Democratic Party (PD). It also translates into the programme of the European socialists, who would like a geopolitically strong Europe, but not at the price of increasing arms spending, especially if this were to lead to cuts in the social sphere. Support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russian aggression sometimes go hand-in-hand with tacit hopes of rebuilding relations with Russia in the future. There are exceptions. For example, the leader of the moderate French left in the race for the European Parliament is Raphaël Glucksmann (PS-Place Publique), who is known for his biting and long-standing criticism of the Kremlin and the strengthening of the EU’s defence capabilities in alliance with the US.

Renew

The centrist group Renew Europe, in which French President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party plays a leading role, set out its vision for developing the CSDP in an elaborate pre-election document of March 2024. The paper praises the EU’s efforts to date to strengthen defence capabilities and the EDTIB (Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton, who hails from Renew, was largely responsible for this). Still, it considers them insufficient in the current context of interlocking crises and authoritarian states filling the space left by Europeans (e.g. in Africa). Like the EPP, Renew wants to transform the CSDP into a defence union. The group’s position shares the diagnoses of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) Report and the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) about the excessive fragmentation of European defence capabilities and the need for a significant surge in joint purchases and procurement.

According to the Renew Europe document, if more commitment is to be encouraged from the EU member states, it is not enough to present appropriate programmes – financial incentives are also needed. Therefore, Renew proposes to allocate €100 billion within a future budgetary perspective; this idea was previously mentioned by Breton and Renew affiliate Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas. The money would be used to reduce Europe’s dependence on areas such as ‘air-to-air refueling capability, command and control capability, drones, hypersonic weapons, layered air defense, electronic surveillance and warfare capabilities’. Renew also proposes further strengthening cooperation among member states in combating hybrid threats. The bolstering of the EDTIB is also intended to provide more military assistance to Ukraine.

Politically, Renew is betting on speeding up the decision-making and executive process. This will be achieved by moving away from unanimous votes in the Council of the EU on all foreign and security policy issues – except missions and operations with an executive mandate. The group also supports the establishment of a fully-fledged security committee in the European Parliament, the appointment of a “Defence Commissioner” and a special task force within the Commission to prepare a defence union. The Renew programme also envisages the formation of a European defence identity, which is a reflection of the call for a “common strategic culture” which frequently appears in French debates. Joint European youth civil defence exercises are to be a prelude to this. The group also calls for the rapid implementation of the Strategic Compass, including the establishing of the RDC, and the creation of ‘a permanent EU operational Headquarters, with a single command’. The centrists also emphasise the importance of cooperation and complementarity between the EU and NATO on defence issues (“the European pillar of NATO”) and call for closer security and defence cooperation with the UK.

Greens 

Like the Socialists and Democrats, the Greens also have to reckon with the pacifist convictions of some of their voters. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and military threat to European security have prompted the Greens to engage in a deep internal debate, which has laid bare significant differences in positions across the member states. In an attempt to show a more unified course, the paper European Security Union: Greens/EFA Position Paper on European Security and Defence was presented in July 2022. In it, the Greens seek to place defence issues, which are controversial for them, in the broad context of the EU’s peace, stability and security efforts. They demand more cooperation with like-minded partners (including Taiwan) and international organisations like the United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The positive attitude towards NATO expressed in the document is something new, although it does not express the position of all parties in the group. At the same time, the Greens are careful to emphasise that a purely military approach to security is insufficient, hence the term “security union” instead of “defence union”, which also appears in the Greens’ pre-election manifesto of February 2024, but in a low-profile position.

Like the EPP, S&D and Renew, the Greens also emphasise the need for member states to strengthen cooperation to increase the effectiveness of their defence capabilities. Working together is supposed to reduce the pressure to raise military expenditure, which the Greens are sceptical about. At the same time, they stipulate that not only should the EU’s common defence policy not be based on nuclear weapons, but that the EU should strive for global nuclear disarmament. They also demand, among other things, greater transparency in CSDP activities – including scrutiny by the European Parliament –, an emphasis on human rights in the disbursement of European Defence Fund (EDF) grants and the spending of part of the EDF on technologies that reduce emissions and negative environmental impacts. While the paper applauds the adoption of the Strategic Compass, it considers some of its provisions to be too vague. It demands the creation of clear emergency scenarios. It also finds the RDC model adopted in the Compass too complex and lacking ambition.

A discussion involving representatives of Green parties from different EU countries reveal significant divergences in the perception of threats, especially from Russia, and how to respond to them. The need for a complete paradigm shift in the European Greens’ response to the situation (in particular concerning a revision of the pacifist approach) is proclaimed only by the German Greens. Among other things, they emphasise the need to accept armed defence against revisionist imperialism and to support Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian regime. Greens from other countries (Italy, Belgium, Sweden) argue that the current situation should not lead to any questioning of Green ideals and that the pursuit of peace should be a priority. They point out that there are forms of passive resistance alongside armed struggle. They express concern that an excessive focus on the Russian threat leads to others (e.g. those related to climate change) being overlooked. During the same discussion, a representative of French Greens said that the party should focus on ensuring that the mistakes made in policy towards Russia are not repeated with other authoritarian regimes (China and Saudi Arabia).

The European Conservatives and Reformists 

One element that distinguishes the proposals of the ECR from the Euro-enthusiastic parties on defence is the emphasis on the primacy of national state interests. The ECR opposes the encroachment by EU institutions – the European External Action Service (EEAS) or the European Commission – on competencies reserved for member states. At the same time, it recognises the legitimacy of developing security and defence cooperation where it is effective. For the ECR, it is essential to maintain robust transatlantic ties and for the EU not to encroach on fields reserved for NATO cooperation. The ECR’s programme statements, therefore, do more to define themselves by opposing the demands put forward by the HR/VP, the European Commission or the most Euro-enthusiastic member states, than by putting forward their own proposals. At the same time, the ECR – unlike the far-right or the far-left – recognises the usefulness of some of the EU’s formats and instruments for pursuing a common security and defence policy (the EPF, missions and operations) or a common foreign policy (Polish MEPs from the former ruling Law and Justice Party have always been heavily involved in shaping the Eastern Partnership).

The ECR’s attitude towards the CSDP could change if the representation of Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party is strengthened following the forthcoming European elections. In recent months, some of its representatives have demanded the strengthening of the CSDP or even the creation of a European army. For FdI, the expansion of the CSDP could be a new priority for the EU, much less damaging from the point of view of sovereigntist or right-wing groups than, for example, climate policy. Security threats provide an opportunity to take defence issues seriously and raise topics traditionally closer to right-wing parties than to the left.

A more enthusiastic approach to the expansion of the CSDP – which has traditionally favoured the interests of the EU’s southern flank – may, at first glance, encounter opposition from Polish MEPs and lead to an internal crisis within this group. However, even among Law and Justice MEPs, the approach to EU defence varies: from sceptical (Anna Fotyga) to active participation in shaping the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) or the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) regulations (Zdzisław Krasnodębski). It was important for the ECR to support the EDTIB in a way that would promote the role of small and medium-sized enterprises and would not harm competition in the European market.

From conversations with experts close to the ECR, one can hear about the role of two breakthroughs in shaping the EU’s thinking about its security. The first was COVID, and the second was the outbreak of war. Both helped to break down the sense of the EU’s inability to do anything real about the security of its citizens. For the CSDP, the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM) and the EPF are as crucial as the EU’s NextGeneration recovery fund for economic issues. ECR experts recognise that America is strategically over-stretched, so European states should be prepared to take more responsibility for their defence. According to one of these experts, in taking joint action, the Europeans should be guided by rationality and practicality along the following lines:

– How can the money we already spend on defence be better spent: at the national level, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, or through EU institutions?

– Is the action better carried out under the EU or NATO flag? If it requires significant resources, the EU would be better able to handle it. NATO is much more efficient in coordinating already existing capabilities.

– The development of “disruptive technologies” should be a priority. This is impossible under the “Buy European” paradigm due to the backwardness of European industry when compared with US and Asian partners.

The proposal for a “Defence Commissioner” is considered in the ECR as a step towards a European army, which is regarded as undesirable. All existing military structures under the EU flag have been ineffective or even a sham (EU Battle Groups). According to an ECR expert, the diversity of the armies of the member states is a strength and not a weakness of the West. Instead, greater interoperability is needed, and attention must be paid to ensuring that EU actions are coordinated with NATO.

Identity and Democracy

ID, the alliance of European Eurosceptic and far-right parties, argues against the expansion of European defence because it contradicts the principles of national sovereignty. Some ID-affiliated parties also put their reluctance towards the CSDP down to fears of creating competition with NATO (the Italian Lega or the Alternative for Germany (AfD)). In contrast, others – such as the French National Rally (RN) – are equally sceptical of the North Atlantic Alliance as they are of EU defence. Marine Le Pen’s party also explains its reluctance to deepen defence cooperation within the EU to the fear of France being dominated by Germany. For the Lega, on the other hand, the threat is France’s desire to dominate Europe by taking defence integration too far. While both the RN and the AfD favour increasing defence spending, the Lega, as a member of its country’s governing coalition, is putting the brakes on measures to achieve this.

The European Left

Part of the European Left’s manifesto ahead of the 2024 elections is opposition to the “militarisation of the EU”. Representatives of the party argue that security on the European continent is only possible when it has the same level for all states. This implies support for a programme of “peace, security and disarmament” and of the “neutrality and non-alignment” inherently incompatible with the expansion of common defence. The European Left demands a reduction in arms spending, immediate full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The European Left places Russian aggression against Ukraine and the Israeli military intervention in Gaza on an equal footing. They insist that there should be immediate peace talks leading both to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and Israeli forces from all occupied territories.

Conclusions

The attitudes to the common defence of the various European political parties and groups broadly align with their assessment of the current tendencies in European integration. The four main Euro-enthusiastic groups (EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens) approve of the European Commission’s action to support the arms industry and the expansion of the CSDP. How they express their support varies according to the sensitivities of their constituents and the extent to which they support increasing arms spending. S&D and the Greens, in particular, are reluctant at the prospect of an increase in arms spending, preferring instead to talk about the advantages of cooperation. They all back close cooperation between the EU and NATO and treat European defence as complementary to NATO for those EU countries that are members of the alliance. At the same time, these groups call for the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP to be reduced and for more competencies to be transferred to the European Parliament and the Commission. The idea of a “Defence Commissioner” and the proposal to create a fully-fledged “Defence Committee” in the Parliament with broad oversight powers are intended to serve this purpose. It is expected that the member states – most often headed by representatives of the same Euro-enthusiastic political families – will be cautious about these demands, and that the European Parliament’s participation in shaping the CSDP will be limited.

The ECR is an interesting case. There is an ongoing internal discussion on the attitude to European defence there. The group is decidedly pro-Atlantic, but Italian and Czech MEPs seem more accepting of the call for an expansion of the CSDP and support for EDTIB than, for example, MEPs from Poland. From the point of view of the ideological approach of conservatives and reformists, the most important argument in favour of EU defence is the possibility of drawing voters’ attention to topics closer to the sensibilities of right-wing parties. In contrast, the equally important need for the ECR to protect national sovereignty argues against this move.

The ID group and the European Left remain consistent opponents of EU defence. For the former, a defence union is incompatible with differing national interests, while the European Left sees increasing defence capabilities as equivalent to increasing the risk of an even wider armed conflict in Europe.