CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 5/2024
By Gesine Weber
1.3.2024
Key issues
- The UK has proven its iron-clad commitment to Euro-Atlantic security through a leadership role in support of Ukraine against Russia. This engagement opens a window of opportunity for its integration into security and defence cooperation across the continent.
- 2024 is a critical year for EU-UK cooperation in security and defence, but the trajectory for cooperation is likely to be strongly effected by elections on both sides of the Atlantic.
- Plug-and-play mechanisms for EU-UK cooperation are a promising option for tackling hybrid threats, providing maritime security and scenarios requiring rapid intervention. In more remote theatres where the EU or individual member states and the UK share interests, flexible cooperation between willing and able partners can be an important enabler for cooperation.
Introduction
The United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has directly impacted its relationship with the EU and individual member states in the realm of security and defence. Due to the absence of a formal agreement on security and defence cooperation between the EU and the UK, the UK does not anymore participate in the EU’s missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), or in other institutionalised formats of security and defence cooperation within the EU, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defence Fund (EDF). While close ties with individual member states, both on the political and operational level, were maintained, and the UK remained a part of the European security architecture through its engagement in NATO, the potential for cooperation with individual EU member states however suffered from the fact that cooperation on certain security matters naturally took place in the EU — where the UK was out.
This CSDS Policy Brief argues that 2024 can constitute a pivotal moment for reviving EU-UK cooperation in the field of security and defence. While the presidential election in the United States (US), and particularly the scenario of a second Trump mandate, raises concern regarding deterrence and defence in Europe, the fact that both the EU and the UK will hold elections in 2024 as well is sometimes rather considered in passing. Yet, the potential changes in political leadership on both sides of the Channel constitute a window of opportunity to rethink EU-UK cooperation on security and defence. Regardless of its political colour, the EU’s leadership can be expected to push for more EU action in the field in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the long-term structural changes in US foreign policy, even if it does so more out of strategic necessity than deliberate political choice. In the UK, where elections will be held most likely in the second semester of 2024, the Labour Party, currently leading in the polls, has clearly signalled its willingness to seek closer cooperation with the EU. Almost eight years after the Brexit referendum, public opinion also appears much more favourable towards respective initiatives. Facing the threat from Russia and the looming scenario of a second Trump administration, both sides can enhance security and defence cooperation particularly on the working level from now on – to be prepared for the second, and certainly not calmer semester, of the year.
Convergence in grand strategy and European support for Ukraine
Leaving the EU required the UK to flesh-out its post-Brexit foreign and security policy independently from the bloc. With the Integrated Review, the UK formulated the aspiration of becoming “Global Britain”, which described the UK’s affirmation of its willingness to be the most capable ally in Euro-Atlantic security, to “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific and to enhance its global role as a technology power.
With regard to strategic priorities, the UK’s strategy does not significantly divert from the approaches formulated in national capitals or in Brussels. Both in London and on the other side of the Channel, security in the Euro-Atlantic area and addressing the war in Ukraine are seen as the utmost priorities, while there is also no doubt that the most important theatre for future security challenges is likely to be the Indo-Pacific. While conventional threats remain high on the priority list, the importance of resilience in all domains, ranging from protecting critical infrastructure to preventing foreign information manipulation and interference, is increasingly seen as a task for states to address to ensure their citizen’s security.
Beyond the similar strategic approaches, the UK and the EU cannot escape geography: Europe is the main theatre for their security policy. Accordingly, they are facing a similar threat environment, with the most recent and significant security challenges being Russia and the impact of the Middle East conflict on maritime security and supply chains. Similarly, they are likely to be affected in a similar way by broader geopolitical shifts, such as the ramifications of intensifying US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific, the security implications of climate change or technological development.
The ability of the UK and EU, and Europeans more broadly, to address pressing security challenges in the European security theatre has been particularly visible since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. The war has clearly shown that the UK’s exit from the EU did in no way constitute a departure or disengagement from European security. In fact, the UK has played a “vanguard role” in providing support for Ukraine, and hence acted as a leader in European security. Already before the invasion, the UK started to train Ukrainian soldiers and supply weapons for the Ukrainian armed forces; today, London is at the forefront in providing Ukraine with heavy weapons and sophisticated capabilities, including drones, and has concluded a bilateral security agreement with Kyiv. Close coordination inside NATO and among governments allowed EU member states, the EU institutions and the UK to convey strong and unified messages of support for Ukraine. This cooperation was based on the clear needs resulting from the shared threat, and it shows that much can be achieved without a formal security and defence agreement.
Fitter together: prospects for capability development and defence industrial cooperation
While the UK and the EU have demonstrated that their approaches are convergent and complementary for supporting Ukraine, formalised cooperation on security and defence between the EU and the UK remains very limited. Until today, there is no formal EU-UK cooperation agreement on security and defence, neither with regard to operational cooperation nor to structured strategic exchanges or defence-industrial cooperation. Nevertheless, the EU and the UK are likely to face similar challenges in all these domains, such as the need to quickly respond to threats, including hybrid threats, reflect on the medium- and long-term challenges for European security, or strengthening the industrial and technological backbone to be able to match the requirements. In November 2022, the UK joined the EU’s military mobility project under PESCO, which was an almost obvious choice as the logistical challenges, and the need for better cooperation, became apparent with Russia’s war against Ukraine. While this decision is a promising first step, it is only a drop in the ocean compared to the challenges the EU and the UK are facing. As Europeans need to massively ramp up production in their defence industries, cooperation to promote a more genuinely European defence market is one of the fields where positive synergies could arise from EU-UK cooperation. Within the EU, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides member states with a valuable tool for mapping capability gaps and adapting procurement decisions. Including the UK in this procedure could constitute a good opportunity to enhance visibility of the “bigger picture” of European capabilities. Ideally, this procedure could be linked to joint spending on defence R&D through a participation of the UK in the European Defence Fund (EDF).
One may argue that the UK can coordinate with EU member states on capabilities through NATO and the Defence Planning Process (NDPP), but a participation of the UK in EU structures could potentially be even more beneficial, given that the EU has vowed to beef-up its funding for the EDF. The EU’s Defence Industrial Strategy, which is expected now in March, can furthermore serve as a starting point for reflections on potential plug-in mechanisms for the UK. Indeed, the publication of the EU Defence Industrial Strategy is a critical moment for the UK to start engaging with the EU on questions like the creation of a European — not just EU — defence-industrial base. For both sides, having the UK involved in these reflections is important: if Europeans are serious about their aspiration to build capabilities to defend the continent and reduce strategic dependencies, leaving one of Europe’s most capable military powers out of this process would structurally weaken the project from the very beginning.
Crisis management, maritime security, hybrid threats: no shortage of security challenges
The immediate focus for concrete cooperation between the EU and the UK is certainly the war in Ukraine, but shared security challenges extend beyond the Russian threat. The situation in the Western Balkans remains unstable, and in case of an escalation, it would certainly be up to Europeans rather than the US to intervene for stabilisation. Similarly, conflict in the Middle East has demonstrated that Europe’s Southern flank is far from quiet, and that security challenges associated with the region, such as the need for counter-terrorism or crisis management, persist, even though they moved to the background in political attention due to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The same applies to a multitude of other conflicts particularly in Africa, where several military coups in the Sahel demonstrated the necessity for quick action, for example for the evacuation of European nationals. Similarly to European action on Ukraine, cooperation to address the most urgent challenges does not necessarily need a formal agreement, given that the UK and militaries from EU member states, particularly France, have extensive experience in operational cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperation on scenario planning would certainly be beneficial if the need for quick interaction arises. Concretely, the EU and the UK might also reflect on the potential for cooperation between the UK and the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC). This new EU rapid force is supposed to be fully operational by 2025, and can serve as an initial entry force, for reinforcement or as a reserve force. If it needs to be deployed, identifying how the UK could best join forces with the RDC, provided there was political will to do so, would certainly be beneficial for both sides.
EU-UK cooperation on crisis management is particularly important as Europeans have to brace themselves for a situation where the US, increasingly focused on competition with China, and hence the Indo-Pacific security theatre, will demand Europeans to step-up their efforts as security providers in their neighbourhood. The same applies to certain maritime security theatres, where European security interests would be disproportionally affected by security crises. Just as the conflict in the Middle East illustrates, the risk of significant humanitarian crises at the EU’s border and ramifications this could have for free trade also have concrete security implications for Europeans. Not only is the physical security of European ships passing through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at stake, but also the integrity of supply chains and hence European economic security. In fact, the challenge of maintaining the freedom of navigation is not only limited to the Red Sea, but to the entire Indo-Pacific region, given that 60% of global maritime trade is shipped through the region.
Maritime security is no terra incognita for Europeans: in fact, EU member states and the UK have been extensively engaged in the region in the last decades. The EU’s anti-piracy mission at the coast of Somalia, ATALANTA, is widely known for its long-standing presence in the region – an effort to which the UK significantly contributed to, having previously provided the Operational Headquarters (OHQ). Smaller coalitions of the willing complement these efforts of European states as maritime security providers, like Operation Agénor as the military part of the European-led Maritime Awareness Mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), or the participation of European states in the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX). The EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) allow able and willing EU member states to enhance their cooperation in previously defined Maritime Areas of Interest by drawing on a Coordination Cell within the EU’s Military Staff. Thanks to their flexibility, the CMPs could pave the way for more flexible, plug-and-play cooperation between the EU and the UK on maritime security.
Both in more remote security theatres and directly on the European continent, resilience is a critical domain where EU-UK cooperation almost imposes itself. Information manipulation and misinformation, cyber threats and attacks on critical infrastructure are not contained by geographical borders, and particularly in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU and the UK face a similar threat environment. The participation of the UK, alongside other EU member states and non-member states, in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which aims to boost the capacities of participating states to counter hybrid threats, reflects an acknowledgement of the necessity of close cooperation in this domain. Yet, cooperation could already start at a point before threats occur. A critical step for enhancing resilience is awareness of the threat environment through intelligence: within the EU, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, established within the EU Single Intelligence and Analysis Capacity (SIAC), performs a critical function analysing the threat environment. Reflections on how the UK could participate in, or work more closely with the Hybrid Fusion Cell, could be a useful starting point. Alternatively, further enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing could be another solution, which would also allow other European non-NATO members to come on board. Furthermore, strategic communication and dismantling disinformation – both in Europe and in areas where the EU and the UK are engaged, such as the Indo-Pacific or Africa – would benefit from close cooperation and coordination of narratives by the implementing EU and UK authorities in the respective environment. Lastly, developing mechanisms of mutual assistance in case of hybrid attacks against critical infrastructure, such as energy networks or satellites, would be a logical step, not least because of the geographical proximity between the EU and the UK. More generally, the EU’s Hybrid Toolbox provides a solid framework for the EU to strengthen resilience. Creating plug-and-play mechanisms with the toolbox, similar to crisis management or maritime security, could allow London to participate in the efforts tackling hybrid threats over the short-term, while both sides engage to find a mechanism for more structured and institutionalised cooperation for the long-term.
Elections in 2024 as a catalyst or obstacle
The level of ambition and implementation for EU-UK security and defence cooperation in 2024 will significantly depend on elections on both sides of the Channel, as well as on the US elections. From an institutional perspective, the European Commission is facing a lame duck period, given that the EU elections in June will most likely be followed by several months of back-and-forth between member states, as well as the Commission and the European Parliament, for the negotiation of deals over the top jobs in Brussels. At this time, the UK will also be plunged into an electoral campaign – the elections are to be held before the end of January 2025 –, so that ambitious deals or formats of cooperation are unlikely. However, as the defence ties between the EU and the UK have never disappeared, coordination within NATO and other minilateral formats, particularly at the working level, will almost certainly continue.
Political sequencing will matter in 2024, and the US elections are the big elephant in the room. Regardless of their own internal power shuffles, the scenario of a re-election of Donald Trump as US President will force Europeans to prepare very seriously for a situation where the US is unwilling to defend Europe in case of an attack. In fact, much of the preparation for this scenario already needs to be done before the US elections. For the short-term challenge of providing European support to Ukraine, this needs to include an “all hands on deck” reflection — a concrete plan of how much Europeans can provide if US support for Ukraine stops abruptly. At a time where the EU, the UK and the US all risk to be in a post- or pre-election period, where big political initiatives cannot be expected, good preparation is of paramount importance. Particularly on the working level, bureaucrats can play a critical role in identifying low-hanging fruits in fields where policies already converge, and which will hence not be subject to significant politicisation. This approach can allow the EU and the UK to avoid falling into a lame duck period in late 2024, as cooperation on technical aspects could continue. These relatively technical proposals could then pave the way for an ambitious agenda on the level of political leadership.
While a Trump scenario would constitute a massive geopolitical shock that could drive the EU and the UK closer together by strategic necessity, cooperation between the EU and the UK will become more important in the forthcoming years because of the structural long-term trends in US foreign policy. Europe is not the priority of US security policy, which clearly has competition with China at its centre and designs almost all aspects of foreign policy with regard to this competition. The challenges to convince the US Congress to step up aid for Ukraine are illustrative of these priorities, and a similar trend is likely to accelerate in the future. Regardless of the administration in the White House, Europeans can expect that they will have to step up in terms of capabilities and strategy, and shoulder most of the responsibility for European security and defence. And regardless of the incoming government in London and EU leadership in Brussels, this realisation is likely to serve as a catalyst for EU-UK cooperation on security and defence.
