Melting Away? The European Union’s Geopolitical Role in the Arctic

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 3/2025

By Ivan Zaccagnini and Yan Cavalluzzi

5.2.2025

Key issues

• There is evidence that the Arctic is becoming a prospective theatre of war, and the European Union (EU) must therefore try to act as a guarantor of peace.
• The EU should continue to help to deter Russia and it may seek to cooperate with China over the Arctic, despite the risks. However, it needs to cooperate with like-minded partners in the region, thereby trying to prevent escalation in the region.
• The Arctic highlights the importance that the member states work through the EU to develop their deployable forces and Arctic-relevant military capabilities and technologies.

Introduction

The Arctic today represents one of the most geostrategically complex and dynamic regions on the planet, with significant implications for international security, geopolitical relations and the global economy. The progressive reduction of sea ice because of climate change has created new economic opportunities and heightened international interest in the region. The vast reserves of natural resources make the Arctic a focal point for global powers. However, with the possibility of considerable economic benefits there are also the accompanying risks of geopolitical tensions and competition for control of resources. It is estimated that 13% of undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of gas reserves lie in the region, increasing its economic and strategic significance. We should also acknowledge that the Arctic is gaining greater political saliency because of these factors, with President Trump signalling his intention to “buy” Greenland to pursue the United States’ (US) national security interests in the north.

The EU recognises the crucial importance of the Arctic for global stability. With the publication of its Arctic Policy update on 13 October 2021, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to a secure, stable, sustainable, peaceful and prosperous Arctic. This policy aims to preserve the Arctic as a region of peaceful cooperation, slow the effects of climate change and support the sustainable development of Arctic communities, including Indigenous Peoples, for future generations. However, regional cooperation came to an abrupt halt following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The EU, together with its member states and international partners, suspended cooperation with Russia and Belarus in key regional frameworks, including the Northern Dimension Policy, the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation and the Council of Baltic Sea States. What is more, the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO has not only strengthened the Western presence in the region, but it has also intensified Russia’s response. Moscow has increased its deterrence capabilities by reactivating Soviet military bases and developing advanced defence infrastructure. This is a result of a new and broader anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) posture, which includes the deployment of air and naval deterrence systems along the entire Arctic coastline.

The strained diplomatic relations with Russia in the Arctic underlines that the EU aims to collaborate only with like-minded partners through appropriate channels, while avoiding direct involvement with actors considered to be destabilising. The Russian invasion of Ukraine radically changed the global geopolitical equilibrium, and this has turned the Arctic into a potential area of confrontation between Russia and the other members of the Arctic Council, all of which are part of NATO. Three of them –Finland, Denmark and Sweden – are also part of the EU, making the Union a major player in the development of future scenarios. Moreover, the interests of non-Arctic powers such as China, which calls itself a quasi-Arctic state, complicate the context and confuse Western strategies. On the one hand, China’s promotion of commercial initiatives like the Polar Silk Road suggests its willingness to seek economic cooperation in and through the region. On the other hand, actions involving China’s assistance in Russia’s construction of strategic infrastructure in the region suggest that they may have already chosen a side, thereby undermining the neutrality that could foster cooperation.

The aim of this CSDS Policy Brief is to better understand if the Arctic will become a location for future warfare. It also considers what approaches the EU could take to avoid an escalation in the region. We argue that there are three main strategic factors that can shape the future of the region: climate change, geopolitical dynamics and territorial claims disputes over natural resources. Predicting the future development of these factors with precision is extremely difficult, but we argue that it is nevertheless possible to draw certain scenarios and to analyse geostrategic behaviours in the Arctic. Overall, we argue that the EU needs to have a more autonomous defence policy to deal with the strategic dynamics unfolding in the Arctic region.

Climate change and the consequent melting of ice

The progressive melting of polar ice is a direct consequence of climate change. In 1980, the surface area of the polar ice caps was 7 million square kilometres (kms); by 2022, data indicate a reduction of about 39%, with a critical peak in 2012, when the reduction reached almost 70%. This phenomenon made it possible for the first time in history to navigate safely during the winter without the use of icebreakers. The example is the January 2021 transit of three Arc7-class liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers along the High North route without the assistance of icebreakers. The Arctic’s increased accessibility opens new trade routes that could transform shipping between Europe and Asia. These routes offer shorter travel times and lower operating costs, providing a safer alternative to the Straits of Malacca and Gulf of Aden which are known to be home to pirates. However, its navigability, which currently fluctuates between July and October, will increase more and more in the years to follow due to the melting of the polar ice cap, making the route increasingly usable.

In total, 53% of the route skirts Russia and the Kremlin does not recognise traditional coastal boundaries to define its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but instead claims a large portion of the Arctic including the North Sea route (interview). This has important consequences for transit through Russian waters. Furthermore, the region is home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, located in Severodvinsk on the Kola Peninsula, which is responsible for the majority of Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines, such as the Yasen-class, that make up the maritime component of Russia’s strategic triad. On the one hand, climate change could affect the hiding capabilities of submarines given that sound propagation changes according to specific temperature variations and water conditions, making detection systems (e.g. SONAR and hydrophones) more or less effective. On the other hand, Moscow may not view favourably a potential influx of ships transiting through a region that has historically been under its military control.

Finally, as outlined in the white paper published by the State Council in January 2018, China is taking a more active role and interest in the Arctic. The main objective of China’s plan is to develop new maritime routes and exploit the region’s energy resources, thereby strengthening China’s role as a significant player in a context traditionally dominated by Arctic states. Maritime routes through the Arctic can reduce the shipping route by <30% to 50%, saving 14-20 days for cargo shipments from Beijing, with a considerable impact on global trade efficiency. As part of the construction of the Polar Silk Road, China is planning significant investments in crucial infrastructure, such as ports, detailed mapping and research stations. These investments, some of which are already underway, are expected to increase further in the near future to consolidate strategic checkpoints essential for the implementation of the Polar Route.

Geopolitical and military dynamics

The Arctic’s militarisation has intensified following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This escalation suggests that the region may become the site of a renewed Cold War, where conditions are ripe for potential crises. Economic interests from resource extraction, coupled with the ambiguity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in defining EEZs, create a state of anarchy, spurring fervent territorial claims. Extreme positions on these claims could ignite a competitive stand-off, where neither power is willing to show weakness. Indeed, following Finland’s entry into NATO, the Alliance has taken responsibility for an extensive new border with Russia and NATO’s overall posture in the north has become stronger since Finland and Sweden’s accession into the Alliance. Both Russia and NATO are engaged in the region. This is clear if one looks at the recent exercises taking place in the north, such as NATO’s Nordic Response 24 and Russia’s Ocean-2024. In March 2024, Russia called NATO manoeuvres in the north ‘provocative’ and warned of possible ‘military incidents’. A spokesperson from the Kremlin stated that NATO’s increased activities in the Arctic heighten the risk of ‘unintentional incidents’ in the region, potentially posing a veiled threat akin to the Cold War. It is therefore no coincidence that Russian militarisation has manifested itself notably through the modernisation and reopening of abandoned Soviet military bases, as well as the expansion of defence infrastructure in the region. This strategy is evident in the installation of new air defence systems and anti-ship missiles along Russia’s Arctic coastline, thus reinforcing their military presence in an area already complex to manage internationally and consequently increasing the risk of accidents in response to the perceived threat. Summing up then, Russia’s current strategy in the Arctic is based on a balance between resource protection, military power projection, increased deterrence and the consequent maintenance of territorial hegemony.

Additionally, another factor to reflect on is the magnitude of NATO’s Nordic Response 24 exercise and the intrinsic significance it carries. Indeed, it is part of the largest US-led NATO military exercise since the Cold War, once again underscoring the strategic importance of the region. Since the end of the Cold War, the US military has significantly reduced exercises in Arctic environments, focusing on other theatres of operation. However, this time the US Marines participated in Nordic Response 24 alongside Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish soldiers precisely to regain the know-how lost over the past 35 years regarding combat in Arctic environments. In addition, according to Norwegian intelligence reports, Russia has started equipping its submarines with tactical nuclear warheads for the first time since the Cold War. This development, together with the increasing number of military exercises, highlights how the forthcoming opening of the route could intensify tensions in the area, increasing its militarisation.

Although China cannot be compared to Russia in the Arctic, Beijing is exerting more geopolitical sway over the region. The choice to call itself a quasi-Arctic state and Beijing’s ambition to become a Polar Great Power by 2030 underlines China’s strategic approach, which interprets its geographical proximity to the Arctic Circle as an advantage to expand its influence in this area. In line with this vision, China has developed the “Polar Silk Road”, an integral part of the wider Belt and Road Initiative, into its Arctic policy with the intention of consolidating its economic presence and initiating a new phase of international and multilateral cooperation in the region. Additionally, China has been increasing the number of expeditions of scientific vessels to the region – five in summer 2024 alone –, which not only conduct research activities, but allegedly also serve military interests.

Territorial claims and disputes over natural hydrocarbon resources 

Since 2001, Russia has claimed that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev submarine ridges are a natural extension of the Eurasian continent, using geological and geophysical evidence to expand its continental shelf. Despite the disputes on this issue, Russia has continued to uphold its claims through the legal process of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), as established by UNCLOS. However, the CLCS rejected the instance claiming that additional documentation and studies were needed in order to deliberate on the matter. The CLCS’ recognition could potentially set a precedent for other Arctic powers to follow, possibly transforming the geopolitical configuration of the region. Russian aspirations in the region extend beyond energy security, encompassing a broader strategy to control sea routes and emerging energy resources as the ice retreats. Russia sees the Arctic, with its enormous hydrocarbon potential, as one of the most promising future energy centres. This suggests that Russia will continue to maintain a leading role in global energy supply, competing with other energy powers, including ones in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In parallel, China has intensified its cooperation with Russia, viewing Moscow’s isolation as a chance to expand influence in the north. After 2022, Sino-Russian cooperation in the region has increased in the economic, scientific and military spheres. In March 2023, Moscow and Beijing established a joint working group to work on the Northern Sea Route project. Later that year, the two countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to bolster cooperation in maritime law. In May, representatives of the BRICS countries met to formulate a unified Arctic agenda as part of the “Arctic Thinking – Global Thinking” project. In addition, in 2023 the two countries conducted joint military exercises in the Bering Strait. However, Beijing seeks a balance: while avoiding jeopardising relations with Western partners by openly supporting Russia, it also cannot afford to distance itself entirely, risking a stronger Western bloc. This ambivalence complicates predicting China’s actions, but it will likely pursue a middle path, aiming for a mediating role in the region that advances its economic interests without compromising its strategic goals.

Despite Beijing and Moscow’s alignment in the Arctic, the EU should still dedicate some of its diplomatic efforts to avoid escalation and geopolitical instability in the region. China’s declared interest in developing safe Arctic sea routes on face value aligns with the EU goals, creating a potential opportunity for cooperation. First, both players have an interest in keeping the region peaceful as a playground for economic cooperation. Secondly, initiatives such as the Northern Sea Route and the Polar Silk Route, which aims to connect Beijing and Rotterdam via the Arctic, demonstrate strong economic and commercial common interests that will entail the need to safeguard trade flows between Europe and China.

However, there are risks with working with China given Beijing’s own interests and its proximity to Russia. In this respect, the EU can work closely with like-minded partners such as Canada. Having resolved a territorial dispute with Denmark over sovereignty over the island of Hans, EU-Canada cooperation in the Arctic could certainly contribute to de-escalation. A second concern may arise regarding the US’ response to a growing EU-China alignment in the region. Specifically, Washington may employ measures of economic coercion to obstruct this process, as has already been observed in critical technological sectors such as telecommunications (4G and 5G) and semiconductors. In these sectors, the US has imposed restrictions, tariffs and sanctions on Chinese companies to curb China’s technological advancements and to discourage EU countries from aligning more closely with Beijing. However, given the growing tensions between the US and China the EU may seek to reach out to both the US and China to defuse tensions in the Arctic region.

Towards a more credible EU Arctic strategy

So far, this CSDS Policy Brief has outlined the security challenges facing the EU in the Arctic. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has altered the EU’s geopolitical stance, but there is a long way to go before the EU can be called more than a diplomatic actor. So far, the EU has not yet established a specific and coordinated security policy for the Arctic region. The lack of autonomous military capacity has limited the EU’s ability to influence the balance of power in the region. EU interests range from energy security and the protection of trade routes to environmental sustainability and cooperation with local communities. The presence of vast oil and gas reserves and the opening of new sea routes make the Arctic crucial for diversifying European energy supplies, as well as reducing transport times between Europe and Asia. For the Russian economy, which is mainly based on trade in raw materials and hydrocarbons, the supply of Arctic resources is undoubtedly a key element, especially at this time of internal economic instability. However, the EU rightly watches the evolving regional dynamics with concern, as this could mean possible future energy instability for the nations of the Union, especially if bilateral relations with the Kremlin remain frosty.

Russian militarisation and the expansion of military capabilities along the Arctic coast require a calibrated response from the EU. Until now, the EU’s focus on diplomacy and environmental cooperation, while important, has not adequately addressed the growing strategic competition. Should the conflict in Ukraine end in the near future, Sweden and Finland can act as facilitators to integrate an Arctic security dimension into the EU’s approach, while promoting a multilateral dialogue to prevent escalation. The presence of both Sweden and Finland in NATO could result in an increase in the EU’s military presence and legitimacy in the region. The EU’s ability to influence regional stability depends on its success to act as a mediator between the major powers. This posture, given the breakdown in regional cooperation with Russia, it seems not yet willing to take. Ideally, the EU could position itself as an independent actor in the Arctic, capable of promoting international standards for the sustainable management of maritime resources and shipping routes. However, it is impossible not to overlap NATO’s interests with those of the EU given the large number of common members. Thus, excluding this hypothesis, one could reflect on the role the EU could play in defusing tensions between China and the US in the Arctic, along with like-minded partners. We argue that the EU is well-placed to try this, although the approach is not without considerable risks. Such cooperation is unlikely to prevent an alignment between China and Russia on Arctic affairs, but the EU’s and China’s common interests in secure maritime trade routes could lower tensions.

Despite the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU is not a military alliance, but an expression of the cooperation of European nations. This cooperation, however, is limited regarding security. In contrast, security is theoretically guaranteed by NATO, an expression of Western cooperation. However, the US clearly holds a dominant position within the Alliance. This means that although the strategic interests between the EU and NATO in the Arctic may be similar, they are not entirely the same. Nowadays, for example, while war threatens the EU’s borders, Trump’s election in the US highlights an anti-interventionist stance, potentially weakening NATO’s relevance. In this respect, the EU member states should strive to lower their dependency on the US in defence terms. Arctic security exemplifies the EU’s security limitations, risking insufficient competitiveness if NATO deems it non-essential given also the shift of US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific. Without a more assertive posture by the EU in the Arctic, regional security will depend on third-party management, limiting the Union’s independence and bargaining power in political strategies. Weak bargaining ties Europe to the US’ willingness to employ deterrence, which could, however, turn out to be devalued if other states know the US’ posture. A more independent EU defence would better protect EU interests, securing fair Arctic resource access and enhancing mediation through independent deterrence capabilities. It would also help the EU develop its own strategic culture, foster military-technological innovation and boost its autonomy.

The Arctic shows, much like the war in Ukraine, that there is a need for the EU to be able to formulate and pursue its own goals without being overly dependent on Washington. To be clear, the US will remain the EU’s main ally but it should not be overly dependent on Washington, especially given recent signals by the Trump administration on Greenland and the broader Arctic region. A military role for the EU in the Arctic or elsewhere means not only potential active involvement in kinetic action, but also the ability to monitor and protect critical infrastructures and ensure credible deterrence against possible aggression or external interference, and only then, possibly, direct intervention if necessary. In fact, exerting deterrence and pursuing de-escalation in the Arctic could represent a shared goal for the EU and NATO, should the US administration desire this. Either way, European nations must develop independent technological capabilities to secure the EU’s strategic interests in the Arctic region. To this end, the EU should prioritise region-specific surveillance and defence technologies including underwater acoustic monitoring systems and unmanned platforms (USV, UUV, UAV). Such efforts would allow the Europeans to track Russian movements, especially near the Kola Peninsula, while safeguarding EU-funded and co-funded connectivity projects in the Arctic like the North Pole Fiber and Northern EU Gateways among others. Additionally, investment in Arctic-appropriate naval defence systems, such as patrol vessels and icebreakers, would secure trade routes, subsea cables and enhance the EU’s role as a stabilising force.

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