Proven Partners: Towards the Implementation of the Republic of Korea-NATO Tailored Partnership

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 33/2024

By Kim Sung-han and Ramon Pacheco Pardo

19.11.2024

Key issues

• The Republic of Korea (ROK)-NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), signed in July 2023, is a landmark agreement for the two parties, which should be the basis to spearhead practical and mutually beneficial cooperation.
• In order to boost practical cooperation, South Korea and NATO need to commit the necessary resources, boost day-to-day civilian and military ties, develop internal consensus and link bilateral cooperation to broader NATO-Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) links.
• Cyber security, nuclear non-proliferation and defence industry cooperation, in particular, are three areas in which South Korea and NATO can strengthen practical cooperation in relatively short period of time.

Introduction

The ROK and NATO signed a new ITPP on 13 July 2023. The ITPP upgraded the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) that the two sides signed in 2012 – revised but not substantially modified in 2017 and 2019 –, itself the first formal cooperation agreement between the two sides since they became partners in 2006. The ITPP in 2023 marks a significant step forward from the IPCP, reflecting the evolving security landscape and the need for deeper collaboration on both traditional defence and emerging global challenges. It strengthens the partnership between the ROK and NATO by addressing new areas like space, cyber defence, artificial intelligence (AI) and joint operational capabilities, while also enhancing military mobility and political dialogue. In contrast to previous agreements, the ITPP emphasises practical cooperation over dialogue and exchanges, and also casts the ROK in a more active and equal footing to NATO.

The ITPP reflects the burgeoning relationship between NATO and the IP4 partners: Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the ROK. Starting from the London Declaration issued in 2019, NATO has publicly described China as a “challenge”. This characterisation of China became formal policy in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, issued during the organisation’s Madrid Summit. The Strategic Concept also highlighted the “deepening strategic partnership” between China and Russia as a threat to NATO. In other words, from the organisation’s perspective China is a threat in its own right, but also due to its relationship with other countries that NATO leaders perceive to be a challenge. In this respect, the Madrid Summit also witnessed the participation of NATO’s IP4 partners, as has also been the case in subsequent summits. From the organisation’s perspective, the challenge posed by China, Russia and other authoritarian countries can only be met via cooperation with partners. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and – in the eyes of NATO leaders – Beijing’s support for Moscow is the main demonstration of this threat.

On the ROK side, cooperation with NATO has become a top priority for the Yoon Suk-yeol government. The president ordered the opening of a South Korean embassy to NATO shortly after taking office, has attended the three NATO summits to which he has been invited since taking office, prioritised the signing of the bilateral ITPP and has highlighted the importance of ROK-NATO cooperation frequently – including as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy published by Seoul in December 2022. The importance that the Yoon government attaches to ROK-NATO ties reflects the long-standing belief within the country’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other government units, as well as many of the country’s security experts, that this relationship can serve to boost the ROK’s security and defence. In this respect, the MND, in particular, considers NATO a crucial partner to confront the challenges posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and other authoritarian countries.

Securing the implementation of the ROK-NATO ITPP

The level of ambition of the ROK-NATO ITPP and its focus on practical cooperation between the two sides is to be commended. At the same time, this newfound determination to take concrete steps to deepen security and defence ties means that both the ROK and NATO need to commit the necessary resources to demonstrate their commitment. On the NATO side, key relevant units in both the civilian and military structures need to show their commitment to the relationship. In this respect, the regular visits by NATO civilian and military leaders and staff to the ROK should continue. These visits underscore NATO’s commitment to the partnership, particularly at a time when the organisation’s main focus is supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Similarly, visits by NATO member country representatives in their official capacity also help to underline their country’s and the organisation’s commitment to stronger ties with the ROK. In the other direction, visits and dispatches by ROK Armed Forces, MND and MOFA delegations to NATO’s headquarters and other units such as the Supreme Headquarters, Joint Force Command or Maritime Command emphasise South Korea’s commitment to the relationship.

Equally relevant, and eventually arguably more important, will be day-to-day cooperation between military and civilian units on both sides. As a case in point, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and the (South) Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) are rapidly expanding their ties. This will help with real-time data and information sharing, joint cyber deterrence and defence operations or mutual learning, for example. Meanwhile, NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme has been working with South Korean military and civilian counterparts for years as a way to boost joint technological innovation and information exchange. Another instance of day-to-day cooperation is Seoul’s decision to joint NATO’s Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System, used by the organisation’s allies and some partners to share intelligence so as to better coordinate their activities. This type of day-to-day, years-long cooperation offers practical benefits to both Seoul and the Alliance. These are the type of tangible outcomes that will help to make ROK-NATO cooperation endure over time.

Sustainable and long-term implementation of the ITPP agreed by the ROK and NATO also necessitates consensus about its validity and utility in each of the two partners. In the case of the ROK, the Yoon government has upgraded ties with NATO but these ties can be traced back to the liberal Roh Moo-hyun government. Whether more openly or more quietly, successive ROK governments have worked to enhance ties with NATO, although liberal governments tended to focus on diplomacy and multilateralism rather than deepening military ties. This is significant in a country that is often depicted as being bitterly divided between these two political movements. In this respect, the growing consensus among South Korean security and foreign policy elites towards NATO stems from multiple factors. These include the practical benefits that South Korean policymakers and experts perceive from engagement with NATO, the shared perception that the DPRKis a security challenge, the realisation that working with partners is necessary in an era of “polycrises” and the efforts by the United States (US) to bring together its Indo-Pacific and transatlantic partners. In other words, there are multiple factors underpinning ROK-NATO cooperation. Yet, efforts should continue to underscore the importance of this cooperation to Seoul.

In the case of NATO, the shift towards greater cooperation with the ROK and other Indo-Pacific partners seems to have consolidated. After all, the idea that China and its cooperation with Russia are a threat is now part of NATO’s official doctrine. Furthermore, NATO has also routinely emphasised that the DPRK is another threat that it needs to contend with. In short, the idea that NATO has to deal with threats coming from Northeast Asia is now well embedded in the organisation’s doctrine. At the same time, the notion that dealing with these threats requires cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners is also well established. However, countries such as France have called for caution in shifting the organisation’s focus from Russia and the European theatre to the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, it is perhaps necessary to establish what are the goals, tools and limits to NATO’s engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners. In this respect, the ROK and the other members of the IP4 could stress the key areas in which they think NATO can make a difference in their region.

Implementation of the ITPP between the ROK and NATO can also be strengthened by linking it to collective NATO-IP4 cooperation. Japan signed a similarly comprehensive ITPP in July 2023. Likewise, Australia also reached an ITPP of its own that month. New Zealand, meanwhile, signed its own ITPP in July 2024. Even though the detailed content of these ITPPs and South Korea’s ITPP remain unpublished, the publicly available information and conversations with NATO and IP4 country officials indicates that their contents are similar. Therefore, NATO’s ITPPs can serve to develop practical cooperation with IP4 partners. This makes it easy for each of them to individually explain the benefits of deeper ties with NATO to domestic audiences.

Cooperation areas to prioritise

The ROK-NATO ITPP highlights eleven sectors for cooperation between the two sides. They include the following: 1) dialogue and consultation; 2) arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; 3) counterterrorism; 4) cybersecurity; 5) emerging and disruptive technologies; 6) capability development and interoperability; 7) practical cooperation for interoperability; 8) science and technology; 9) women, peace and security; 10) climate change and security; and 11) public diplomacy. This is an ambitious and broad agenda. Thus, it makes sense to initially and especially focus on areas that will bring the most tangible and potentially biggest benefits.

Cybersecurity

In particular, three areas hold the greatest promise for the ROK and NATO to build on their ITPP relatively quickly and in a way that leads to tangible benefits for both sides. To begin with, cybersecurity ought to be a priority area for cooperation. In May 2022, the ROK became NATO’s first Asian partner to formally join the organisation’s CCDCOE. Seoul also participates in the organisation’s Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP). NATO has extensive expertise in areas such as deterrence, intelligence sharing or joint tabletop exercises. The ROK is building up its cyber security capabilities, an area in which it lagged behind other developed countries until recently. Most notably, Seoul’s latest National Cybersecurity Strategy (NIS) – issued in February 2024 – primarily maintains a defensive posture, but it has evolved to include more proactive and offensive elements in response to the growing complexity of cyber threats. The strategy – which incidentally identifies NATO and its member countries as key partners in this area – can serve as an anchor for the ROK’s NIS, MND and other government agencies working in the area of cybersecurity to collaborate with their NATO counterparts. More specifically, forming a NATO-ROK Cybersecurity Working Group would create a formal platform for dialogue, exchange of expertise and cooperation on specific cyber challenges. The group could meet regularly to share intelligence, assess emerging cyber threats and coordinate joint activities. In addition, NATO and the ROK could launch joint research and development (R&D) projects focused on cyber defence technologies, including AI-driven cybersecurity tools, encryption technologies and next-generation intrusion detection systems. By leveraging both NATO’s and the ROK’s strengths in technology development, they can push the frontier of cybersecurity innovation.Increased NATO-ROK cyber security cooperation would not only bolster their collective cyber defences, but also set the stage for stronger global cyber governance,. This can contribute to a more robust, secure and resilient cyberspace.

Nuclear non-proliferation

Another area of cooperation for the ROK and NATO to prioritise is nuclear non-proliferation. This includes deterrence, with Seoul worried about the DPRK’s potential threat to employ nuclear weapons and NATO preoccupied with Russia’s stated threat to use nuclear weapons in its invasion of Ukraine. The ROK and NATO can share information about deterrence doctrines and strategies, including the role of nuclear capabilities as part of them – as per its 2022 Strategic Concept and 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. Furthermore, NATO’s long-standing Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) holds lessons for the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) established in 2023. As the ROK grapples with the nuclear threat posed by Pyongyang, and with some public officials in the country openly discussing whether Seoul should develop nuclear capabilities of its own, the NPG’s role in reassuring non-nuclear allies should inform NCG discussions. In addition, the US-ROK NCG can gain valuable insights from NATO’s NPG on how to manage nuclear deterrence through consultative processes, crisis management, transparency and the integration of multiple deterrence tools. These lessons would help strengthen the credibility of US extended deterrence for the ROK and improve the alliance’s ability to respond to the nuclear threats posed by the DPRK. The US-ROK NCG can also be a platform for NATO members to share insights on nuclear deterrence policies in response to heightened threats from the DPRK and any military support it may receive from Russia. More directly linked to the DPRK’s proliferation activities, ROK-NATO intelligence sharing and NATO member country navies’ support for non-proliferation activities in the waters around the Korean Peninsula can affect the DPRK’s behaviour.

Defence industry

One last area of cooperation that the ROK and NATO should focus on to swiftly move ahead with ITPP implementation is joint defence industry work. This would fall under ITPP priorities such as emerging and disruptive technologies, capability development and science and technology. Bilateral arms sales deals between the ROK, on the one hand, and NATO member countries like Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland or Romania, on the other, provides a strong basis for cooperation in this area – particularly as countries such as Poland or Romania express their interest in co-production. In this respect, ROK-NATO cooperation via NATO SPS holds great promise. As a case in point, the ROK is part of the Detection of Explosives and Firearms to Counter Terrorism (DEXTER) programme – an SPS initiative to detect explosives and firearms in public spaces without disrupting the flow of pedestrians. The ROK’s world-leading investment in R&D and NATO’s growing focus on supporting defence industry innovation among Allies means that cooperation via SPS and other NATO initiatives could scale up rapidly. South Korean weapons systems adhere to NATO standards, which will make it easier to strengthen defence industry ties. The ROK brings innovative, cost-effective technologies and regional expertise, while NATO countries offer advanced systems, global reach and strategic frameworks. By leveraging these complementary strengths, both parties stand to benefit from enhanced security, broader market access and more resilient defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The ITPP agreed by the ROK and NATO in July 2023 is a landmark agreement in that it positions Seoul as an equal partner to the Brussels-based organisation and puts the emphasis on practical cooperation, moving the bilateral relationship beyond dialogue and exchanges. The NATO-ROK ITPP has important strategic implications, strengthening NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing defence capabilities against the DPRK, fostering cybersecurity and hybrid threat cooperation and positioning the ROK as a more prominent global security player. Building on this momentum, the two partners should swiftly move ahead with its implementation to ensure that cooperation continues to move ahead in years to come. In this respect, it is encouraging that the number of mutual visits has increased recently, day-to-day cooperation is becoming more common, there seems to be a consensus about the benefits of cooperation with NATO among South Korean policymakers and ITPPs with all IP4 countries can serve to reinforce one another.

In this context, it is sensible for the ROK and NATO to prioritise some key areas of cooperation in which progress can be made relatively rapidly. This will help to maintain the momentum behind bilateral cooperation, lay out the benefits of working together with each other and ultimately help to make ROK-NATO ties sustainable. Thus, cyber security, nuclear non-proliferation and the defence industry are three areas that Seoul and the Alliance should prioritise and put into concrete actions. The ROK, NATO and several NATO member countries have strengths in all three areas. Therefore, it should be possible to develop a wide range of cooperation activities that will embed bilateral ties in the defence doctrines and strategies of the two sides. This will help to ensure that ROK-NATO ties stand the test of time.

__________