Strategic Stability: Can Europe Stabilise Relations with China After the Xi-Trump Summit?

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 13/2026

By Olivia Cheung

27.5.2026

Key issues

• The Xi-Trump summit signals a shift towards short-term stabilisation in China-US relations, but both sides expected the stabilisation to be fragile, suggesting that the significant uncertainty and rivalry in bilateral relations have not changed.
• Given Trump’s sidelining of Europe’s China-related concerns, Europe should rethink its tactics of talking to China, in the interest of the long-term stabilisation of bilateral relationships.
• Europe’s approach to China needs to be clearly anchored in a European commitment to multilateralism and rules, presented to China in ways that resonate with China’s own policy priorities.

Introduction

The Xi-Trump summit in mid-May in Beijing, the first visit by an American president in nine years, allowed both leaders to claim partial success. Xi Jinping secured Donald Trump’s agreement on “constructive strategic stability” and discussed Taiwan in detail, to which Trump appeared receptive. Trump secured Chinese purchases of American agricultural products and Boeing aircraft, but not a firm commitment on Iran. Trump’s wish list for China reflected his “Making America Great Again” (MAGA) vision: narrow commercial interests were prioritised above all else. Serious concerns about China’s actions were sidelined. These included its island-building activities and coast guard patrols in the South China Sea, the use of grey-zone military intimidation towards Taiwan, material support for Russia, Iran and North Korea to skirt Western sanctions, significant industrial overcapacity, rapid nuclear buildup, overseas espionage and surveillance, domestic repression of political freedoms and rights, etc. This is so even though these remain to be ongoing concerns, of varying intensity, not only for the United States (US), at least according to various official sources, but also for US allies and partners: middle powers that find themselves grappling with some of these issues, not only from the perspective of longer-term strategic calculations, but also in the routine management of their bilateral relationships with China.

Looking back at the recent Xi-Trump summit, and situating it within the overall trajectory of US-China, US-Europe and China-Europe relations under Trump’s second presidency since January 2025, this CSDS Policy Brief argues that Europe needs a clearer anchor to stabilise its own relations with China in the long term. It maintains that such an anchor should be none other than European support for multilateralism and rules. Taking inspiration from China’s own international communication strategy, it further argues that a clear European anchor on multilateralism and rules could potentially provide an opening for Europe to engage with China meaningfully on Europe’s China-related concerns.

Shifts in Chinese and American framings of bilateral relations

The Xi-Trump summit reflects a shift in both Chinese and American framings of bilateral relations. Except on the “red line” on Taiwan, Beijing downplayed earlier demands that the US respects China’s other “red lines”, pertaining to “democracy and human rights”, “China’s path and system” and “China’s development right”. It is not that Beijing has abandoned these concerns, but only that its goal for the summit is narrowed to stabilising relations with Washington in the short term only. It also helps that Trump does not see dealing with China in terms of upholding the rules-based international order, something that Xi likely appreciates.

For Trump, he used the summit to reframe US-China relations as a personal relationship between two strongmen, who share “mutual respect” for each other. He offered China the “help” of American tech firms seeking to earn more profit in China without promising to loosen export controls. He took Xi’s agreement to visit Washington in September as a much-needed stamp of approval at a time when the US is mired in a war with Iran. His willingness to discuss US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi, and to link it with the US’ trade relations with China, could play to China’s advantage, even though China wants to settle the Taiwan issue on its own terms, not through a quid-pro-quo deal with Trump, who Beijing finds unreliable.

The shifts in Chinese and American framings of bilateral relations suggest a strong appetite on both sides to stabilise relations in the short-term, even if this détente is fragile, and could easily be disrupted by deeper or more structural tensions in their relationship, such as some of the issues listed in the introduction.

Implications for Europe

Europe could take advantage of the anticipated stabilisation of China-US relations to pursue more autonomy in managing its complex interdependence with the two powers, especially China, which has displayed greater pragmatism in dealing with Europe than Trump has. A less vicious China-US relations should give Europe more space to put in place policies that could strengthen its economic competitiveness and national security, in ways that make the most sense for Europe, even if it is not in complete alignment with the tempo or focus of the US’ competition against China, which could shift quickly according to Trump’s preference.

Yet, the above benefits of the Xi-Trump summit to Europe are only potential benefits. They are far from a windfall and are contingent on how long China-US relations can be stabilised, and whether Europe can take advantage of the reprieve offered. While Europe may or may not be able to benefit meaningfully from the outcomes of the Xi-Trump summit, one clear takeaway from the summit is that Trump cares little whether the US is onside with Europe in negotiating with China. Trump did not seem to have used this historic opportunity to meet Xi, where the two had nine hours of conversation, to bring up Beijing’s actions that are of concern to Europe, as above, in a serious or meaningful way.

Xi cautioned Trump that not handling the Taiwan issue well could push China-US relations to a very dangerous position. Trump did not seem to have responded with any expectations on Beijing’s conduct on Taiwan in exchange, at least not on the record. Trump’s noticeably de-emphasising of international concerns about China’s behaviour does not help Europe, which sees addressing these issues as necessary for defending their interests and values, security and prosperity.

Europe should talk to China better

The mixed picture presented above points to an obvious conclusion: Europe needs to become stronger so that it can navigate China-US dynamics with greater leverage. While this is already a consensus view among European policymakers, material strengthening takes time and risks being outpaced by rapid geopolitical shifts. This raises the need for complementary, lower-cost and faster tools that Europe might realistically develop to improve its position. One such tool could be developed by harnessing Europe’s support for multilateralism and rules, which could serve as a foundation for finding a common platform with China. Even though there are major differences in how the two sides interpret these concepts, as implied in the earlier list of Europe’s China-related concerns, there could also be scope for convergence if Europe could resonate with China’s policy priorities.

The aim of a communication strategy anchored in multilateralism and rules is to encourage China to see that it is in its own interest to play a positive role in addressing Europe’s China-related concerns. The premise here is that Europe should aim to achieve the longer-term stabilisation of its relationship with China. A related premise is that any stabilisation would be short-term if Europe shelves its concerns on China to avoid offending Beijing, or addresses these concerns mainly unilaterally or with allies, thus leaving China, seen by Europe as the source of the concern, more as a problem to be fixed than as a partner in finding solutions. It is not a matter of avoiding looking weak in front of China, but that it unnecessarily narrows the agenda for meaningful cooperation with China at a time when opportunities exist.

To this end, Europe should recognise the limitations of the liberal international order framing when raising its China-related concerns. In this framing, multilateralism and rules are anchored in the interests and values of Western nations, liberal democracies and advanced economies. It is useful for coordinating with allies and expanding middle power diplomacy, but it can alienate China. It could also inadvertently support the long-standing postcolonial critique of a Western-led international order—that it imposes its interests and values on others as a power move—an argument central to China’s international communication strategy. Rhetoric aside, the reality is that the complexity of Europe’s relationship with China is such that China is not only simultaneously using the EU’s tripartite characterisation, a “partner, competitor and rival”, in discrete policy areas, but could possess all three characteristics in the same policy area. To encourage a constructive Chinese response, Europe could adopt a more inclusive and outcome-oriented language that reframes its China-related concerns as shared challenges with China. The use of an inclusive language does not imply naivety about China’s positions, but it signals that Europe is willing to explore the potential convergence of interests with China. It remains a question of tactics as to when constructive language should be prioritised over, where applicable, calling China out or resorting to coercive toolkits.

The idea sketched in this policy brief takes a page from China’s own playbook. China likes to stress that it is listening to others’ positions (e.g. seen in Beijing’s approach to the US-Israel war on Iran), generally avoids passing judgements (except if the target is “US hegemony” or when China’s direct interests are involved) and avoids a negative characterisation of bilateral relations with any country. Instead, it assigns differentiated categories of “partnerships”, or in lieu of which, a “constructive relationship”, to all. This does not imply that China does not treat other countries as competitors, rivals or other unfriendly categories, but only that it finds a declaratory policy of negative relationship counterproductive. Another nuance to bear in mind is that the above analysis refers to official Beijing categorisations instead of semi-official or non-official Chinese sources, which are often more forthright and at times provocative, compared to official language.

Since Xi embarked on his third term in 2022, China has become noticeably more invested in shaping global governance, loosely defined to include not only agenda-setting or rule-shaping inside the United Nations or other international organisations, but also more broadly in terms of having a clear voice and playing a constructive role in international affairs that have global repercussions. Beijing’s ambition to lead in global governance is in tension with its aversion to taking up an international burden and the preference for non-intervention. This tension provides scope for Europe to reframe, where amenable, (some parts of the selective) issues that it desires constructive Chinese engagement within a framework of global governance anchored in multilateralism and rules, for which China has consistently expressed support. Better still, it could be framed as issues for global governance involving the “Global South”, a term used by China loosely to include the “non-Western” countries in claiming leadership in global governance. If Europe could adopt a more inclusive language to talk to China, and in ways that appeal to China’s interests to work with the Global South to champion multilateralism, it would stand a better chance in engaging with China constructively to address its China-related concerns.

Russia / Ukraine

A concrete illustration can be seen in NATO’s interaction with China over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO has condemned China for not criticising Russia and for providing material support, yet such naming and shaming has had limited, if any, observable effect in distancing China from Russia. A more pragmatic approach would shift the emphasis away from China’s complicity in Russia’s war efforts, especially given that the complicity charge could be levied to varying degrees across many “Global South” countries, towards a wider discussion, open to other “Global South” countries to participate, about the interests and concerns of non-European countries in the Ukraine War.

Such framing would allow NATO to acknowledge more clearly that China has not supported Russia more strongly than it could have done, and that its interests in the war are not identical to Russia’s. This would resonate with Beijing’s own political signalling to NATO, which seeks to balance a “no limits” partnership with Russia with claims of “principled neutrality”. It could provide political space for NATO to engage with China constructively to address the secondary effects of the war, which has broader international significance, as China’s own Global Security Initiative, introduced months after the war started, acknowledges.

Iran

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, linked to the US-Israel war against Iran, provides a different illustration. European leaders have already engaged China through bilateral phone calls and expressed hope that Beijing would use its influence over Iran to help ease the situation. So far, however, European goodwill has not resulted in China pulling its weight to resolve the conflict as much as they hope to see. To move forward, Europe could broaden its approach by engaging not only China but also other middle powers and Global South countries on shared concerns about energy flows and supply chain stability. Framing the issue in terms of global governance would make cooperation more attractive to China, as it would not be seen as doing US allies a favour but as acting in line with its own stated ambitions to contribute to international stability.

Taiwan

The Taiwan case is the most sensitive and complex in terms of how Europe can adopt a constructive language towards China. Europe is not a direct strategic rival of China in this issue, but it has clear interests in preserving stability and in supporting Taiwan as a democratic partner. Europe faces a choice between acting as a stakeholder in cross-straits stability and aligning more closely with the deterrence dynamics shaped by US-China rivalry. For nearly a decade, as China’s grey-zone military intimidation towards Taiwan increases, Europe’s role has largely conflated deterring unification and preserving cross-straits stability.

A more pragmatic approach would be to clarify that Europe’s primary concern is cross-straits stability, more so than involvement in deterrence dynamics shaped by US-China rivalry. Europe could engage China on the Taiwan issue by clearly expressing goodwill towards continued dialogues between the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s largest opposition party, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as the meeting between Xi and KMT leader Cheng Li-wun in April, and the hope that it could be broadened into an inclusive conversation involving all of Taiwan society, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the ruling party that was democratically elected in Taiwan to serve a third consecutive presidential term, in the interest of cross-straits stability.

Since eliminating the DPP seems to be a part of Beijing’s unification strategy, Beijing would likely view the suggestion for direct dialogue with the DPP, without the DPP making major changes in their positions vis-à-vis China, with scepticism. The reality is that if China does not aim to unify Taiwan in the near-term, there is no urgency for having dialogue with all of Taiwan’s political stakeholders. Nonetheless, the aim of suggesting an inclusive dialogue – and to explore political means in making it possible – is to signal to Beijing that Europe’s approach to Taiwan is consistent with its support for multilateralism and rules applied to all international sovereignty disputes, including those in the South China Sea, where the goal of deterring grey-zone military intimidation is not to thwart China’s sovereignty claims, but to maintain international stability.

China’s industrial overcapacity

When it comes to China’s industrial overcapacity, which is Europe’s other prominent China-related concern, a more inclusive language towards China could start with clear European recognition that industrial overcapacity is a major domestic concern for China. This is reflected in the Chinese government’s efforts to curb “involution”, or excessive competition leading to destructive price-cutting, prompting Chinese companies to prioritise cost reduction over technological innovation in strategic sectors such as electric vehicles and solar energy. Europe could offer to explore with China whether there is scope for synergy not only with Beijing, but also Chinese provincial governments, in tackling “involution”, which could, in turn, contribute to addressing China’s industrial overcapacity in Europe.

Conclusion

The Xi-Trump meeting may provide a window for the short-term stabilisation of China-US relations, but it also underlines that Europe cannot rely on US backing in addressing its China-related concerns. These mixed signals suggest potential opportunities for Europe but also highlight its geopolitical vulnerability. To improve its precarious position, Europe could experiment with lower-cost approaches to stabilise its relations with China over the longer term. This is to be done not by shelving its China-related concerns or addressing them mainly with allies and partners, but by exploring constructive engagement with China on these issues, through adopting more inclusive and outcome-focused language clearly anchored in Europe’s support for multilateralism and rules. This framing is intended to appeal to China’s professed commitment to multilateralism and rules, its interests in international stability, its geopolitical pivot towards the Global South and its claim of leadership in global governance. Such an approach will not result in China meeting Europe’s most direct demands, for example, to make Putin pay a price for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Its goal is more modest: to encourage China to play a constructive role in addressing Europe’s China-related concerns. Even if that role is more peripheral to the heart of these concerns, it would nonetheless represent a step forward in addressing them and could contribute to the stabilisation of Europe’s relations with China in the longer term.

The ideas floated in this policy brief are inspired by China’s own international communication practices and would require significant refinement prior to implementation. In particular, the details need to be worked out both at a general level and on a case-by-case basis to determine when a more constructive language towards China should be prioritised, whether different European countries or institutions could use different approaches in simultaneous, multi-pronged or sequential communication with China, how these communication strategies might join up with Europe’s engagement with different countries that self-identify as the “Global South”, etc. Europe and China’s mutual interest in a more stable relationship, and China’s eagerness to project itself as a positive force in juxtaposition to Trump’s volatility, could provide favourable conditions for Europe to begin testing this communication strategy.

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