NATO Plus: From Partnerships to a Cross-Theatre Security Ecosystem

CSDS POLICY BRIEF • 14/2026

By Kohei Nakamura and Luis Simón

11.6.2026

Key issues

• NATO’s partnerships have expanded significantly over the past three decades, but many remain fragmented, under-utilised and insufficiently adapted to the demands of contemporary strategic competition.
• As military effectiveness and deterrence increasingly depend on industrial depth, defence innovation, resilience and technological standards, artificial intelligence or cyber warfare capabilities, NATO and the IP4 are gradually forming a cross-theatre security ecosystem that existing partnership mechanisms are not fully equipped to support.
• NATO should leverage its standards architecture, institutional infrastructure and extensive network of partnerships to develop a more structured “NATO Plus” framework capable of generating greater strategic coordination, common standards and practical cooperation while preserving the Alliance’s core role as a Euro-Atlantic collective defence organisation.

 

Introduction

NATO’s partnerships have become one of the Alliance’s principal instruments of engagement beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Over the past three decades, NATO has developed an extensive network of partnerships across Europe, the Mediterranean, the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific. Most recently, cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea (the IP4) has expanded significantly in response to intensifying strategic competition and technological change.

Yet, while NATO’s strategic environment has evolved rapidly, its partnership architecture has remained largely unchanged. Existing partnerships have facilitated dialogue and selected forms of practical cooperation, but they continue to operate primarily in a dispersed fashion. As a result, partnerships often exist alongside one another rather than as part of a coherent strategic framework. Despite growing political attention, many remain underdeveloped instruments that generate limited practical outcomes and strategic effect.

This gap is becoming increasingly problematic. The domains that underpin deterrence and defence – industrial capacity, defence innovation, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, strategic communications and space – are inherently transnational. Addressing them effectively requires not only stronger cooperation between NATO and individual partners, but also greater coordination among NATO’s closest partners themselves. Yet, existing partnership arrangements were not designed for this purpose.

The challenge is not to expand NATO’s geographic scope or alter its core mission as a Euro-Atlantic collective defence alliance. Rather, it is to ensure that NATO’s partnerships are leveraged strategically and adapted to the realities of great-power competition and technological change. NATO does not need more partnerships; it needs a more coherent framework through which existing partnerships can generate cooperation, common standards and strategic effect.

This CSDS Policy Brief argues that NATO should move from managing a collection of partnerships to cultivating a cross-theatre security ecosystem. Building on the Alliance’s existing partnership architecture, a “NATO Plus” framework could provide the institutional mechanism through which NATO and its closest partners coordinate cooperation in areas that increasingly shape military effectiveness and deterrence, while preserving NATO’s primary role as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security.

The building blocks of a cross-theatre security ecosystem

The foundations of a more integrated security ecosystem are already emerging. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cooperation between NATO and the IP4 has expanded significantly, moving beyond political dialogue towards practical collaboration in domains that increasingly shape deterrence and defence.

The political foundations of this cooperation are now well established. The participation of the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea at successive NATO summits since Madrid in 2022 reflects growing strategic convergence between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres. What began as political dialogue has evolved into practical cooperation across multiple domains. While NATO remains focused on the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, cooperation with the IP4 has become an increasingly important component of its broader approach to security. The most significant developments have occurred in functional areas where cooperation can generate tangible strategic benefits.

Cyber cooperation provides one of the most mature examples. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn has become a key platform for engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. Japanese personnel have been seconded to the Centre since 2019 and have participated in its flagship Locked Shields exercise. Regular NATO-IP4 consultations and initiatives such as the Cyber Champions Summit have further deepened cooperation in an area where common standards, procedures and practices are increasingly important.

Similar trends can be observed across the wider IP4. South Korea has emerged as an important partner in defence industrial cooperation, while Australia has deepened collaboration with NATO in areas ranging from resilience and emerging technologies to support for Ukraine. Together, these developments demonstrate that the emerging ecosystem extends beyond any single partner.

Cooperation in emerging technologies is an important element of the NATO-IP4 agenda. AI, autonomous systems, quantum technologies and other dual-use innovations are becoming increasingly central to military effectiveness. NATO and the IP4 have consequently identified innovation and AI as priority areas for cooperation. The growing involvement of private-sector actors and start-ups further reinforces the need for mechanisms that facilitate coordination across national and regional boundaries.

The space domain illustrates a similar dynamic. Space assets underpin military communications, intelligence gathering, navigation and targeting. Cooperation between NATO and the IP4 has increasingly focused on opportunities for collaboration, including engagement with commercial space actors. Here too, geography presents fewer obstacles than in traditional military cooperation.

Beyond technology, NATO and the IP4 have expanded cooperation in strategic communications, resilience and countering disinformation. As hybrid threats become more prominent, the ability to exchange information, share best practices and coordinate responses has become increasingly important. Initiatives such as the Japan-NATO Strategic Communications Conference demonstrate how cooperation is extending into domains that contribute directly to deterrence and societal resilience.

Perhaps the most consequential area of cooperation concerns defence industrial capacity. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of production capacity, supply chains and industrial resilience in sustaining deterrence and military operations. NATO members and Indo-Pacific partners face similar challenges in rebuilding industrial capacity and adapting to heightened demand for advanced military capabilities. Recent NATO-Japan and NATO-South Korea defence industry dialogues, alongside broader discussions involving the IP4, reflect growing recognition that defence industrial cooperation, standardisation and interoperability will become increasingly important components of future security cooperation.

Defence industrial cooperation also illustrates why a more integrated framework is needed. The war in Ukraine has exposed structural challenges affecting both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including limited production capacity, fragile supply chains, dependence on critical minerals and the need to accelerate defence innovation. Increasingly, the ability of democracies to generate military power depends not only on national defence industries, but also on access to wider industrial and technological ecosystems. South Korea’s growing role in supplying defence equipment to European countries demonstrates how defence production is becoming increasingly cross-theatre. These challenges are difficult to address through isolated bilateral partnerships alone, creating a strong rationale for more systematic coordination among NATO and its closest partners.

Taken together, these developments point towards the emergence of a cross-theatre security ecosystem. Cooperation increasingly encompasses the technologies, standards, industrial capabilities and networks that underpin military power. The challenge now is to ensure that these initiatives evolve as part of a coherent strategic framework rather than remaining a collection of disconnected activities.

The case for “NATO Plus” cooperation

The growing scope of NATO-IP4 cooperation raises a fundamental question: if cooperation in areas such as defence industry, innovation, space, strategic communications and cyber is already expanding, why is a new framework needed? The answer is that cooperation remains fragmented. While NATO has developed an extensive network of partnerships over the past three decades, these relationships continue to operate in a dispersed fashion. NATO engages with individual partners or small groupings on specific issues, while many interactions among partners themselves take place through separate regional or issue-specific arrangements. As a result, cooperation often develops in parallel rather than as part of a coherent strategic framework.

This model has served NATO well in an era where partnerships primarily facilitated political dialogue and selective operational cooperation. However, the requirements of contemporary strategic competition are different. Increasingly, military effectiveness depends not only on platforms and force structures, but also on common standards, technological ecosystems, resilient supply chains, industrial capacity and the ability to rapidly integrate innovation into defence planning. These challenges are difficult to address through isolated partnerships alone. A more integrated approach could also generate benefits in terms of efficiency, scale and speed of delivery by reducing duplication, simplifying production and fostering more interoperable defence ecosystems across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

The objective should not be to create new alliances or expand NATO’s collective-defence commitments beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Nor should it encourage NATO or its partners to divert attention from their primary regional responsibilities. European allies will remain focused on the Euro-Atlantic theatre, just as Indo-Pacific partners will remain focused on their own region. The purpose of a NATO Plus framework is not to expand operational commitments across theatres, but to strengthen cooperation upstream in areas such as standards, innovation, resilience, industrial capacity and technology that reinforce deterrence in each partner’s home region.

A useful analogy can be found in the OECD. The organisation does not replace national economic policies, nor does it constitute an economic bloc. Instead, it provides a standing framework through which advanced economies develop common approaches, coordinate policies, establish standards and facilitate practical cooperation on shared challenges. Security and defence increasingly require a similar mechanism. Much as the OECD performs these functions in the economic domain, a NATO Plus framework could help coordinate policy, standards and cooperation in areas such as defence industry, emerging technologies, AI, cyber security and resilience. While military alliances remain regional by nature, many of the industrial networks, technologies and resilience challenges that underpin military power are global.

NATO is uniquely positioned to serve as the nucleus of such an ecosystem. Unlike most international organisations, NATO combines political consultation with practical mechanisms for implementation. It possesses an extensive standards architecture, longstanding expertise in interoperability, permanent political structures, military command arrangements, specialised agencies, Centres of Excellence and established relationships with governments, armed forces, industry and research communities.

This comparative advantage is particularly relevant in domains such as industrial cooperation, defence innovation, AI, cyber security and resilience. These areas require more than political declarations; they require common standards, technical expertise and sustained institutional engagement. NATO already possesses much of this infrastructure. The challenge is to make it more accessible and strategically relevant to the Alliance’s closest partners.

A more integrated ecosystem would also help address a growing strategic asymmetry. While cooperation among authoritarian powers is becoming increasingly coordinated across regions and domains, cooperation among like-minded countries remains divided across multiple institutions and frameworks. In the Indo-Pacific, initiatives such as the Quad, AUKUS and other minilateral arrangements are developing their own approaches to technology, resilience and defence cooperation. Without stronger mechanisms for coordination, there is a risk that like-minded countries will develop parallel initiatives, duplicate efforts or establish competing standards.

This risk is not merely theoretical. As Indo-Pacific countries deepen cooperation through arrangements such as the Quad, AUKUS and GCAP, there is a growing possibility that parallel institutional frameworks will emerge outside NATO. While such initiatives can be complementary, they could also contribute to fragmentation if they evolve separately. A NATO Plus framework would help ensure that cooperation among like-minded countries develops through interoperable standards, shared practices and sustained coordination rather than through disconnected institutional tracks.

Building a cross-theatre security ecosystem centred initially on NATO and the IP4 would help mitigate this risk. The IP4 provide a natural starting point. They are longstanding allies of the United States (US), technologically advanced economies and have already institutionalised cooperation with NATO at an unprecedented level. Over time, however, a successful framework could facilitate deeper cooperation with other highly capable partners that share an interest in resilience, innovation, industrial cooperation and technological standards.

A NATO Plus framework would not replace existing partnerships, regional initiatives or alliances. Nor would it seek to develop joint operational planning or collective-defence arrangements beyond NATO’s existing mandate. Rather, it would provide a mechanism for linking partners more effectively upstream, in areas where cooperation on standards, resilience, innovation, defence industry and technology can strengthen deterrence within their respective regions. In practice, this could involve deeper cooperation on technological standards, greater participation in Centres of Excellence and exercises, more structured defence-industrial dialogue, enhanced collaboration on resilience and strategic communications and stronger coordination among innovation ecosystems.

In short, the question is not whether NATO should become a global alliance. It should not. The question is whether NATO’s partnerships should remain a loose constellation of bilateral relationships, or evolve into a more integrated ecosystem capable of generating practical cooperation and strategic coordination across the domains that increasingly shape deterrence and defence.

Updating NATO’s partnership architecture

If NATO’s partnerships are to evolve from a collection of separate relationships into a more integrated security ecosystem, the objective should not be to create a new alliance or duplicate existing institutions. Rather, NATO should generate greater strategic effect from existing partnerships by providing a more structured framework for cooperation in areas that increasingly underpin deterrence and defence.

A practical starting point would be to deepen cooperation between NATO and the IP4. The participation of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in successive NATO summits since 2022 has created an unprecedented degree of political engagement. The next step is to translate this convergence into more systematic forms of cooperation. Rather than treating partnerships primarily as vehicles for consultation, NATO should increasingly view them as instruments for capability development, resilience and technological collaboration.

Several initiatives could help advance this objective.

First, NATO should expand opportunities for partner participation in Centres of Excellence, exercises and specialised working groups. Existing initiatives such as the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and the Locked Shields exercise demonstrate the value of standing mechanisms through which allies and partners can jointly develop expertise, test concepts and share best practices. Similar approaches could be extended to resilience, emerging technologies, strategic communications and defence innovation.

Second, NATO and the IP4 should pursue greater coordination on standards and interoperability. As AI, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities and space assets become increasingly important to military effectiveness, ensuring interoperability among like-minded countries will become a growing strategic imperative. NATO’s standards architecture could provide an important foundation for this effort.

Third, cooperation on defence industrial issues should be institutionalised. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners face similar challenges in rebuilding industrial capacity, securing access to critical technologies, strengthening supply chain resilience and fostering defence innovation ecosystems. Existing mechanisms such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), in which Japan already participates, provide a useful foundation. More structured dialogue could help identify opportunities for cooperation, reduce duplication and promote greater compatibility between industrial and technological ecosystems.

Fourth, NATO should strengthen mechanisms for cooperation on resilience and hybrid threats. Disinformation, cyberattacks, economic coercion and threats to critical infrastructure increasingly affect countries across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. Closer cooperation would allow allies and partners to exchange lessons learned, develop common approaches and improve preparedness.

Finally, NATO should consider establishing a more structured NATO Plus framework for coordinating cooperation with its closest partners. One option could be a standing NATO Plus Council, initially bringing together NATO Allies and the IP4 while remaining open to the gradual inclusion of other highly capable partners. Modelled in part on the NATO-Ukraine Council, it could provide a permanent mechanism for consultation and cooperation on defence industry, technological standards, emerging technologies, cyber security and resilience. Such a framework would not alter NATO’s core mission as a collective-defence alliance or extend Article 5 commitments beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO’s existing partnership architecture provides a strong foundation upon which to build. The challenge is to ensure that these partnerships are organised and leveraged in ways that reflect contemporary strategic realities. Success will depend not only on the strength of alliances, but also on the ability of like-minded countries to cooperate effectively across regions, domains and technological ecosystems.

Conclusion

The debate over NATO’s partnerships is often framed in geographic terms: whether the Alliance should devote greater attention to the Indo-Pacific or remain focused on the Euro-Atlantic area. This is the wrong question. NATO’s primary responsibility will remain the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic region. Yet the technologies, industrial networks and resilience challenges that increasingly underpin deterrence and defence are no longer confined to a single theatre.

The challenge for NATO is therefore not to become a global alliance, but to ensure that its partnerships evolve alongside the strategic environment. Over the past decade, NATO and the IP4 have already laid many of the foundations for deeper cooperation in cyber security, emerging technologies, resilience, strategic communications, space and defence industry. The next step is to connect these initiatives within a more coherent framework capable of generating strategic effect.

Moving from a collection of partnerships to a cross-theatre security ecosystem would not alter NATO’s core mission. Rather, it would help ensure that the Alliance’s partnerships remain relevant, practical and strategically consequential. In an era where strategic competition increasingly unfolds across technologies, supply chains, industrial ecosystems and information networks, the effectiveness of NATO’s partnerships will depend less on their number than on their ability to generate cooperation, common standards and strategic effect. The challenge is no longer to build partnerships; it is to organise them.

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